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This thesis presented ten experiments investigating the role of working memory and 
long-term memory in forming, storing and using representations of what is known (i.e., 
common ground) among people engaged in communication. Chapter 1 provided a general 
review of common ground and perspective-taking effects in referential communication. 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined how memory loads and memory capacities constrain adults and 
children’s ability to use a speaker’s perspective in language comprehension. Experiment 1 
employed eye-tracking with adult participants, and indicated dissociable roles of working 
memory and long-term in perspective encoding and perspective integration. Experiments 2-3 
observed an age-related improvement in the use of perspective information in language 
comprehension between 8- and 10-year-olds. Chapters 5 and 6 explored whether effects of 
common ground could be achieved via a low-level memory-based mechanism reviewed in 
Chapter 4, without necessarily going though explicit inferences about perspectives. 
Experiments 4-7 tested whether partner-specific effects could be achieved via memory 
associations between conversational partners and referents. Experiments 8-10 explored 
whether an object being in common ground or privileged ground during a preceding 
discourse would influence people’s memory for this object. Finally, Chapter 7 provided a 
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1.1. Overview  
Human beings are social. We navigate our social lives largely through communication. 
At home, we communicate with family members to show how much we love and care about 
them. At a party, we communicate with friends or strangers to show friendliness and interest. 
In a seminar, we communicate with other attendees to share our knowledge and 
understanding of the topic. In business, we communicate with clients to tailor our services 
and products for their needs. In politics, we communicate with voters to win over their vote. 
These examples can go on for pages, as we communicate with different people, in different 
ways, under different situations, driven by different motivations to achieve different goals in 
everyday life.  
Communication is an action jointly achieved by both the speakers and the listeners. 
Grice (1957), a well-known philosopher of language, has pointed out that successful 
communication does not merely involve encoding and decoding of information, but also 
dependent on the ability of making pragmatic inferences based on communication partners’ 
intentions and knowledge. Grice (1975) has proposed the Cooperative Principle, which 
suggests that partners in conversation should act cooperatively in order to convey and 
understand the meaning of their utterances, and to achieve particular communicative goals. 
According to this principle, conversational participants ‘expect each other to make a 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange’ (Grice, 1975, p. 45).  
Following the line of Grice’s arguments, Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981) have 
proposed the concept of ‘common ground’, which refers to the mutually shared information 
between the speakers and listeners. Clark and his colleagues have argued that speakers and 
listeners should work within their common ground in order to achieve successful 
communication (e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).The 
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concept of ‘common ground’ is not uncommon in our everyday communication. As 
experienced communicators, we need to be aware of whom we are speaking to and what we 
share in common with them, in order to tailor our speech and interpretation accordingly. For 
example, when we are talking to colleagues, we tend to use technical terms to show 
professionalism; when we are talking to a layman, however, we try to avoid jargons. Much 
work has been conducted in recent decades by psycholinguistics, social psychologists, 
cognitive psychologists and developmental psychologists, in an attempt to address some 
essential questions about common ground. For example, researchers have been exploring 
when and how conversational partners make appropriate inference about common ground 
between themselves, and when and how relevant common ground information is used to 
guide their communication. 
One important line of research in this area, which is the focus of this thesis, examines 
the role of memory in the inference and use of common ground during communication. 
Memory has a key role in many aspects of the processes by which common ground guides 
our communication. For example, during communication we encode in memory our 
conversational partner’s names, voices, physical features, occupations, what they tell us, and 
what we have in common with them, whether intentionally or unintentionally. We also 
retrieve the previously encoded information of such kind from our memory, and integrate it 
with the messages that we are delivering or receiving. The aim of this thesis is to examine the 
memory processes involved in inferring, retaining and using common ground information 
during communication.  
This chapter offers a brief overview outlining the historical and current debates 
surrounding when and how people infer and use common ground information to guide 
communication. Much of the debates is informed by the literature on theory of mind and 
perspective taking. This chapter also provides a rationale for examining the relationship 
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between people’s ability to infer and use common ground information and the underlying 
memory processes within the context of referential communication. Importantly, the 
overview here is not meant to be an exhaustive or comprehensive literature review of the 
research on common ground in communication. Instead, it is mainly to introduce readers with 
the research context in which this thesis is based. Please note that 1) Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
each contains an introduction section which reviews literature relevant to that chapter; 2) 
Chapter 4 has been written as an introductory chapter to Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 4, 
relevant research on the low-level memory-based mechanism of common ground has been 
reviewed, and the rationale for the research questions of Chapters 5 and 6 has been set up.   
1.2. Common ground and perspective taking in referential 
communication 
According to the classic view proposed by Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981), common 
ground can be established on three bases: physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence and 
community membership. In other words, mutual knowledge between conversational partners 
can be obtained through shared physical environment, shared past / present conversations and 
shared sociocultural background between speakers and listeners. It is worth noting that these 
three types of co-presence are heuristics, which communicators draw upon to assess whether 
one piece of information is in the common ground. This account does not provide an 
operational definition of common ground, though.  
In order to form the assumptions of common ground for communication to work 
successfully, speakers and listeners need to appreciate the perspective of another person. 
People bring their own, usually unique, perspectives into communication, such as different 
beliefs, desires, intentions, knowledge and experience. In our everyday life, people’s differing 
perspectives usually influence the manner and content they communicate with each other. 
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Perspective-taking ability, as an essential ability in human social cognition, is involved 
substantially in the representations of common ground. Previous research has examined 
perspective taking along two dimensions. One is visual perspective taking. This concerns 
how people take into account another individual’s visual point of view when it differs from 
one’s own, and how this perspective difference influences what people see and talk about 
(e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000). The other dimension is 
mental perspective taking, which concerns how people reaches the understanding that other 
individuals’ behaviours are guided by their own distinct mental states, such as their beliefs, 
desires or intentions (e.g., Ferguson, Apperly, Ahmad, Bindemann, & Cane, 2015).  
A large number of studies examining when and how people attend and use 
conversational common ground in communication has been conducted within the context of 
perspective taking in referential communication. These studies examine how speakers took 
their listeners’ perspectives into account and adapted their way of referring to a specific item 
or a piece of information accordingly (e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Horton, 2007; Nadig & 
Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Wardlow, 2013). These studies also examined how 
listeners took their speakers’ perspectives into account and adjusted their interpretation of the 
speakers’ referring expressions accordingly (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Brown-Schmidt, 
2009a, 2009b; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 
2003; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Nilsen & Graham, 2009).  
The representations of common ground play an essential role in shaping the production 
and comprehension of referring expressions. For example, one interesting phenomenon is that 
when one person has previously established a referring term for a specific item with a 
conversational partner, both people tend to use the same term repeatedly to refer to the same 
object. They also tend to expect each other to use the same term. This phenomenon is termed 
as ‘lexical entrainment’ (e.g., Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod & Anderson, 1987), which will 
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be further explained in details in section 4.3 in the thesis. This phenomenon exemplifies how 
people use mutual knowledge and experience to tailor their way of referring to items. To give 
another example, if people refer to an item whose name (a novel meaningless label) has been 
previously learnt together with their conversational partner, they tend to use the name itself to 
refer to the item. In contrast, if  people refer to an item whose name is not shared with their 
conversational partner, they tend to include detailed descriptions to help their conversational 
partner identify the item (e.g., Heller, Gorman, & Tanenhaus, 2012). Another example is that 
when people hear an instruction ‘pick up the glass’ from a speaker, they tend to choose the 
glass which is visible to the speaker even if there are two glasses from their own point of 
view. However, when both glasses are visible to themselves as well as the speaker, people 
tend to ask for further clarification (e.g., Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). These examples 
demonstrate that people use common ground information to shape how they produce and 
interpret referring expressions in communication.  
There is little doubt that common ground information modifies the language that we 
produce and shapes how we comprehend the speech of others. What remains unclear, 
however, is when and how people make use of common ground information during 
communication. The following two sections in this chapter will review relevant literature on 
when and how people access common ground in communication respectively. Please note 
that the accounts regarding the time course of common ground effects in communication also 
provide explanations of the underlying mechanism of how common ground affects language 
use. The reason why I group the theories into two separate sections regarding when and how 
people access common ground is to highlight the two specific focuses of the intensive debates 
surrounding the use of common ground in the existing literature.  
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1.3. Different accounts of when people access common ground in 
communication 
There has been an intensive debate on the time course by which common ground 
information is incorporated in language use during communication. The invention and 
increasing use of eye-tracking devices allow researchers to monitor participants’ eye 
movements during moment-by-moment language processing. Much research has been carried 
out by adapting the visual world paradigm (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & 
Sedivy, 1995). The visual world paradigm has been mostly used to study people’s online 
language comprehension. In a typical visual world experiment on language comprehension, 
participants are presented with dynamic visual scenes as the verbal messages unfold, and 
participants’ moment-by-moment eye movements are recorded and analysed to reveal the 
online time course of their language processing. For example, Altmann and Kamide (1999) 
presented participants with a visual display showing a boy, a cake and some other non-edible 
objects. Participants was presented with either the sentence ‘they boy will move the cake’ or 
‘the boy will eat the cake’. They found that participants were quicker to launch a fixation on 
the cake in the display when the word ‘eat’ was spoken compared to when the word ‘move’ 
was spoken. Furthermore, in the ‘eat’ word condition, participants fixed on the cake before 
the word ‘cake’ was mentioned. However, in the ‘move’ word condition, participants fixed 
on the cake after the word ‘cake’ was heard. This pioneering study demonstrated that 
participants were able to integrate the linguistic information with the visual display to 
identify the domain of reference.   
The eye-tracking visual world paradigm provides rich continuous data without intruding 
into participants’ performance. Several types of measures are available for analysis. For 
example, researchers can compute the total dwell time or the number of fixations on certain 
objects or locations in the visual display during a fixed window of time. They can compare 
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the likelihood of participants’ look at the target object and that of competitor objects, and 
observe how this likelihood changes over time. They can also calculate the amount of time it 
takes for participants to launch their first fixations or final fixations on certain objects or 
locations. With this visual world paradigm, researchers have provided some empirical 
evidence for accounts regarding the time course of the effect of common ground in language 
use. Four different accounts are outlined in the following sections.  
1.3.1. Reference diary account 
Clark and Marshall (1978) propose that people use Reference Diaries, i.e., an updated 
record of partner-specific knowledge, to help them keep track of common ground. People 
consult their partner-related reference diaries to determine whether a piece of information is 
shared or privileged, and whether the information can be used for guiding communicational 
references. According to this theory, the representations of common ground are rich, diary-
like and episodic. People search in their memory for an episodic event which evidences 
physical, linguistic and/or cultural co-presence. More importantly, the reference diary 
account suggests that ‘we must search in every case for an event (of co-presence)’ (Clark & 
Marshall, 1978, p. 63). This implies that common ground acts fully as the domain of 
interpretation, and that it serves as an immediate constraint upon language production and 
comprehension. The reference diary account provides an analogy between how people 
assume common ground and how people consult a reference diary. However, it is unclear 
how exactly this reference diary functions.  
1.3.2. Perspective adjustment model 
A series of studies conducted by Keysar and his colleagues (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000; 
Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998; Keysar et al., 2003) provide compelling evidence against 
the reference diary theory. These studies employed a communication task (i.e. the director 
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task) to examine perspective-taking performance in the context of referential communication. 
In a typical director task, participants were asked to follow a director’s instructions to move 
the referred objects around a grid. Some objects were visible to participants and the director, 
thus in the common ground, while some other objects were occluded from the director’s 
perspective, thus in participants’ privileged ground. Participants had to rule out the distractors 
in the privileged ground, which competed against the targets as potential referents, and move 
the target referents in the common ground instead. However, findings revealed that 
participants occasionally processed director’s instruction using their privileged knowledge, 
incorrectly moving the item that was invisible to the director. Eye-tracking results further 
indicated that participants frequently looked at the distractor in their privileged ground before 
they moved the target object in the common ground. Such egocentric bias was found at the 
earliest moments of language processing.  
Based on these findings, Keysar and colleagues propose the perspective adjustment 
model (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Keysar et al., 1998). According to this model, two processes 
operate sequentially during language comprehension. At the initial stage, people interpret 
another person’s utterances without taking common ground into consideration. This initial 
process is relatively efficient and effortless, and it is followed by a relatively slow and 
effortful adjustment process that is sensitive to common ground information. Based on the 
perspective adjustment account, common ground only act as a second-stage filter which 
detects and corrects any egocentric and faulty interpretations established in the initial stage, 
rather than acting as an immediate constraint on language processing. Consequentially, if 
people fail to use common ground information to adjust the initial egocentric interpretation, 
communication will suffer from egocentric errors. Epley, Keysar, Van Boven and Gilovich's 
(2004) study also provided supporting evidence for the perspective adjustment model. This 
study found that it took participants a longer time to recognise a different perspective from 
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another individual than a similar perspective. It was also observed that participants’ degrees 
of egocentrism increased under time pressure, and decreased with motivation or rewards for 
accuracy. This implies that it took efforts for participants to adjust an initially established 
egocentric interpretation. According to Epley et al. (2004), these findings suggest that people 
initially anchor their interpretation of utterances from a speaker on their own perspective, 
before using information about the speaker’s perspective to account for differences between 
themselves and others and to incrementally adjust away from the anchor.  
1.3.3. Constraint-based model  
Some studies, however, suggest that people are not always initially egocentric. For 
instance, Hanna, Tanenhaus, and Trueswell (2003) found that although listeners failed to 
completely ignore the interference of privilege ground, common ground still had an 
immediate effect on reference resolution. The first Experiment in Hanna et al. (2003) 
employed a referential communication task similar to the director task in Keysar et al.’s study 
(2000, 2003). Participants were asked to follow a director’s instructions (e.g. ‘Put the blue 
triangle on the red one’). The target object was the intended referent which was visible to the 
director (e.g., the red triangle in the common ground), while the competitor was the object 
which shared the same features with the target but was invisible to the director (e.g., the red 
triangle in the privileged ground). Although participants could not fully ignore the competitor 
in the privileged ground which also matched the director’s description, they still showed 
preferential looking at targets over competitors from the earliest stage of reference resolution.   
Based on the results above, Hanna et al. (2003) have proposed that common ground 
could be regarded as a probabilistic constraint within the framework of a constraint-based 
model (e.g., MacDonald, 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). Therefore, different types of 
information, including not only common ground information, but also other factors (e.g., 
phonological information, semantic information and previous discourse), can all act as 
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probabilistic constraints and can be tracked in parallel. People integrate information from 
different sources to generate a most plausible interpretation. Whether a certain piece of 
information succeeds in the competition with others is dependent on its salience and strength 
in a specific context. This account implies that the effect of common ground information 
varies with its salience and strength. For example, if the likelihood for an item to be 
mentioned by a conversational partner seems quite irrelevant to whether the item belongs to 
common ground, then the common ground information is not a very salient and consistent 
constraint. In this case, listeners might not exhibit strong effects of common ground when 
they communicate with the speaker. The constraint-based model, therefore, is partially 
consistent with the perspective adjustment model, in that common ground does not 
completely constrain the domain of interpretation for referring expressions. However, it 
argues against the perspective adjustment model’s idea that common ground is fully ignored 
in the earliest moments of language processing and that it can only affect later adjustment.  
A growing body of research supports the constraint-based model by providing evidence 
that common ground partially modulates the initial stage of language processing (e.g., 
Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2009a, 2012; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & 
Tanenhaus, 2008; Heller et al., 2008). For example, Heller et al. (2008) used a variation of 
the director task with a group of four items the display. Two factors were manipulated in their 
study. First, the group contained either one pair of objects with contrasting sizes (e.g., small 
duck, big duck, box, and soap) or two pairs (e.g., small duck, big duck, small box and big 
box). Secondly, the soap in the ‘one contrast’ condition and the small box in the ‘two 
contrast’ condition were either visible or occluded from the speaker’s perspective, while all 
other three objects were visible to the speaker. Participants heard instructions such as ‘pick 
up the big duck’. This study found that participants were quicker to disambiguate the referent 
in the ‘one contrast’ condition than the ‘two contrasts’ condition, which demonstrated that 
 12 
participants expected the referent to be from a pair of items with contrasting sizes when 
hearing the scalar adjective (e.g., ‘big’). More importantly, in the ‘two contrasts’ condition, 
participants showed an earlier disambiguation of referent when the second pair of contrasts 
contained an object which was occluded from the speaker’s perspective, in contrast to when 
all two pairs were visually shared. Heller et al. (2008) concluded that participants were able 
to use perspective information from the early moments of language processing.  
1.3.4. Anticipation-integration account 
Barr (2008) employed a variant of the director task, where instructions contained 
temporary referential ambiguity. Among the four objects displayed on the grid, two objects 
were phonological competitors (e.g., a bucket and a buckle) which made the target of the 
speaker’s referring expression temporarily ambiguous until they heard the last part of the 
object name (e.g., ‘et’ or ‘le’). Compared to when neither of the two objects were occluded 
from the speaker’s perspective, participants were more likely to fixate on the object in the 
common ground upon hearing the first part of the instruction (e.g., ‘click on the’) when one 
of these two objects was occluded from the speaker’s point of view. However, participants 
were equally likely to fixate on the object in the privileged ground and the object in the 
common ground when hearing the first part of the object name ‘buck’. Such dissociation in 
the effects of common ground in different phases demonstrated that although participants did 
anticipate speakers to refer to an object from common ground, they were unable to reduce the 
egocentric interference in a later phase when they needed to integrate linguistic input with the 
perspective information. 
Based on these findings, Barr (2008) has proposed the anticipation-integration account. 
According to this account, people may have an early anticipation for common ground 
information prior to the point when they need to integrate perspective information with 
linguistic inputs. Nonetheless, the later integration process still suffers from the autonomous 
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activation of egocentric knowledge, despite participants’ explicit awareness of the need to 
take another person’s perspective into account. Therefore, the mechanism underlying 
perspective taking not only involves the process of using common ground information, but 
also involves ignoring the autonomously activated egocentric interference during the 
integration phase. Unlike from the perspective adjustment model, this account suggests that 
listeners do not strategically or adaptively ‘anchor’ on their own egocentric perspective. 
Instead, the anchoring effect is imposed upon them by a relatively low-level autonomous 
activation of privileged knowledge, which reflects human’s processing limitations.  
1.4. Different mechanisms of how people access common ground 
in communication 
1.4.1. Literature on theory of mind 
The accounts of common ground often assume that people rely on the theory of mind 
ability to infer another person’s perspective. Theory of mind (which is also termed as 
mentalising, mindreading, or folk psychology) is the ability to understand and reason about 
other people’s mental states such as their beliefs, desires and intentions (Astington & Gopnik, 
1991; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). Theory of mind is believed to play an essential role in the cognitive processes of 
communication. For example, Grice (1957, 1975) has argued that human communication 
features the importance of making pragmatic inferences about each other’s intentions. 
Building upon Grice’s view, Sperber and Wilson (1986, 2002)  have proposed that a 
specialised ‘theory of mind module’ or a ‘dedicated inferential mechanism’ is involved in the 
interpretation processes of communication. This theory of mind module provides 
mindreading inferences, which help listeners to generate the most relevant interpretation and 
also help speakers to produce the most appropriate utterances.  
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Early and traditional research on theory of mind has focused on the question of when 
young children start to gain such theory of mind abilities by passing the classic false belief 
tasks (e.g., Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Perner et al., 1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A 
meta-analysis study suggests that children develop the necessary ‘theory of mind’ concepts to 
be able to successfully infer other people’s mental states between the age of 2 to 7 years old, 
and mostly begin to pass the classic false belief tasks between 3 to 5 years old (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Recent years have seen an increase in the number of studies on 
older children and adults who have grasped the basic ‘theory of mind’ concepts, as well as 
younger infants whose cognitive abilities and social experience are very limited. Surprisingly, 
some studies have found that older children and adults, who have presumably obtained the 
basic understanding of mental states, still experience difficulty in using theory of mind ability 
to accommodate another’s perspective which is different from their own (e.g., Apperly et al., 
2010; Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003). On the other 
hand, some studies have also showed that when being examined by indirect measures such as 
looking time instead of being asked to provide explicit verbal responses, even infants seem to 
be sensitive to other people’s mental states (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007).  
To reconcile these seemingly conflicting evidence, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) have 
proposed that there are two distinct systems of theory of mind. One system involves explicit 
inference of others’ mental states. This system allows the theory of mind reasoning to be 
flexible and accurate, but this flexible reasoning process is limited by its heavy demands on 
general processing resources, such as language, memory capacity and inhibitory control. This 
idea of a controlled but effortful theory of mind system is consistent with the finding that 
even adults might experience difficulty in using theory of mind to accommodate another 
person’s differing perspective, especially when their general processing resources were 
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occupied by other cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., Lin et al., 2010). It is also consistent 
with the finding that children between 3-5 year olds started to pass the verbal false-belief 
tasks as their language and executive functions develop (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; 
Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Wellman et al., 2001). The other system, in contrast, 
allows the theory of mind reasoning to be relatively automatic, efficient and effortless, so that 
one can make quick inference about another’s mental states in order to go through moment-
by-moment social interaction smoothly. However, this system is inflexible and may not be 
accurate on complex social occasions. According to Apperly and Butterfill (2009), the non-
verbal studies on infants, which showed that infant participants’ eye movements were 
sensitive to another’s beliefs (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), provided supporting 
evidence for such an implicit theory of mind system.  
1.4.2. Dual-mechanism account of common ground 
The idea of a dual-system model is not uncommon in the research field of social 
cognition (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999, for a review on the dual-process models of social 
information processing). Evidence from some cognitive areas such as number cognition 
(Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004) also support the notion of a dual-process model. The 
dual-system models proposed by different researchers typically share one feature: one system 
is a relatively high-level domain-specific system which operates under deliberate control and 
relies on executive resources, whereas the other is a relatively low-level domain-general 
system which operates without conscious control and is relatively automatic, efficient and 
effortless (e.g., Kahneman, 2011).  
Similarly, such a dual-mechanism system may both exist in the process of using 
common ground information during communication. There may be a high-level mechanism, 
which allows people access common ground information by inferring other people’s mental 
states in a controlled and effortful way. There may also be a low-level mechanism, which 
 16 
enables the use of common ground in communication to be achieved through domain-general 
processes, in an automatic and effortless way, without any necessity to go through explicit 
mentalising. In the following two sections, I will explain how each of these two mechanisms 
may operate to help people access common ground information during communication. I will 
also discuss the contribution of memory to each mechanism.  
1.4.3. High-level mechanism: explicit mentalising 
In some circumstances, a high-level controlled and effortful mechanism may underlie 
the processes of using common ground during communication. Specifically, people may get 
access to common ground information by making deliberate inference about another 
conversational partner’s perspective, and then use the relevant common ground information 
to guide communication. People do explicitly judge another conversational partner’s 
perspective in some social situations. For example, when your girlfriend is clearly angry at 
you, but only says ‘nothing’ when you ask her what has happened; or when your supervisor 
hesitates for a while and then says ‘interesting’ after you propose a research idea to him at the 
supervision meeting. If you encounter these social situations for the first time, you will need 
to explicitly draw evidence from different sources, to make efforts to figure out what the 
other person is actually thinking about, and to interpret their messages (‘nothing’ or 
‘interesting’) accordingly. The previously-mentioned ‘director task’ (e.g., Apperly et al., 
2010; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003) also introduces such a complex social situation in which a 
director’s perspective differs from participants’ own. Participants are explicitly required to 
make inference about the director’s limited perspective and then use inferred perspective 
information to identify the target referent. If participants do not accommodate the director’s 
perspective, they will exhibit misinterpretation of their partner’s messages. 
As mentioned earlier, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) has argued that individuals‘ explicit 
mindreading abilities are limited by their executive functions resources, one key component 
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of which is working memory. Several studies have also been done to examine how working 
memory capacity and working memory load affect people’s ability to infer and use common 
ground in communication, but the results seem rather mixed. Some studies found that 
individuals’ working memory capacities affected their perspective-taking performance in 
communication (e.g., Lin et al., 2010; Wardlow, 2013); whereas other studies failed to 
observe any effect of working memory capacities on perspective taking (Cane, Ferguson, & 
Apperly, 2016; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). The mixed results of these studies will be explained 
in details in the introduction section of Chapters 2 and 3. Experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 
employed an adapted version of the director task to unpack the following three questions. 
Firstly, apart from working memory, how might long-term memory contribute to inferring 
and using common ground information in communication? Secondly, what memory factors 
embedded in everyday communication might influence people’s ability to take another 
person’s perspective and to use this perspective information in referential communication? 
Thirdly, how might different memory processes contribute to children’s age-related 
improvement in perspective taking during communication?  
1.4.4. Low-level mechanism: submentalising  
As explained in the previous section, certain circumstances might require one to 
explicitly make pragmatic inference about another conversational partner’s mental states. 
However, people cannot fully reply on the deliberate consideration about others’ mental 
states to navigate everyday social situations, as this deliberate mentalising process is usually 
achieved with a cost of speed and efficiency (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Rather, a lot of 
communicative situations require one to be quick and efficient enough to go through 
moment-by-moment social interaction with other people. Is it possible for people to 
successfully access information mutually shared with other people during communication 
without explicitly reasoning about their mental states? 
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Heyes (2014) is the first to have proposed the concept of ‘submentalising’. According to 
Heyes (2014), the notion of submentalising is different from the notion of implicit 
mentalising. Implicit mentalising, as a type of mentalising, requires people to interpret 
another’s behaviours by thinking about their mental states in an efficient and effortless way, 
instead of a slow and effortful way. Submentalising, in contrast, is a domain-general 
cognitive process which does not involve representing other people’s mental states but can 
simulate the effects of mentalising in social contexts. Heyes (2014) argued that many 
empirical evidence of efficient and spontaneous perspective taking which was assumed to be 
due to implicit mentalising, could instead be explained by domain-general cognitive 
mechanisms via the route of submentalising, such as involuntary attentional orienting and 
spatial coding. In the thesis, however, I do not intend to take stance in this debate, but rather 
to use this ‘submentalising’ concept to illustrate how people may rely on domain-general 
cognitive mechanisms to produce social behaviours which may look as if they were carried 
out by taking into account a conversational partner’s mental states. 
Although the term ‘submentalising’ only appears in literature recently, the idea that 
some social effects may be achieved via basic low-level cognitive mechanisms is not unusual. 
In the literature on common ground, Horton and Gerrig (2005a, 2005b) have proposed an 
influential account that common ground can be achieved via a low-level memory-based 
mechanism. This memory-based mechanism puts an emphasis on the contribution of domain-
general memory encoding and retrieval processes to the use of common ground information 
during communication. It is proposed that people do not only encode the content of a 
conversation in their memory, but also encode the contextual information associated with the 
content, for example, the person with whom they have the conversation. These partner-
specific associations are stored in episodic memory traces and can be automatically activated 
by salient memory cues related to the specific conversational partners (e.g., their physical 
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presence or voices) in working memory, enabling people to retrieve and use common ground 
representations in an implicit, fast and effortless way. Many instances of partner-specific 
effect, which may look as if they occurred on the basis of people’s deliberate consideration of 
common ground, can instead be explained by such a relatively spontaneous, efficient and 
effortless domain-general memory process. More information about this low-level memory-
based mechanism of common ground and its supporting evidence have been reviewed with 
details in Chapter 4, which serves as an introductory chapter to Chapters 5 and 6. 
Experiments in Chapters 5 and 6 aimed to provide evidence in support of such a low-level 
memory-based mechanism underlying common ground representations.  
In summary, I am proposing a dual-system account about how people access common 
ground in communication. Under the high-level controlled and effortful mechanism, people 
make inference about common ground via ‘explicit mentalising’. This high-level mechanism 
depends heavily upon people’s cognitive resources, e.g., working memory and inhibition 
control. In contrast, the low-level mechanism suggests that the use of common ground can 
often be achieved via ‘submentalising’. An important instance of such a submentalising 
mechanism is the low-level memory-based mechanism of common ground proposed by 
Horton and Gerrig (2005a, 2005b), advocating that domain-general memory processes can 
help people achieve the effects of common ground in communication without any necessity 
to go through explicit mentalising. 
1.5. The memory processes in discourse comprehension 
The main purpose of the present study is to examine the memory processes involved in 
encoding, retaining and using common ground information in communication. This thesis is 
particularly interested in how might memory load and memory capacity constrain people’s 
ability to infer and use common ground, and how might domain-general memory processes 
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support the inference and use of common ground information during communication. In this 
section, I will review some theories on the memory processes involved in discourse 
comprehension, which might cast light on the questions that this thesis aims to address.  
According to a review on discourse comprehension (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997), 
traditional models usually hold the view that there are three memory stores employed in 
discourse comprehension, namely, short-term memory, working memory and long-term 
memory. Short-term memory usually focuses the most recent clause being read. Working 
memory actively holds and processes approximately the recent two sentences in mind. The 
information actively rehearsed and encoded in working memory will later be stored in long-
term memory.  
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) have proposed a concept of ‘long-term working memory’, 
which is an extended working memory mechanism that allows relevant information in long-
term memory to be quickly and reliably retrieved through retrieval cues in the traditional 
working memory system. As suggested by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995), the mental 
representations of a situation described by one or two sentences being read are actively held 
in the focus of attention, and thus in working memory. Once people start a new sentence, the 
representations of the previously read sentences will be dropped from the focus of attention 
into long-term memory. Some elements of the actively maintained information in working 
memory may be associated with certain previously encoded information in long-term 
memory, and these elements may act as memory retrieval cues to help the relevant 
information in long-term memory to be efficiently retrieved. This process creates the 
mechanism of long-term working memory. 
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1.6. Summary 
This general introduction to the thesis has outlined several different accounts of when 
and how people access common ground information in communication, and has reviewed 
relevant literature which suggests that memory may act as an important factor underlying the 
representations of common ground during communication. This thesis presents a series of 
empirical studies, which have employed both behavioural and eye-tracking methodologies, to 
investigate the memory processes involved in encoding, retaining and using common ground 
information shared between conversational participants during referential communication. 
The thesis focuses on two main questions. The first part of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 2 
and 3, examines how memory load and memory capacities constrain both adults’ and 
children’s abilities to take into account common ground information in language 
comprehension. The second part of the thesis, including Chapters 4, 5 and 6, explores 
whether common ground effects could be achieved via the low-level memory-based 
mechanism proposed by Horton and Gerrig (2005a, 2005b), without necessarily going 
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Imagine that you and your Thai friend go to a nice Thai restaurant and sit down at a 
table. You start to read the menu but find out the menu is completely written in Thai which 
you have no knowledge about, and there is no picture on the menu to help you order. 
Suddenly a waiter passes your table, holding a plate of food that looks very appetizing and 
smells like heaven. Your and your partner’s attention is attracted by that plate of food. After 
the food has been served, you ask your partner, ‘I wonder what that is?’ You partner does not 
seem to be surprised by your question, and does not ask what exactly you are talking about, 
but rather tells you the name of the dish that just passed by. Although in principle your 
utterance of ‘that’ is entirely ambiguous, and although the dish that you are referring to is no 
longer visible to both you and your partner, your partner still successfully interprets your 
question in the context of the common ground information that has been briefly seen by both 
of you and thus shared between you. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, much work on common ground has used communication 
games, in which participants follow or issue instructions to an interlocutor whose perspective 
differs from their own. For example, in the ‘director task’ (Keysar et al., 2000) participants 
were asked to move objects around a grid by a ‘director’ whose position meant he only saw 
some of the objects. Objects occluded from the director’s point of view remained visible in 
participants’ privileged ground; other objects were visible to both the director and 
participants, and thus in their common ground. Critical instructions required participants to 
select a matching referent from the common ground while ignoring a matching object in the 
privileged ground. Perhaps the most striking observation from such studies is that adult 
participants, who clearly understand the need to take the director’s perspective into account, 
often fail to do so (Abu-Akel, Wood, Hansen, & Apperly, 2015; Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar 
et al., 2000, 2003).  
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It seems plausible that taking account of a speaker’s perspective and using this 
information to rule out distracting alternative objects for their referring expressions may 
depend upon a participant’s capacities for memory and for inhibitory control. However, 
efforts to test these hypotheses have been met with mixed results. Lin et al. (2010) used a 
dual task to manipulate the concurrent memory load while participants undertook a version of 
the director task. These authors also measured participants’ working memory capacity using 
an Operation Span Task (OSPAN task, La Pointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989), 
which was believed to measure the ability to maintain multiple items in memory while 
performing distracting tasks (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). Participants under 
high working memory load, and participants with low working memory capacity, showed 
longer decision times for selecting a referent that was compatible with the director’s 
perspective. Brown-Schmidt (2009b) found evidence that individual differences in inhibitory 
control were related to participants’ ability to ignore a privileged ground distractor during a 
director task with temporary referential ambiguity. Wardlow (2013) found that individual 
differences in both working memory and inhibitory control were related to a speaker’s ability 
to produce utterances adapted to the perspective of their addressee. Nilsen and Graham 
(2009) found convergent evidence for the role of inhibitory control in children’s successful 
accommodation of a director’s perspective, but no role for working memory. Using a variant 
of the director task, Ryskin, Benjamin, Tullis, and Brown-Schmidt (2015) found no 
relationship between memory or inhibition and participant’s successful use of the director’s 
perspective during language comprehension, but a positive relationship between participants’ 
performance on the working memory task (OSPAN task) and their perspective-taking during 
production. Cane et al. (2016) used a director task very similar to that used by Lin et al., 
(2010), but failed to find an effect of individual differences in working memory on listeners’ 
ability to accommodate the director’s perspective. 
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Three limitations of existing studies may help explain these inconsistencies, and more 
importantly, cast new light on the processes involved in the management of common ground, 
and how they can be studied experimentally. Firstly, in most existing studies it is not clear 
how much information participants must actually infer about the director’s perspective, or for 
how long the information must be stored. These tasks typically present participants with a 
grid in which multiple objects appear in common and privileged ground, followed by a series 
of instructions referring to items in the grid. One option available to participants is to first 
identify which items the director can see and remember these as the common ground to 
which she may refer. However, a second option for participants is to process the director’s 
perspective online during comprehension of her instruction; an option made plausible by 
evidence that simple visual perspectives can be calculated rapidly and relatively 
automatically (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, 
& Bodley Scott, 2010). In this case, the demands on memory for tracking the director’s 
perspective would be greatly reduced. It is currently unclear which of these options 
participants pursue, or whether the option pursued varies between individuals or changes 
across different task variants. In the present study we limited participants’ options by 
removing cues to the director’s perspective after participants’ initial period of viewing the 
grid, thereby ensuring that they had to infer and store information about the common ground 
before the need to use this information in language comprehension. 
A second limitation of existing work is the number of objects in the common ground 
(and thus the potential memory load) has varied across studies. Some studies used either 2 x 2 
grids with 1 object per slot (Nadig & Sedivy, 2002), or 3 x 3 grids with 1 object in each of the 
4 corners of the grid (Nilsen & Graham, 2009). One out of the four objects was usually 
blocked off and thus in the privileged ground; the other three objects were in the common 
ground. Most other studies used 4 x 4 grids where 5 out of 16 slots were usually blocked off 
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as privileged ground and the remaining 11 slots were in the common ground. Seven or eight 
objects in total were usually presented in these 4 x 4 grids, and some slots in both the 
common and privileged ground contained no object (Apperly et al., 2010; Cane et al., 2016; 
Keysar et al., 2000, 2003). The number of items in the common ground has obvious face 
validity as a variable that will also be relevant in naturalistic communication, and its variation 
between existing studies may account for some variation in participants’ performance and for 
variation in the role of working memory. The present study will be the first to systematically 
vary this factor within a single study. 
A third limitation is that by focusing exclusively on working memory, as opposed to 
longer term retention, existing studies may be missing critical demands both in the task and in 
the management of common ground in everyday communication. Working memory concerns 
the active manipulation and integration of information over short periods of time and with a 
storage capacity limit of just a small number of items (Baddeley, 1986, 2003; Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974). While it seems plausible that working memory may be important for integrating 
common ground information with the speaker’s current utterance, it is much less clear that 
working memory would be the main resource for retaining common ground information over 
an extended discourse. As a point of comparison, text comprehension is generally thought to 
depend on the use of working memory to integrate information from the small tract of text 
currently in focus with information from paragraphs or pages earlier, with the latter being 
stored and retrieved from longer-term memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Graesser et al., 
1997). The present study overcomes this limitation by examining effects of common ground 
size both during the period when participants must infer and encode this information and in 
the period when they must integrate it with the director’s instructions. Apart from 
experimentally manipulating the potential memory load of the task, we also measured 
participants’ working memory capacities using the Operation Span Task (Turner & Engle, 
 27 
1989), and examined whether effects of common ground size in either time period were 
related to participants’ working memory capacities.  
The present study 
Since our novel design ensured that participants had to process the director’s perspective 
and then hold in memory which objects were in the common ground, we expected to 
maximise our chances of observing memory effects that have been inconsistently reported in 
previous studies. Firstly, we expected that when participants had to integrate common ground 
information with the director’s instruction, participants with higher working memory capacity 
would be less ‘egocentric’ than those with lower working memory capacity. Please note that 
being ‘egocentric’ in the director task means that participants would show faster and more 
accurate responses on experimental trials where it was necessary to integrate common ground 
information, compared with control trials where this integration was unnecessary. Secondly, 
we also expected that when there were more items in the common ground, participants would 
need to devote more resources to inferring and encoding common ground information when 
they first viewed the grid, and would be slower and more error prone when they had to 
integrate common ground information with the director’s instruction. Critically, interactions 
between effects of working memory capacity and common ground size would be informative 
about whether these factors were related. We were particularly interested in whether the 
degree to which participants with higher versus lower working memory capacities differ in 
egocentric tendencies during the integration phase would be greater when common ground 
was larger.  
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2.2. Method 
2.2.1.  Participants 
Thirty-seven native English speakers (15 males, mean age 22.51, range from 19 to 38) 
from the University of Birmingham participated in our experiment for a small honorarium. 
One additional participant’s data were lost due to technical problems, thus not included in the 
analysis. Another additional participant was excluded prior to the analysis because of the 
failure to perform significantly above floor (i.e., failing to respond correctly on more than 3 
out of the 16 experimental trials), as it was unclear whether the low accuracy was due to 
extreme egocentrism, memory failure, or the difficulty in understanding the instructions at the 
first place.  
2.2.2. Apparatus 
A variant of the director task was presented to participants on a computer screen using 
the Experiment Builder software (SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). We 
recorded participants’ eye movements with an Eyelink 1000 using the tower configuration 
(SR Research), recording at 1000Hz.  All participants’ eye movements were tracked through 
their left eyes, and their head was kept still with the help of a chin rest and forehead rest. 
Stimuli were presented on a 24-inch computer screen approximately 60 cm away from 
participants. Participants’ fixations were calibrated via a standard 13-point calibration process 
before each block. A drift correction (central fixation check on the screen) was also carried 
out prior to each trial. The grid-images subtended 26.93° (width) by 20.15° (height). We 
drew interest areas around each slot on the grid, which subtended 3.25° (width) by 3.15° 
(height). The OPSAN task was run by E-prime 2 software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) on an ASUS 14-inch laptop. 
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2.2.3. Design and procedure 
Referential communication task—perspective-taking 
A 2x4 within-participant design was constructed with condition (experimental, control) 
and the magnitude of common ground (3, 5, 7 or 9 objects) as the two factors.  
Each trial consisted of an image of a 4 x 4 grid with 12 objects on it. A female avatar 
was standing behind the grid. Of the 12 objects on the grid, 3, 5, 7, or 9 objects were visible 
to both the participants and the female director, and were thus in their common ground. Other 
objects (correspondingly 9, 7, 5 or 3 in quantity) were occluded from the female director’s 
perspective by green squared backgrounds, and were thus in the participants’ privileged 
ground.  
In the instruction phase, participants were informed that the director could not see and 
could not know about the objects in the blocked slots, therefore would not ask them to move 
any of those objects. Participants were not only informed of the perspective difference 
between themselves and the female director, they were also given an example demonstrating 
how this perspective difference could constrain the director’s reference. A previous study 
found that by giving such comprehensive instructions, adults’ proportion egocentric errors 
were decreased dramatically from 42.2% to 3% (Wang, Cane, Ferguson, Frisson, & Apperly, 
submitted). An image showing how the grid appeared from the director’s point of view was 
also given to the participants. 
A total of 32 grid-images were presented in the test phase. Upon presentation of the grid 
image, participants had 5000ms to view the image and remember what objects the director 
does and does not know about. After 5000ms, all 16 slots were occluded by a green 
background, leaving no visual cues to indicate the perspective difference between the 
participants and the director. After the occlusion of all slots, the verbal instructions began. 
Each grid-image consisted of 3-5 instructions including one critical instruction, and the 
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position of the critical instruction varied in each trial with the caveat of never being the last 
instruction of the trial. A 500ms pause was presented after each instruction. The structure of 
the filler instructions was either ‘nudge the [scalar/normal adjective] [noun] one slot 
[directional word]’ or ‘nudge the [noun] one slot [directional word]’; whereas the structure of 
the critical instructions was always ‘nudge the [scalar adjective] [noun] one slot [directional 
word]’ (e.g., nudge the small ball one slot up). Directional words included ‘left’ ‘right’ ‘up’ 
and ‘down’. Participants were told that the directional words ‘left’ and ‘right’ referred to their 
own left and right sides. For critical instructions, only ‘up’ and ‘down’ directional words 
were used.  
Sixteen grid-images were used for the experimental condition and the control condition 
respectively. In the experimental condition, the object which best-fitted a critical instruction 
from the participants’ point of view was always in the participants’ privileged ground, thus 
making it a ‘distractor’ against the target referent. Participants had to adopt the director’s 
perspective in order to successfully select the target in the common ground. For example, as 
displayed in Figure 2.1, when the director asked for the ‘large balloon’, the item she referred 
to was the yellow balloon as it was the larger one of the two balloons visible to her. However, 
the balloon which best-fitted the director’s instruction from the participants’ perspective was 
the pink balloon. A control trial used an identical grid-image as its corresponding 
experimental trial, except that the distractor was replaced by an irrelevant object which did 
not compete with the target referent as a potential referent. Therefore, in the control 
condition, the employment of the director’s perspective was not a prerequisite for correctly 
selecting the target referent. For example, the pink balloon presented in the experimental 
condition was replaced by a broccoli in the control condition, which did not compete with the 
correct referent—the yellow balloon.   
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Participants were instructed to perform a ‘drag and drop’ movement on their selected 
object using a computer mouse, but consistent with Apperly et al. (2010), the objects did not 
in fact move on the grid. They were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. A timeout would occur after 4000ms from the onset of the adjective (or noun for 
phrases without adjectives), which led to the next instruction or the next grid-image. 
Accuracy and response time were recorded. 
Thirty-two grid-images were grouped into 4 blocks, and each block had 8 grid-images 
which contained both the experimental and control conditions. Participants were allowed to 
take breaks between blocks. A grid-image in the control condition was presented at least 8 
grid-images apart from its corresponding grid-image in the experimental condition. A 
practice block containing 2 additional grid images was presented to the participants prior to 
the 4 test blocks. We created four versions of the experiment by rotating the order of the test 
blocks.  
Upon completion of the director task, participants were asked verbally with three task-
related questions: 1. whether they used any strategy to help them do the task and how it 
helped them; 2 whether they were able to anticipate some of the instructions; 3. what they 
thought the purpose of the study was. Then participants participated in the OSPAN task.  
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Figure 2.1. Example images for the experimental condition and the control condition of the 
director task. 
OSPAN task--Working memory capacity 
The present study measured participants’ working memory capacity using the OSPAN 
task (La Pointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989). The task began with the level of two 
equation-word pairs, and the level gradually increased from two to five equation-word pairs 
as the task progressed. Firstly, a mathematical equation (in the form of a division operation 
followed by an addition operation e.g., (6 / 3) + 4 = 7)) appeared at the centre of the screen, 
and it could be either a correct or incorrect equation. Participants were asked to verify the 
equation as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing buttons labelled ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on 
the keyboard for correct and incorrect equations, respectively. Then a word appeared at the 
centre of the screen, which participants were asked to read out loud. All words were 
monosyllabic concrete nouns with high frequency. The next equation-word pair was then 
presented in the same fashion till the last pair. Finally, in the word recall phase, participants 
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were instructed to recall all the words they had just read out loud in the present trial and type 
them in the correct order using a keyboard. This was considered as a complete trial of the 
OSPAN task. The OSPAN task consisted of 4 levels ascending from two to five equation-
word pairs, and each level consisted of 3 trails. A total number of 12 trials were presented in 
the same order to each participant.  
The word recall for a trial was considered ‘perfect’ when all of the words presented in 
that trial were recalled correctly in the correct order. An individual’s working memory 
capacity was calculated by summing the number of words in all perfectly recalled trials. If a 
trial was not perfectly recalled either because of the wrongly recalled words or the wrongly 
recalled order, then this trial would not contribute any score to this individual’s final working 
memory capacity score. The range of working memory capacity scores could be from 0 to 42, 
and higher scores would indicate higher working memory capacities. 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. OSPAN task--Working memory capacity 
Participants’ working memory capacity scores ranged from 6 (14.3% recall accuracy) to 
42 (100% recall accuracy), M = 26.03, SD = 8.89. Higher scores indicate higher working 
memory capacities (WMC). We were interested in assessing whether participants’ 
performance in the director task varied as a function of their working memory capacity, or as 
a function of interaction between working memory capacity and other independent variables.  
2.3.2. Director task--perspective-taking performance 
Results from the behavioural data and the eye movement data are reported separately in 
this section. Only data from critical trials were entered into any of the following analyses. 
Participants’ referent selection was marked as the time point when participants first pressed 
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the left button of the computer mouse to select the object after hearing the critical adjective 
(e.g., ‘big’). Response to a critical trial was considered as correct if participants selected the 
target object in the common ground. An egocentric error referred to the selection of the 
distractor object in participants’ privileged ground. A non-egocentric error referred to the 
selection of objects or spaces other than the distractor and the target. Participants committed 
non-egocentric errors on 4.8% of the experimental condition trials, and 3.9% of the control 
condition trials; response timeouts occurred on 12.5% of the experimental trials, and 10.4% 
of the control trials. As the causes of the non-egocentric errors were difficult to interpret and 
were not the central interest of the current study, the non-egocentric errors were excluded 
prior to the analyses. Critical trials with response timeouts were also excluded prior to the 
analyses.  
2.3.2.1. Behavioural response 
Egocentric error 
In the control condition, participants made 0% egocentric errors overall. In the 
experimental condition, individual participants ranged from committing 0% to 100% 
egocentric errors in a given magnitude condition and from 0% to 67% egocentric errors 
overall. We also found a large numeric difference in the percentage of trials with percentage 
egocentric errors across different magnitude conditions: when there were 3 objects in the 
common ground, participants made an egocentric error on 14.6% of the experimental trials; 
when there were 5 objects in the common ground, participants made an egocentric error on 
22.9% of the experimental trials; when there were 7 objects in the common ground, 
participants made an egocentric error on 27.7% of the experimental trials; when there were 9 
objects in the common ground, participants made an egocentric error on 31.1% of the 
experimental trials. 
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To assess whether the possibility of making an egocentric error varied according to the 
magnitude of common ground and also working memory capacity, we fitted a generalised 
linear mixed model with the distribution specified as binomial. Due to participants' floor 
performance in proportion egocentric errors in the control condition, we conducted the 
following analyses on trials with experimental condition only. The dependent variable was 
binary, i.e., whether the participant made an egocentric error or not. Matthews, Butcher, 
Lieven, & Tomasello (2012), a study which examined the effect of object array size and other 
independent variables on the complexity of sentences children produced in a communication 
task, used the forward selection procedure to ‘explore theoretically motivated models by 
starting with a simple model with all fixed and random effects, adding two-way interactions 
in their possible combinations and checking for improvement in fit.’ Following the forward 
selection procedure used by Matthews et al. (2012), we also started with a simple model with 
only the fixed effects of the Magnitude of Common Ground and Working Memory Capacity 
(both were entered as continuous variables) and the random effect of Subject (n=37) on 
intercept 1 . We then added the interaction between these two factors and checked for 
improvement in model fit. There was no significant improvement but a significant reduction 
of the goodness-of-fit when we added the two-way interaction of Magnitude x WMC into the 
model, compared to the model that contained fixed effects of Magnitude and WMC but no 
interaction, X2 (1) = 28.944, p < .001. Therefore, the interaction of Magnitude x WMC was 
not included in the final model.  
                  
 
1 The random intercept of Subject was included in the simple model, as Twisk (2006) states 
that ‘the inclusion of a random intercept is a conceptual necessity for a repeated measures 
design’ (p93). The addition of a random slope of Subject indexed by Magnitude did not lead 
to the improvement in fit for either of the dependent measure, ps>0.3. Therefore, only 
random effect of Subject on intercept, but not random slope of Subject indexed by 
Magnitude, was included into the mixed model for each dependent measure.  
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In Table 2.1, we reported the parameters of the final model with Egocentric Error as the 
dependent variable. Results based on the final model revealed that, first of all, participants’ 
working memory capacities significantly predicted their likelihood of committing egocentric 
errors on experimental condition trials, F(1, 487) = 15.124, p < .001. With the increase in 
each unit of WMC score, the odds of committing an egocentric error were multiplied by 
0.938 (95% CI [0.908; 0.969]), which suggested that participants with higher working 
memory were less likely to make egocentric errors on experimental condition trials. 
Independent of this WMC effect, we also found that the magnitude of common ground 
significantly predicted the likelihood of participants making egocentric errors, F(1, 487) = 
8.523 , p = .004. With each unit of increase in the magnitude of common ground, the odds of 
committing an egocentric error were multiplied by 1.158 (95% CI [1.049; 1.278]), which 
suggested that participants were more likely to commit egocentric errors when the magnitude 
of common ground was larger. The interaction between the effects of WMC and magnitude 
of common ground was not included into the final model, which suggested that working 
memory capacity influenced participants’ egocentrism in this director task in general, but it 
did not modulate the effect of magnitude on participants’ egocentric error rate.  
Table 2.1. Fixed effects in the generalized linear mixed model with Egocentric Error (binary) 





Participants’ response time to a critical instruction was measured from the onset of the 
critical adjective word (i.e., the onset of the integration phase) to the point where they 
selected a referent by pressing down the left button of the computer mouse. Only the critical 
trials on which participants responded correctly were included into the response time (RT) 
analysis, resulting in a further 10.3% of all the critical trials excluded prior to subsequent 
analyses. Only one response time data point (1268ms) fell 2.5 standard deviations beyond the 
mean RT, and this was removed prior to the RT analysis.  
A linear mixed model was fitted with response time as the dependent variable. Similar to 
the egocentric error data, we also started with a simple model with the fixed effects of the 
Magnitude of Common Ground, Working Memory Capacity and ExpCondition, and with the 
random effect of Subject (n = 37) on intercept. The Magnitude of Common Ground and 
Working Memory capacity were both entered as continuous variables, and ExpCondition was 
entered as a binary variable (1 = Experimental condition, 0 = Control condition). Based on 
the simple model, we then added the interactions between these three variables in all possible 
combinations and checking for improvement in fit. There was no significant improvement 
when we added any of the two-way or 3-way interactions, compared to the model whose 
fixed effects contained only Magnitude, WMC and Experimental/control condition without 
any interaction, all X2 (1)s < 0.825, ps > .364. Therefore, no 2-way or 3-way interaction was 
included in the final model.  
In Table 2.2, we reported the parameters of the final model with Response Time as the 
dependent variable. Results based on the final model revealed that only the magnitude of 
common ground significantly predicted participants’ response time errors, F(1, 846.230) = 
40.067, p < .001. With one unit of increase in the magnitude of common ground, participant’s 
response time increased 34.781 (95% CI [23.996; 45.566]). The ExpCondition and WMC 
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factors did not predict response time data, p =.588 and p = .377 respectively. Overall, the 
response time results suggest that the more objects presented in the common ground, the 
longer it took for participants to select the target, regardless of whether there was any 
distractor competing against the target as a potential referent, and regardless of participants’ 
working memory capacities. 
Table 2.2. Fixed effects in the linear mixed model with Response Time (ms) as the dependent 
variable. 
 
Notes: ExpCondition (Experimental condition = 1, control condition = 0). The experimental condition 
was specified as the reference category in the mixed model.   
2.3.2.2. Eye movements 
The same trials used for the response time analysis were used in eye movement 
analyses. Each critical trial was divided into two time windows of interest, namely the 
perspective encoding phase and perspective integration phase (see Figure 2.2). The 
participants’ eye movements from these two phases were analysed and reported separately. 
The initial 5000ms from the onset of a new grid-image was treated as the perspective 
encoding phase. During this time, participants did not receive any audio input and they were 
instructed to examine and remember what the director could and could not see. This was the 
only phase when perspective encoding could take place, as the visual cues indicating an 
object’s ground status would be removed after the initial 5000ms. The perspective integration 
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phase was defined as the period from the onset of the adjective of the critical instruction (e.g., 
‘big’ in ‘nudge the big balloon one slot up’) until participants’ referent selection. Participants’ 
referent selection was marked as the time point when participants first pressed the left button 
of the computer mouse to select an object. During the perspective integration phase, 
participants were expected to integrate the encoded perspective information with the critical 
linguistic information (i.e., the scalar adjective in the critical instruction) to successfully 
resolve reference. Note that there was an additional time period during the critical 
instructions, starting from the onset of the first word of the instruction and ending prior to the 
critical scalar adjective, i.e., ‘Nudge the...’. However, given that this phase only lasted an 
average of just 914ms and the eye movement data from this phase were likely to be noisy due 
to participants attending to the onset of the instruction, the eye movements from this time 
window were not analysed. 
 
Figure 2.2. Illustrations of the structure of perspective encoding phase and perspective 
integration phase of a critical trial. 
During the perspective encoding phase the critical information about the target (i.e. the 
adjective and the noun) had not yet been provided to participants. As the only difference 
between the grid-image used in the experimental and its corresponding control condition was 
that a distractor in the experimental condition was replaced by an irrelevant object in the 
control condition, we expected participants in both conditions to examine the two grid-
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images similarly prior to the onset of the critical adjective. However, during the perspective 
integration phase, we expected participants to behave differently when interpreting the 
instructions from the experimental condition versus the control condition. The reason for this 
expectation was that in the experimental condition, participants could only identify the 
correct referent by taking the director’s perspective into account; while in the control 
condition the same correct referent could be identified without perspective integration.  
Only fixations started 200ms after the onset of one phase and before the offset of the 
same phase were counted as fixations during that phase. Planning a saccade takes 200ms in 
general and thus fixations in the first 200ms are unlikely to reflect participants’ examination 
of the experimental stimuli. Fixations shorter than 100ms were excluded from the analyses, 
as they were more likely to be a pause in a sequence of saccades, rather than an actual 
fixation. For a fixation that lasted beyond the offset of its phase, only the portion from the 
beginning of the fixation until the offset of the phase was calculated and included in the 
analysis.  
Two dependent variables were calculated from the eye movement data, one from each 
time window, based on both findings from previous studies and also our research hypotheses. 
For the encoding phase, based on the previous findings that participants showed 
preference/anticipation effect to common ground objects than to privileged ground objects 
(Barr, 2008; Heller et al., 2008), we expect participants to dwell and fixate more on common 
ground objects. Common ground was therefore the focus of our analysis of the perspective 
encoding phase, as objects in the common ground form the set of potential referents if 
participants were successfully taking the director’s perspective into account. Three steps were 
taken to compute a Common Ground Preference Score for each magnitude. First, we 
calculated each participant’s expected dwell time on common ground items on the null 
hypothesis that they were equally likely to fixate on each of the 12 objects in the array. To do 
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so we summed participants’ total dwell time on common ground and privileged ground 
objects for each trial, and multiplied this by the fraction of common ground items (e.g., for 
the 3-common-ground condition, this fraction would be 3/12). Next we subtracted this 
expected dwell time from the observed dwell time on common ground items. Finally, we 
divided this remainder by the number of common ground items. This procedure yielded a 
preference score for common ground items, expressed in milliseconds, the value of which 
should be zero on the null hypothesis that participants had no preference for common ground 
items.  
During the perspective integration phase, people tend to fixate on an object prior to 
selection.  Participants’ final fixation on the target before they correctly selected the target 
was interpreted as the marker of the end of participants’ decision-making process (Keysar et 
al., 2000). The latency to final target fixation was thus calculated by many studies employing 
this particular version of the director task to measure the amount of time participants took to 
resolve a referential problem and make a decisive fixation (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000; Lin et 
al., 2010; Wang et al., submitted; Wu & Keysar, 2007). A longer decision-making process 
was expected to reflect more difficulty in resolving the reference. While some other eye-
tracking studies have also calculated participants’ proportion of fixations to the target and/or 
to the distractor, and examined how participants’ target advantage scores (proportion of target 
fixations minus proportion of competitor fixations) change over time during perspective 
integration phase (e.g., Barr, 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2009b), this measure was not appropriate 
for the current design. The aforementioned studies all used a variant of the director task 
which contained instructions with temporary ambiguity, and the referring expressions could 
be disambiguated either at an early point or at a late point of the instructions. For example, 
Barr (2008) used objects that were phonological competitors (e.g., a bucket and a buckle), 
and thus made the target of the speaker’s referring expression temporarily ambiguous until 
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they heard the last part of the object name (e.g., ‘et’ or ‘le’). Brown-Schmidt (2009b) used 
images and instructions of ‘the cow that’s wearing shoes’ versus ‘the cow that’s wearing 
glasses’. By comparing participants’ fixations to the targets and/or distractors between 
conditions with either early or late point of disambiguation, researchers were able to 
investigate the more fine-grained time course of the effect of common ground during 
referential communication. However, the version of the director task used in the present study 
was not designed with such temporary ambiguity, but was designed with scalars (e.g., 
big/small) with the aim of maximising the chances of committing an egocentric error. In the 
current version of the director task, the distractors were only present in the experimental 
condition but not in the control condition. Therefore, the current design does not allow for 
meaningful comparison between the experimental condition and control condition on 
proportion of fixations to target / distractor were not theoretically. Additional analyses were 
conducted to examine the effect of common ground size and working memory capacity on 
participants’ proportion of fixations on the distractor during the experimental condition only, 
but no significant effect was found. 
Perspective encoding phase: common ground preference 
Firstly, one-sample t-tests were conducted to test whether participants’ aggregated 
common ground preference scores in each magnitude condition differed from zero. A 
common ground preference score significantly higher than zero would indicate a preference 
for common ground, and a score significantly lower than zero would indicate a preference for 
privileged ground. For 3 and 5 magnitude condition, the common ground preference scores 
were both significantly larger than zero, t(36) = 7.650, p < .001 and t(36) = 5.087, p < .001, 
respectively, suggesting a viewing preference for common ground object. For 7 magnitude 
condition, no significant preference for either common or privileged ground objects was 
observed, t(36) = -.166, p = .869. Interestingly, for 9 magnitude condition, the common 
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ground preference score was significantly lower than zero, t(36) = -5.105, p < .001, 
suggesting a viewing preference for privileged ground objects. 
Secondly, a linear mixed model was fitted with participants’ Common Ground 
Preference Scores as the dependent variable. We started with a simple model with the fixed 
effects of Magnitude, WMC and ExpCondition, and with the random effect of Subject on 
intercept. We then added the interactions between these three variables in all possible 
combinations and checking for improvement in fit. Only the addition of the interaction of 
WMC x Magnitude significantly improved the goodness-of-fit of the model, X2 (1) = 6.026, p 
= .014. There was no further improvement to the goodness-of-fit of the model when other 
two-way or 3-way interactions were added. Therefore, the final model included the fixed 
effects of Magnitude, WMC, ExpCondition and WMC x Magnitude, and the random effect of 
Subject on intercept.  
In Table 2.3, we reported the parameters of the final model with common ground 
preference scores as the dependent variable. Results based on the final model found that, first 
of all, participants’ working memory capacities significantly predicted their common ground 
preference scores, F(1, 133.446) = 6.319, p = .013. With the increase in each unit of WMC 
score, participants’ common ground preference score increased 4.768 units (95% CI [1.017; 
8.520]), which suggested that participants with higher working memory were more likely to 
dwell longer at each common ground object compared with privileged ground objects. The 
magnitude of common ground also significantly predicted participants’ common ground 
preference scores, F(1, 831.526) = 14.039, p < .001. With one unit of increase in the 
magnitude of common ground, participant’s common ground preference score decreased 
23.171 units (95% CI [-35.310; -11.033]). This suggested that participants were more likely 
to dwell longer at each common ground object when there were fewer objects in the common 
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ground. The ExpCondition did not predict common ground preference scores, F(1, 833.089) 
= .130, p = .719, which was consistent with our expectation. 
Moreover, a significant interaction of WMC with Magnitude was found, F(1, 831.262) = 
.6.046, p = .014. To follow this interaction up, firstly, we fitted a linear mixed model on 
participants’ common ground preference scores for each magnitude group, with the fixed 
effect of WMC and the random effect of Subject on intercept. For the 3-common-ground 
magnitude condition, WMC only marginally significantly predicted participants’ common 
ground preference scores, p = .095, β = 4.129. For 5, 7 and 9-common-ground magnitude 
condition, WMC was not a significant predictor at all, ps > .600. Secondly, we divided 
participants into 3 groups based on their WMC scores, i.e., low WMC group (n=12, WMC 
<= 20), medium WMC group (n=13, 21<=WMC<=29) and high WMC group (n=12, 
WMC>=30), and fitted a linear mixed models on participants’ common ground preference 
scores for each WMC group. The magnitude of common ground significantly predicted 
common ground preference scores for each WMC group, ps < .001. With one unit of increase 
in the magnitude of common ground, participant’s common ground preference score 
decreased 26 units (95% CI [-33.665; -19.166]) for low WMC group, 44 units (95% CI [-
50.453; -37.431])  for medium WMC group, and 41 units (95% CI [-46.755; -34.377]) for 
high WMC group respectively. This seemed to suggest that all participants fixated longer 
onto each privileged ground object over each common ground object when there were fewer 
objects in the privileged ground, and fixated longer onto each common ground object over 
each privileged ground object when there were fewer objects in the common ground. 
However, compared to participants with low working memory capacities, participants with 
medium to high working memory capacities revealed a greater degree of sensitivity to the 
experimental manipulation of the relative size of common ground versus privileged ground.  
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Table 2.3. Fixed effects in the linear mixed model with Common Ground Preference Scores 
(ms) as the dependent variable. 
 
Perspective integration phase: latency to final target fixation 
A linear mixed model was fitted on the latency to final target fixation data. Subject 
(n=37) was added as a random effect on intercept. We started with a simple model with the 
fixed effects of Magnitude, WMC and ExpCondition, and with the random effect of Subject 
on intercept. Based on the simple model, we then added the interactions between these three 
variables in all possible combinations and checking for improvement in fit. There was no 
significant improvement when we added any of the two-way or 3-way interactions, compared 
to the model whose fixed effects contained only Magnitude, WMC and ExpCondition 
without any interaction. Therefore, no 2-way or 3-way interaction was not included in the 
final model.  
In Table 2.4, we reported the parameters of the final model with Latency to Final Target 
Fixation (ms)  as the dependent variable. Similar to the response time data, results based on 
the final model revealed that only the magnitude of common ground significantly predicted 
participants’ response time errors, F(1, 770.589) = 26.879, p < .001. With one unit’s increase 
in the magnitude of common ground, participant’s response time increased 43.728 (95% CI 
[27.171; 60.285]). The ExpCondition and WMC factors did not predict response time data, p 
=.588 and p = .377 respectively. Overall, the more objects presented in the common ground, 
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the longer it took for participants to launch a final fixation on the target before making a 
correct response, regardless of whether there was any distractor competing against the target 
as a potential referent, and regardless of participants’ working memory capacities. 
Table 2.4. Fixed effects in the linear mixed model with Latency to Final Target Fixation (ms) 
as the dependent variable. 
 
 
2.3.2.3. Supplementary analyses on participants’ reported encoding strategy 
During the debriefing session, 20 out of 37 participants explicitly reported that they paid 
more attention to common ground objects when there were fewer objects in the common 
ground than in the privileged ground, and switched their attentional preference to privileged 
ground objects when there were fewer objects in the privileged ground during the 5s viewing 
phase. This ‘switching’ strategy was the most common strategy participants reported during 
the director task. We therefore divided participants into two groups based on their report of 
this switching strategy: those 20 participants who had explicitly reported their use of this 
specific strategy was in the ‘strategy’ group, the remaining 17 participants who did not report 
the use of this strategy were in the ‘no-strategy’ group. While we had not planned to include 
this reported strategy use as a factor in our main analyses, we did check its effects on each 
dependent variable.  
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As over half of the participants explicitly reported that they used a ‘switching’ strategy 
during the perspective encoding phase, a 2x4 repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted on 
participants’ common ground preference scores with the reported strategy and the magnitude 
of common ground as two factors, in order to check whether the inclusion of this strategy 
factor exerted any effect. The common ground preferences scores were collapsed between 
experimental and control condition, as no difference was expected to be found between the 
experimental and control condition, and this expectation was also confirmed by the non-
significant effect of experimental/control condition observed from the linear mixed model on 
common ground preferences scores. The relevant descriptive data was reported in Table 2.4. 
Results from ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of magnitude, F(3, 
105) = 77.803, p < .001, ηp2 = .690, but no main effect of reported strategy, F(1, 35) = 
21.227. p = .365, ηp2 = .378. Interestingly, a significant interaction of magnitude x strategy 
was observed, F(3, 105) = 8.712, p = .001, ηp2 = .199. To further explore this significant 
interaction, independent t-tests were conducted between ‘strategy’ group and ‘no-strategy’ 
group for each array size. In the 3 magnitude condition, strategy group showed significantly 
higher degree of common ground preference than the no-strategy group, t(35) = -2.420, p = 
.021. In the 5 or 7 magnitude condition, no difference was found between the groups, t(35) = 
-.966, p = .360 and t(35) = 1.072, p = .304, respectively. Conversely, in the 9 magnitude 
condition, strategy group showed significantly higher degree of preference towards privileged 
ground than the no-strategy group, t(35) = 2.052, p = .048. Results suggest that participants 
who reported use of ‘switching’ strategy showed a neat correspondence between their eye 
movements and the strategy reported. While both groups showed the same qualitative pattern, 
the eye movements of participants who reported a ‘switching’ strategy were affected by the 
size of common ground to a greater degree than those in the no-strategy group. 
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Table 2.4. Means and standard errors of common ground preference score for ‘strategy’ and 
‘no-strategy’ groups respectively. 
 
Similarly, a 2x4 repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted on participants’ percentage 
egocentric errors in experimental condition, with reported strategy use and magnitude of 
common ground as two factors. The analysis revealed no significant main effect of strategy 
use (p = .815) or any interactions involving this factor (p = .260). A 2x4x2 ANOVA was then 
carried out on response time, including reported strategy, magnitude of common ground, and 
condition as factors. The analysis revealed no significant main effect of reported strategy (p = 
.530) or any interactions involving this factor (p = .957 for condition x strategy, p = .248 for 
magnitude x strategy, p = .828 for condition x magnitude x strategy). A 2x4x2 ANOVA was 
also carried out on latency to final target fixation, including reported strategy use, magnitude 
of common ground, and condition as factors. This analysis revealed no significant main effect 
of this strategy use (p = .151) or any interactions involving this factor (p = .697 for condition 
x strategy, p = .410 for magnitude x strategy, and p = .666 for condition x magnitude x 
strategy). 
In brief, only participants’ eye movements in the perspective encoding phase were 




Existing research has led researchers to strikingly inconsistent conclusions about the 
relationship between working memory and the use of perspective during communication. 
Some studies found that individual differences in working memory capacity affected 
perspective use in communication (Lin et al., 2010; Wardlow, 2013); whereas other studies 
failed to observe any effect of individuals’ working memory capacities on perspective taking 
(Cane et al., 2016; Nilsen & Graham, 2009). To cast new light on this important relationship 
we followed previous studies by measuring participants’ working memory capacities, but in 
addition we adapted the commonly-used director task so that participants were forced to 
remember the director’s perspective, and for the first time we manipulated memory load by 
systematically altering the relative size of common ground versus privileged ground. With 
our adapted director task we succeeded in finding distinct memory effects during perspective 
encoding, and during the integration of perspective information with the director’s 
instructions. Fixation patterns during encoding were sensitive to the number of items in the 
common versus privileged ground, but were not affected by participants’ working memory 
capacities. Egocentric errors during integration were sensitive both to the number of items in 
the common ground and to participants’ working memory capacities, but these effects were 
statistically independent, suggesting that they arose from distinct processes. We expand our 
discussion of these results below. 
Perspective encoding. During the encoding phase participants’ viewing preference 
towards common ground was the focus of our analysis. Our study showed that the size of 
common ground had a significant linear effect on participants’ eye movements. Interestingly, 
when common ground size was greater, rather than devoting more resources to encoding 
relevant common ground information as we predicted, participants instead paid more visual 
attention to each privileged ground object compared to each common ground object. This 
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finding might appear to be at odds with the ‘anticipatory effect’ found by Barr (2008) that a 
preference for common ground items was typically observed prior to the point when 
participants were required to integrate information about a speaker’s perspective with her 
instructions. However, two points are noteworthy. First, in studies reporting anticipatory 
effects, the number of objects in the common ground was typically low (e.g., 3 common 
ground objects and 1 privileged ground object in Barr (2008)), and within the range where we 
too found preferential attention to common ground items. Second, in previous studies 
participants was not required to remember which items are in the common versus privileged 
ground, because this information remained available at the point of need. We speculate that, 
under the enforced memory demands of our adapted director task, participants might have 
encoded information in the array strategically, with a preference for remembering the smaller 
set of items, whether they were in the common or privileged ground.  
Supportive of our speculation, 20 out of 37 participants in the debriefing session 
explicitly confirmed their employment of the strategy of encoding whichever was the smaller 
set of items. Our supplementary analyses suggested that the group who reported their use of 
strategy were indeed doing what they reported, as their common ground preference scores 
were significantly higher than those of the no-strategy group when the number of items in the 
common ground was smaller, and significantly lower than those of the no-strategy group 
when the number of items in the common ground was larger. This strategy may be task-
specific, or may reflect the flexibility with which people approach the problem of tracking 
common ground in discourse. Outside of the laboratory people surely do sometimes identify 
privileged ground items specifically for the purpose of not incorporating them into discourse, 
as when reminding oneself not to mention the salient but secret surprise party being held for 
our interlocutor. Either way, it is noteworthy that the strategic effects observed during 
encoding did not have any observed consequences for success at actually using perspective 
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information during the integration phase. This result accords with a study on language 
production which suggests that people do not only have difficulty avoiding leaking privileged 
knowledge, but that reminding oneself not to mention the privileged information makes it 
actually harder to guard against giving the secret away (Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006).  
Apart from the effect of the size of common ground, we also found a significant linear 
effect of working memory capacity during perspective encoding. Participants with higher 
working memory capacities were more likely to dwell longer at each common ground object 
compared with privileged ground objects during perspective encoding phase, compared to 
participants with lower working memory capacities. However, when we followed up on the 
significant interaction of Magnitude x WMC, the effect of WMC was only marginally 
significant for the 3-common ground magnitude condition, but not for other greater 
magnitude conditions. Moreover, follow-up analyses on the significant interaction of 
Magnitude x WMC showed that participants with medium and high working memory 
capacities revealed a greater degree of sensitivity to the experimental manipulation of the 
relative size of common ground versus privileged ground, compared to participants with low 
working memory capacities. That is, participants with medium and high working memory 
capacities were more likely to fixate longer onto each privileged ground object over each 
common ground object when there were fewer objects in the privileged ground, and were 
more likely to fixate longer onto each common ground object over each privileged ground 
object when there were fewer objects in the common ground. This is the opposite pattern to 
what would be expected if greater working memory capacity enabled participants to focus 
more reliably on common ground items. It is also noting that the eye movements during 
perspective encoding only indicated how participants distributed their attention to items in the 
common ground versus privileged ground. It was therefore unclear, both in principle and in 
terms of the actual pattern of results, how this attention allocation pattern during online 
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perspective encoding phase contributed to participants’ final performance on the director task 
which was revealed by the three dependant variables (i.e., egocentric errors, response time 
and latency to final target fixations) in the perspective integration phase.  
Perspective integration. During this phase, participants had to integrate the director’s 
instruction with information about her perspective. Our principal interest was in the 
‘egocentric’ effects whereby responses were slower or more error prone in the experimental 
condition where a response based only on participants’ own perspective would differ from a 
response that took account of the director’s perspective, compared with the control condition 
where responses based on either privileged ground or common ground would not conflict 
with each other. In the present study, this ‘egocentric’ effect was only observed in the 
proportion egocentric errors, and not in response times or latencies to final fixation, which is 
consistent with some previous studies (Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010).  
Firstly, participants in the present study made more egocentric errors as the size of 
common ground increased. Increasing the number of items in the common ground also 
resulted in slower responses and longer latencies to final target fixation, but unlike the case of 
errors, experimental and control trials were equally affected. Secondly, we observed a 
significant effect of working memory capacity exclusively on participants’ proportion 
egocentric errors. Individuals with higher working memory capacities tended to commit 
fewer egocentric errors in the experimental condition where common ground information 
needed to be integrated with the speaker’s message. This finding is consistent with Lin et al. 
(2010)’s study where participants with lower working memory capacities showed delayed 
response time to select the target referent; however, it is inconsistent with Cane et al. (2016) 
and Nilsen and Graham (2009) where correlations between participants’ working memory 
capacity scores and their perspective-taking performance failed to emerge. We think it is 
likely that our study greatly enhanced the chances of detecting memory effects because, 
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unlike previous studies, it guaranteed a demand of having to remember the speaker’s 
perspective, rather than being able to compute it at the point of need. However, this would 
still leave the positive results of Lin et al. (2010) without an explanation, as Lin et al.’ s study 
did not require participants to retain information about perspectives. In this case, it seems 
plausible that Lin et al.’s analysis strategy of only selecting participants whose working 
memory capacity scores were within the top 20 or bottom 20 percentiles of their pre-test 
sample was likely to have enhanced their chances of detecting a significant effect of working 
memory capacity.  
Critically, while both common ground size and working memory capacity influenced the 
number of egocentric errors participants made on experimental condition trials, these factors 
did not interact. That is to say, the number of egocentric errors participants with lower 
working memory capacities committed was no more influenced by common ground size than 
for participants with higher working memory capacities. This lack of interaction between the 
magnitude of common ground and working memory capacity could potentially provide some 
informative insights into the memory processes involved in perspective taking during 
communication. In the present study, an egocentric error could be made due to two reasons:1) 
participants had difficulty in successfully remembering and holding in mind relevant 
perspective information of what was in common ground; 2) participants had difficulty in 
successfully integrating the correctly encoded common ground information with the verbal 
messages from the director. If both the magnitude of common ground and working memory 
capacity had affected the number of egocentric errors participants committed by affecting the 
likelihood of successfully remembering and holding in mind relevant perspective 
information, then we would have observed an interaction of Magnitude x WMC. Similarly, if 
both magnitude and working memory capacity had affected the likelihood of successfully 
integrating the relevant perspective information with linguistic input then we would have also 
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observed an interaction of Magnitude x WMC. However, our results provided no evidence 
for either of these two accounts.  
The most plausible explanation was that the size of common ground and working 
memory capacity might have affected participants’ perspective-taking performance via 
different routes. Firstly, we propose that participants’ working memory capacities were likely 
to have influenced the number of egocentric errors they committed by directly affecting the 
likelihood of successfully integrating the critical constraint from information about the 
director’s perspective with the linguistic information from the director’s instruction. This 
speculation is consistent with common views about working memory as an executive-
attention control mechanism that helps integrate diverse sources of information together with 
goal-relevant information over short timescales (e.g., Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). The 
perspective integration process is likely to depend heavily upon one’s working memory 
capacities. The lower one’s working memory capacity, the fewer memory resources one 
could utilize to integrate perspective information into communication, and the more 
egocentric errors one would commit.  
In contrast, the size of common ground may have affected adults’ perspective use 
mainly via a longer term memory route. we propose that the size of common ground was 
likely to have affected the number of egocentric errors participants committed by affecting 
the likelihood of their being able to successfully encode and retain what was in common 
ground. Recall that the current results found that as the size of common ground increased, 
participants generally devoted progressively less attention to common ground items. We 
suggest that one plausible consequence of this effect was that when common ground was 
larger, participants retained a less accurate record of what was in common ground in their 
longer term memory, and thus were less likely to correctly reject the distract in the privileged 
ground and choose the target object in the common ground. The size of common ground was 
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likely to have affected the rates of egocentric errors through such a long-term memory route. 
This speculation is consistent with our finding that the effect of common ground size on 
egocentrism was insensitive to participants’ working memory capacities. The demand to hold 
in mind an increasing amount of common ground information served as a separate 
contributing factor to the egocentric effect observed in the current study. This detrimental 
effect of an increasing common ground size could not be simply compensated by having 
more available working memory resources. Importantly, this effect is also consistent with 
other studies in the literature suggesting that constraints on discourse processing operating 
over time scales of more than a few seconds depend upon retention and retrieval of 
information from long-term memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Graesser et al., 1997).  
Some researchers might argue that the observed effect of working memory on 
egocentrism the current study could be alternatively explained by participants’ motivation to 
succeed on both the director task and the OSPAN task. Admittedly, it was possible that 
participants who were more motivated to succeed on the OSPAN task might also be more 
motivated to succeed on the OSPAN task. However, given that OSPAN task is a cognitively 
demanding task and is generally believed as a reliable and valid measure of working memory 
capacity (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 
2009), it is unlikely that participants’ performance on OSPAN task was a mere reflection of 
their motivation in succeeding on the task. Participants who were less motivated to succeed 
on the OSPAN task might get a lower working memory capacity score, even when they had 
the working memory capacity required by the task. On the contrary, participants with high 
motivation in succeeding on the OSPAN task would still be constrained by the cognitively 
demanding nature of the OSPAN task if their working memory capacity was rather limited. 
Nonetheless, future studies could include a measure which is not expected to correlate with 
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participants’ performance in either the director task or the OSPAN task to rule out this 
motivational explanation.   
To conclude, what was novel in the present study was that we adapted a widely-used 
director task to capture the memory demand of holding in mind someone’s perspective, 
which is commonly embedded in our everyday communication but was overlooked in the 
previous literature. Apart from this, we systematically varied the size of common ground in 
the adapted version of director task, and also measured participants’ working memory 
capacities. Our findings are consistent with suggestions that perspective integration draws 
heavily upon domain-general working memory resources. Participants exhibited higher 
degree of egocentrism when common ground size was larger, and when ones’ working 
memory capacities were smaller; but these two factors did not interact. We propose that such 
results provide some evidence for dissociable effects of long-term memory and working 
memory on perspective encoding and perspective integration respectively. It’s important for 
future studies to dissociate the sub-processes involved in taking other people’s perspectives, 
and to incorporate into laboratory communication tasks the varying memory loads 
interlocutors may experience in everyday communication. This will help specify the 
mechanisms underlying how different memory processes contribute to different sub-process 










The cognitive demands of remembering a speaker’s 
perspective and managing common ground size modulate 8- 




Perspective taking can be seen as a common instance of ‘theory of mind’ use. Until 
relatively recently, a large number of developmental studies on the research area of ‘theory of 
mind’ focused on answering the question of when children develop this understanding of 
others’ mental states and perspectives (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Perner et al., 1987). 
Classic accounts suggest that children are egocentric, and incapable of understanding others’ 
perspectives before around 7 years (Piaget, 1959; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). More recent 
evidence suggests that ‘theory of mind’ concepts develop significantly earlier, between 2 and 
7 years (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), and may even be present in infants (e.g., 
Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; Moll & Tomasello, 2006; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007). In contrast, recent research on older children and adults, 
who have clearly developed a basic understanding of mental states, shows that they are still 
egocentrically biased especially when facing communicative situations where differing 
perspectives have to be taken into account (e.g., Dumontheil et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2000, 
2003). This suggests that employing theory of mind abilities in communication requires much 
more than just acquiring the necessary theory of mind concepts.  
As introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, a large number of studies employing this director 
task on healthy adults have demonstrated that adults suffer from interference of their own 
privileged perspective (Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007). 
Children, who are less experienced communicators than adults, may suffer more from this 
egocentric bias when required to accommodate differing perspective in the director task. 
Although eye movement data from Nadig and Sedivy (2002) suggested that even 6-year-old 
children were sensitive to their interlocutor’s limited perspective and were able to use this 
perspective information from the early stage of language processing, egocentrism did not 
completely evaporate in their study. Indeed, the first experiment in Nadig and Sedivy (2002) 
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suggested that children speakers were not as reliable as adult speakers at providing adjectives 
to fully disambiguate the referents when there are two similar candidates in the common 
ground. Epley, Morewedge, and Keysar (2004) demonstrated that 4- to 12-year-old children 
acted more egocentrically in the task (as they reached for hidden referents more frequently) 
compared to the adult participants. They provided a plausible explanation that adults and 
children appeared to not differ in the initial processing stage during which they both 
processed information egocentrically, but differed in the later adjustment stage during which 
adults were more capable to correct their egocentric bias and accommodate their 
interlocutor’s differing perspective than children. Moreover, Epley et al. (2004) also observed 
an incremental improvement in performance as children’s age increased. Convergingly, 
Dumontheil et al. (2010) and  Symeonidou, Dumontheil, Chow, and Breheny (2016) found 
that children’s ability to accommodate a speaker’s limited perspective continued to develop 
through childhood to adolescence till adulthood. Similarly, Frick, Möhring, and Newcombe 
(2014) used an experimental paradigm where two agents saw the same sets of objects from 
two different visuo-spatial perspectives from which participants’ own perspective could also 
differ. This study found that the capacity to inhibit egocentric choices and to recognize what 
agents could see from their own perspectives gradually developed between 5 to 8 years of 
age. These findings suggest that the use of information about others’ perspectives goes 
through prolonged developmental improvements even after the acquisition of the basic theory 
of mind competence.  
In the present study, we first sought to identify the cognitive factors, especially memory 
factors, that might affect children’s abilities to infer and utilize a speakers’ perspective during 
language comprehension. Secondly, we considered whether the same factors would drive 
age-related improvements in children’s perspective-taking performance. As reviewed in 
Chapter 2, most studies examining the relationship between memory capacities and 
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perspective-taking performance in referential communication have been conducted on adults, 
but the findings are currently mixed (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, 2009b; Cane et al., 2016; Lin et 
al., 2010). Little research has been done to directly examine the memory factors that affect 
children’s ability to use a speaker’s perspective in referential communication tasks e.g., the 
director task. The most relevant developmental evidence came from Nilsen and Graham 
(2009), where they found a positive correlation in children aged three to five between their 
inhibitory control skills and their perspective-taking abilities in language comprehension. A 
similar tendency was also observed for the measure of working memory capacities, but it did 
not reach significance. A more recent study conducted by Wang, Ali, Frisson, and Apperly 
(2016) observed that 10-year-olds performed less egocentrically than 8-year-olds in the 
director task overall, and both age group committed more egocentric errors when a director’s 
instruction sentence was complex (e.g., ‘nudge the large jar one slot up’) rather than simple 
(e.g., ‘nudge the large jar’). However, both 8- and 10-year-olds were affected by the 
cognitive demands of integrating complex messages with the speaker’s limited perspective to 
the same degree, suggesting the age-related improvements in children’s perspective-taking 
performance was not driven by the development of executive capacities that might be 
necessary for meeting this demand. Some other studies, though not directly employing the 
director task, have also demonstrated the important role of memory in children’s performance 
in referential communication. For example, a previous study by Dahlgren & Sandberg (2008) 
found that free recall capacities measured by both verbal and object free recall tasks 
contributed significantly to performance in a referential communication task for both children 
with autism spectrum disorder and normally developing children. Another study found that 
preschoolers’ executive functions contributed more than IQ to their pragmatic communicative 
skills during a semi-structured conversation with an experimenter (Blain-Brière, Bouchard, & 
Bigras, 2014). Specifically, children with higher working memory capacities were found to 
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be more likely to generate contingent answers and produce clear utterances to their listeners; 
and children with higher inhibitory control exhibited a reduced degree of talkativeness and 
assertiveness in conversation.  
In the current study, we investigated the role of memory in 8- and 10-year-old children’s 
perspective-taking performance during language comprehension. We chose 8- and 10-year-
old children as our subjects on two bases. First, on almost any contemporary account, 
children in this age range are believed to have the full range of basic theory of mind concepts. 
In particular, the ‘Level-1’ perspective-taking necessary for the director task is typically 
observed in children as young as 2.5 years (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981) or even 
in infants (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007). The second is that previous studies have shown robust 
age-related changes in performance on the director task across this age range (Dumontheil et 
al., 2010; Symeonidou et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016).  
Two key memory-related manipulations were employed in our study. Firstly, children 
were assigned to two different versions of the director task: a hidden perspective version and 
a visible perspective version. The hidden perspective version and the visible perspective 
version were designed to be minimally different, with the only difference being: in the hidden 
perspective version, the visual cues to the director’s perspective were removed after an initial 
5000ms-viewing-time, thus children had to infer and hold in mind what’s in common ground 
and/or in privileged ground until the point of need; whereas in the visible perspective version, 
the visual cues remained available throughout each trial, thus the relevant perspective 
information could be inferred efficiently at the point of need. Secondly, we also 
systematically manipulated the relative size of common ground and privileged ground in the 
director task. In Experiment 2, the number of objects visible to both participants and the 
director was systematically manipulated from 3, 5 to 7, and the number of objects occluded 
from the director was held constant as 2, leaving the overall number of displayed objects 
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varying from 5, 7 to 9. In Experiment 3, the overall number of objects was held constant as 
12, and the number of objects in the common ground was systematically manipulated from 3, 
5, 7 to 9, leaving the number of object occluded from to the director to vary from 9, 7, 5 to 3.  
Based on these results from adults in Chapter 2, we hypothesized that children would be 
more prone to make egocentric errors in the hidden perspective version than in the visible 
perspective version of the director task. Secondly, we predicted that when the size of 
common ground was greater, participants would need to devote more cognitive resources to 
managing the increasing size of common ground, and would thus become more prone to 
egocentric errors and slower to respond. Thirdly, we expected 10-year-olds to make fewer 
egocentric errors than 8-year-olds on the experimental trials of the director task. Critically, if 
10-year-olds were indeed better perspective takers than 8-year-olds, then it would be of 
interest to examine whether 10-year-olds and 8-year-olds were equally affected by the 
memory load from the hidden perspective version of the task and the size of common ground. 
If a factor influenced egocentrism less in older children than in younger children, then this 
factor would be a potential cause of developmental improvement in children’s abilities to use 
a speaker’s perspective information during communication. Specifically, by observing 
whether any interaction was found between age and memory-related factors (i.e., task 
version, common ground size) on children’s degree of egocentrism, we would be able to 
know whether our memory-related manipulations tapped into any developmental factor that 
contributed to age-related improvement in perspective use during communication.  
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3.2. Experiment 2 
3.2.1. Methods 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-nine 8-year-old children (mean age 8.17, age range 7.54 to 8.71, 18 males and 21 
females) and fifty-seven 10-year-old children (mean age 10.13, age range 9.53 to 10.79, 28 
males and 29 females) from three primary schools located in Birmingham and neighbouring 
area took part in the study. Children from each class were selected according to an 
alphabetical class list, and were assigned to either the hidden perspective version or the 
visible perspective version alternately. This method ensured that condition assignment was 
unsystematic with respect to age, sex and any other relevant variables. Nineteen 8-year-olds 
took part in the hidden perspective version; another 20 took part in the visible perspective 
version. Twenty-nine 10-year-olds took part in the hidden perspective version, and another 28 
took part in the visible perspective version. There was no difference between the ages of 
children assigned to the two task versions within each age group, p = .546 for the 8-year-old 
group and .751 for 10-year-old group respectively.  
3.2.1.2. Design and procedure 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 mixed design was constructed with age (8- and 10-year-olds) and task 
version (hidden perspective and visible perspective version) as two between-subject factors, 
and condition (experimental and control conditions) and magnitude of common ground (3 
objects, 5 objects and 7 objects) as two within-subject factors. 
Our computerised referential communication task was introduced as an engaging 
computer game to children. Each child took part in the experiment individually. Children 
were greeted warmly, instructed step-by-step using a PowerPoint presentation and then tested 
individually outside of their classrooms by the experimenter. The whole experiment, 
consisting of an instruction phase, a practice phase and a test phase, lasted for 15-20 minutes 
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for each individual. The experiment was presented on a 15.6’ Samsung laptop. The practice 
and test trials were presented with Experiment Builder (SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, 
Ontario, Canada). Accuracy and response time data were automatically recorded by the 
Experiment Builder software. 
Instruction phase 
In the instruction phase, a 4 x 4 shelf image was presented on the computer screen. A 
number of objects were placed on the shelf. A female director, who was introduced to 
children as Sally, was standing behind the shelf and facing the participants. Some slots were 
blocked by green squared backgrounds from Sally’s perspective. The experimenter explained 
to children that Sally could not see the objects in the blocked slots, because she was standing 
on the other side of the shelf and the green backgrounds were blocking her view. An image of 
the back of the shelf was shown to children in order to highlight Sally’s limited perspective. 
Children were then asked five check questions about whether Sally could see certain objects. 
We included 3 objects from open slots and 2 objects from blocked shots into the check 
questions in order to make sure that children fully understood Sally’s limited perspective. 
Children were only allowed to carry on if they answered all five questions correctly, 
otherwise the experimenter would again explain how Sally’s perspective is limited. If 
children correctly answered the check questions, they were further instructed that if Sally 
could not see objects in the blocked slots, then she could not know about those objects, and 
therefore would not ask them to move any of those objects. Children’s understanding of the 
instructions was checked by another five questions on whether Sally could know about 
certain objects (3 from open slots and 2 from blocked slots), and three additional questions on 
whether Sally could ask them to move certain objects (2 from open slots and 1 from blocked 
slots). Every participating child managed to answer all these questions correctly.  
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After checking children’s understanding of Sally’s limited knowledge of the shelf, one 
example image of the shelf (see the left image in Figure 3.1) was shown to children. Children 
assigned to the hidden perspective version were given the instruction that ‘you have 5 
seconds to remember which objects Sally does and doesn’t know about. After 5 seconds, all 
of the slots will be blocked by a green background’; while children assigned to the visible 
perspective version were told that ‘you have 5 seconds to look at what object Sally does and 
doesn’t know about. After 5 seconds, Sally will start to give you some instructions.’ After 
five seconds, children in the hidden perspective version were shown the shelf image with a 
covering green background (the right image in Figure 3.1) and those in the visible perspective 
version were shown the original image (the left image in Figure 3.1).  
Each child was first given an example instruction ‘nudge the ball one slot up’, shown 
how to drag the ball one slot up and then drop it using the computer mouse, and then asked to 
practice and carry out the same ‘drag and drop’ action. Children were then given the next 
instruction ‘nudge the big hat one slot down’ and were prompted to point out the two hats 
Sally knew about (one big and one small). If children wrongly pointed to a hat in the blocked 
slot, the experimenter would point to the image and say, ‘look here, Sally doesn’t know about 
this hat, because this one is in the green slot and it’s blocked off’. The same instruction would 
then be repeated until children got it right. After identifying the two hats Sally knew about, 
children were asked by the question ‘so which one is the big hat that Sally is talking about’. If 
children responded correctly, the experimenter would ask children the reason why they chose 
that hat, to make sure that the correct response was not driven by unexpected strategies. If 
children responded incorrectly, the experimenter would explicitly tell children about the way 
in which Sally’s limited perspective constrained reference by saying ‘Sally couldn’t see this 
red hat, so she does not know that this red hat is on the shelf, and therefore she can’t be 
talking about this red hat. Instead, Sally must be talking about this blue hat, which she can 
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see.’ At the end of the instruction phase, another shelf image with a different array of objects 
was presented to children as a comprehension check. A critical instruction ‘nudge the big 
bowling pin one slot right’ was delivered. Children who not only failed the comprehension 
check in the instruction phase but also performed at floor level in the main test phase were 
excluded prior to the analysis (see section 3.2.2 for details). 
 
Figure 3.1. Examples of shelf images used for the visible perspective version and hidden 
perspective version respectively. 
Test phase 
Children undertook either the hidden perspective or the visible perspective task version 
they were assigned to. For each task version, two practice shelf images were first presented 
with 3 instructions each. Twenty-four test shelf images were then presented with 2-3 
instructions each. Twelve shelf images corresponded to the experimental condition, and the 
other 12 shelf images corresponded to the control condition. In the experimental condition, 
the object which best fitted a critical instruction from the participants’ point of view was 
always in the participants’ privileged ground, thus made it a ‘distractor’ from the target 
referent. Participants had to use the information about the perspective difference between the 
director and participants, in order to select the correct referents. Control trial images were 
minor adaptations of each corresponding experimental trial image, whereby the competing 
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object in (‘distractor’) in the participants’ privileged ground was replaced by an irrelevant 
object, which did not compete with the target referent as a potential referent. As illustrated in 
Figure 3.2, the pink balloon in the privileged ground in the experimental condition was 
replaced by the broccoli when in the control condition. Therefore, in the control condition, 
the use of the director’s perspective was not a prerequisite for correctly selecting the target 
referent. We checked the visual salience (e.g., size and colour) of the ‘distractors’ in the 
experimental condition versus the irrelevant objects which replaced the distractors in the 
corresponding control condition: the distractors in the experimental condition was not 
systematically more visually salient than the irrelevant object in the corresponding control 
condition, and vice versa.2 
The shelf image in the control condition was presented at least 6 shelf images apart 
(which equals to at least 12 instructions apart) from its corresponding shelf image in the 
experimental condition. 24 shelf images were grouped into 4 blocks, each block was mixed of 
experimental and control trials. Participants could take breaks between blocks.  
 
Figure 3.2. Example images for an experimental condition trial (left) and its corresponding 
control condition trail (right). 
                  
 
2 Future studies using this experimental paradigm could consider creating two sets of stimuli 
by balancing the visual salience of the distractor and the irrelevant object for each shelf 
image, e.g., by swapping the colors of the distractor and the irrelevant object. 
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The shelf image in the experimental condition and the shelf image in its corresponding 
control condition shared the same set of 2-3 verbal instructions, one of which was a critical 
instruction, and the others were fillers. The position of the critical instruction varied between 
the first and third in the sequence. Each instruction was made of individually pre-recorded 
words in order to prevent participants from using co-articulation to identify an object prior to 
the onset of the noun. The structure of the critical instructions was ‘nudge the [scalar 
adjective] [noun] one slot [directional word]’ (e.g., nudge the small ball one slot up). The 
structure of the fillers was either ‘nudge the [scalar/normal adjective] [noun] one slot 
[directional word]’ or ‘nudge the [noun] one slot [directional word]’. Directional words 
included ‘left’ ‘right’ ‘up’ and ‘down’. Children were told that the directional words ‘left’ 
and ‘right’ referred to their own left and right sides, and labels indicating children’s left and 
right sides were presented across the top of the laptop screen during their participation. For 
critical instructions, only ‘up’ and ‘down’ directional words were used.  
Children were instructed to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible. If children 
did not respond within 8500ms after the onset of the adjective or noun, then the trial would 
timeout, bringing up the next instruction or the next shelf image.  
3.2.2. Results 
We performed both a comprehension check (i.e. whether children responded correctly to 
a critical question at the end of instruction phase), and a floor performance check (i.e., 
whether children responded correctly on more than 2 trials out of 12 trials) on participating 
children’s performance. The purpose of adopting these two criteria together for exclusion was 
to exclude children whose low performance was highly likely due to the lack of 
understanding of the current experiment instructions, rather than egocentrism. For children 
who failed to pass the comprehension check question in the instruction phase, it was not clear 
whether this failure occurred only accidently or it truly reflected insufficient understanding of 
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the task instructions. For children who failed to perform significantly above floor, it was not 
clear whether their low performance was the true reflection of their insufficient understanding 
of the task instructions, or was induced by the cognitively demanding nature of the current 
experimental manipulation. Therefore, we used both rules to exclude participants. Two 8-
year-olds (which were not included into the 39 eight-year-old participating children reported 
in section 3.2.1.1) were excluded prior the analysis due to both the failure to pass the 
comprehension check and the failure to perform significantly above floor. 
3.2.2.1. Proportion egocentric errors 
Only data from critical trials were entered into our analysis. A response was considered 
as correct when children selected a target object which was visible to both the director and 
themselves. An egocentric error referred to the selection of the distractor in privileged ground 
rather than the target object in the common ground. A non-egocentric error referred to the 
selection of other objects or spaces other than the target and the distractor. The causes of the 
non-egocentric errors (which constituted 5.92% of the data from the hidden perspective 
version in 8-year-olds, 7.92% of the data from the visible perspective version in 8-year-olds, 
4.17% of the data from the hidden perspective version in 10-year-olds, and 3.72% of the data 
from the visible perspective version in 10-year-olds) were difficult to interpret and were not 
the central interest of the current study, therefore the non-egocentric errors were excluded 
prior to the following analysis. Trials with response timeout (1.82%) were also excluded from 
the analysis.  
The proportion egocentric errors in the experimental condition and the control condition 
were calculated separately for each magnitude condition for each participant. In the 
experimental condition, the proportion egocentric errors of individual participants ranged 
from no errors to 1 in a given magnitude condition and from no errors to .917 overall. In the 
control condition, the mean proportion egocentric errors for each age group in each task 
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version were all below .005. Due to the floor level of proportion egocentric errors in the 
control condition and the unequal variance between the experimental and control conditions, 
it was questionable to include the factor of condition (experimental and control) into an 
omnibus analysis. Therefore, a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was conducted for the experimental 
condition only, with age and task version as two between-subject factors, and common 
ground size as a within-subject factor. The pattern observed here in the 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA 
still held for the analysis of proportion egocentric errors when we included condition 
(experimental, control) as a factor in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA.  
There was a significant main effect of common ground size, F(2, 184) = 14.026, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .132, with a significant linear trend only, F(1, 92) = 21.568, p < .001, ηp2 = .190 
(the quadratic trend was not significant, p = .116). This showed that the rates of egocentric 
errors participants made increased proportionally as the common ground size grew. A 
significant main effect of age was observed, F(1, 92) = 9.314, p =.003, ηp2 = .092, with 10-
year-olds outperforming 8-year-olds. A significant main effect of task version was also 
observed, F(1, 92) = 4.133, p = .045, ηp2 = .043, with children revealing higher degrees of 
egocentrism in the hidden perspective version than in the visible perspective version. A 
significant interaction between task and age was observed, F(1, 92) = 7.434, p = .008, ηp2 = 
.075, and also a significant interaction between common ground size and age, F(2, 184) = 
3.627, p= .029, ηp2 = .038. There was also a marginally significant interaction between 
common ground size and task version, F(2, 184) = 2.740, p = .058, ηp2 = .031. Most 
importantly, a significant 3-way interaction of common ground size x task version x age was 
observed, F(2, 184) = 7.740, p = .001, ηp2 = .078 (see Figure 3.3).  
To follow up the significant 3-way interaction of common ground size x task version x 
age, two 2-way mixed ANOVAs were conducted for 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds separately, 
with task version and magnitude as the two factors. For 8-year-olds, there was a significant 
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main effect of common ground size, F(2, 74) = 10.179, p < .001, ηp2 = .216, with a 
significant linear trend only, F(1, 37) = 16.118, p < .001, ηp2 = .303 (quadratic trend, p = 
.444). This showed that the proportion egocentric errors 8-year-olds committed increased 
proportionally with the increasing common ground size. A significant main effect of task 
version was also found, F(1, 37) = 8.771, p = .005, ηp2 = .192, as 8-year-olds made more 
egocentric errors in the hidden perspective version compared to the visible perspective 
version. Critically, a significant interaction between common ground size and task version 
was also found, F(2, 74) = 6.442, p = .003, ηp2 = .148. Two sets of one way repeated 
measures ANOVAs with common ground size as the within-subject factor were conducted 
for memory and visible perspective versions, respectively. For the hidden perspective 
version, a main effect of magnitude was observed, F(2, 36) = 13.420, p < .001, ηp2 = .427, 
with a significant linear trend only, F(1, 18) = 16.753, p = .001, ηp2 = .482 (quadratic trend, p 
= .195). For the visible perspective version, only a marginally significant main effect of 
magnitude was observed, F(2, 38) = 2.473, p = .098, ηp2 = .115.  
For 10-year-olds, a 2-way mixed ANOVA was also conducted with task version and 
common ground size as factors. There was a significant main effect of common ground size, 
F(2, 110) = 3.252, p = .042, ηp2 = .056, with a marginally significant linear trend, F(1, 55) = 
3.778, p = .057, ηp2 = .064 (quadratic trend, p = .120). No main effect of task version was 
observed, F(1, 55) = .315, p = .577, ηp2 = .006. No significant interaction was found between 
task version and common ground size, F(2, 110) = 1.245, p = .292, ηp2 = .022. 3 
                  
 
3  The proportion egocentric error data suffered from the problem with non-normal 
distribution. We considered the concerns around running ANOVA on proportion data when 
the data violated normal distribution. Although many studies give strong support for the 
robustness of the ANOVA under application of non-normally distributed data (e.g., Glass, 
Peckham, & Sanders, 1972; Harwell, Rubinstein, Hayes, & Olds, 1992; Schmider, Ziegler, 
Danay, Beyer, & Bühner, 2010), we also conducted GEE (generalised estimating equation) 
analysis to double check the effects observed in ANOVAs. GEE is an estimating method 
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Figure 3.3. Proportions of egocentric errors on experimental trails in Experiment 2. Error bars 
show standard errors. 
3.2.2.2. Response time 
Only trials with correct responses were included in the response time analysis. As the 
error rates among the experimental trials were uneven among different task versions in 
different age groups, the numbers of data points across conditions varied. The response time 
data therefore could not be interpreted with confidence, as it was likely for the results to be 
                                                       
 
extended from the linear model used for ANOVA, which accommodates non-normal 
distribution, repeated measurements and categorical independent variables. This GEE 
approach has not been adopted in our main analysis, as it provides a less complete treatment 
of the data.  But in the complimentary GEE analysis, GEE results converged with the results 
from ANOVA on proportion egocentric errors in Experiment 2. The magnitude of common 
ground was specified as a within-subject variable, age and task version as two between-
subject variables, and percentage egocentric errors as the dependent variable. The distribution 
of the dependent variable was specified as poison rather than normal distribution. 
Convergingly, the GEE results showed a significant main effect of magnitude (p < .001), a 
main effect of age (p = .002), a main effect of task version (p = .042) and a significant three-
way interaction of magnitude x age x task version (p =. 002). 
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inflated by the variance induced by insufficient data points. For this reason, we only reported 
the descriptive statistics for the response time (see Figure 3.4). Figure 3.4 demonstrates that 
overall children tended to spend longer time to make a correct response in the experimental 
condition than in the control condition for each magnitude condition. Children tended to 
spend longer time to make a correct response when there were more objects in the common 
ground. This effect of common ground size seemed to be prominent for both the hidden 
perspective task and visible perspective task, and also for both 8-year-olds and 10-year-olds, 
with the only exception being the control condition trials in visible perspective task for 10-
year-olds. Note that these were only trends observed from the descriptive statistics but not 
from formal statistical analysis, therefore could not be further interpreted with confidence.  
 





















Overall, children performed more egocentrically when they were under the enforced 
memory load in the hidden perspective version, and when the common ground size was 
greater. As expected, 10-year-olds committed fewer egocentric errors compared to 8-year-
olds. Critically, an interaction was observed between the effects of task version, common 
ground size and age on egocentrism. In 8-year-olds, we found a systematic linear effect of 
common ground size on egocentrism in the hidden perspective version but not in the visible 
perspective version; while for 10-year-olds, there was limited evidence suggesting that 
common ground size had a systematic linear effect on their degree of egocentrism, and no 
difference was found between the hidden perspective and visible perspective versions. This 
interaction with age suggests that younger children were disproportionally affected by the 
common ground size when they were under the enforced memory load than when such 
memory load was absent. The results pattern from Figure 3.3 is also consistent in suggesting 
that the main effect of task version, age and the size of common ground were mainly driven 
by the distinctive performance of 8-year-old children in the hidden perspective version. 
Altogether, this suggests that our memory manipulations might have partially accounted for 
the age-related improvements between 8- and 10-year-olds’ perspective-taking performance.  
However, two confounding variables were associated with the experimental design in 
Experiment 2. The first was that although we were manipulating the number of objects in the 
common ground, the number of objects in the privileged ground was held constant as 2, 
which left the total number of objects increasing with the size of common ground. The 
greater the common ground size, the greater the whole object array size, and the more 
complex the object array. Frick et al. (2014) showed that the visual complexity of an array of 
objects influenced 5- to 8-year-old children’s visuo-spatial perspective-taking performance. 
Therefore, it was unclear from Experiment 2 whether 8-year-old children’s degrees of 
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egocentrism in the hidden perspective version varied as a function of the size of common 
ground as we intended to examine, or alternatively as a function of the overall array size or 
visual complexity. Secondly, the size of privileged ground was held constant as 2 in quantity. 
If children in the hidden perspective version were being strategic, then they could choose to 
only encode the two objects in the privileged ground regardless of the number of objects 
presented in the common ground. Therefore, the cognitive load of encoding and holding in 
mind relevant perspective information could have been greatly reduced and kept invariable 
across different magnitude conditions. Given that only 8-year-old children in the hidden 
perspective version were affected by the increasing common ground size, it is plausible that 
the 8-year-olds attempted to encode the objects in the common ground or the whole object 
array, whereas 10-year-olds may have identified this efficient encoding strategy and encoded 
the objects in the privileged ground instead.   
In Experiment 3, we aimed to disentangle the effect of common ground size from the 
confounding effect of object array size and also to rule out the use of potential memory 
strategy. We systematically varied the number of objects in the common ground between 3, 
5, 7 and 9 whilst holding the total number of objects constant as 12, leaving the number of 
objects in the privileged ground to vary between 9, 7, 5 and 3.  
3.3. Experiment 3 
3.3.1. Methods 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
Sixty-two 8-year-old children (mean age 7.91, age range 7.17 to 8.81, 30 males and 32 
females) and 71 10-year-old children (mean age 9.97, age range 9.18 to 10.81, 36 males and 
35 females) from three primary schools located in the Birmingham area took part in the 
study. Children from each class were selected according to an alphabetical class list, and were 
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assigned to either the hidden perspective version or the visible perspective version 
alternately. Twenty-nine 8-year-olds took part in the hidden perspective version; another 33 
took part in the visible perspective version. Thirty-four 10-year-olds took part in the hidden 
perspective version, and another 37 took part in the visible perspective version. There was no 
difference between the ages of children assigned to the hidden perspective version and those 
assigned to the visible perspective version within each age group, p =.380 for 8-year-olds, 
and p = .725 for 10-year-olds. Six additional 8-year-olds and 5 additional 10-year-olds were 
excluded prior the analysis due to both their failure to pass a comprehension check at the end 
of the instruction phase and also failure to perform significantly above floor level.  
3.3.1.2. Design and procedure 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 4 mixed design was constructed with age (8- and 10-year-olds) and task 
version (hidden perspective and visible perspective versions) as between-subject factors, and 
condition (experimental, control) and the magnitude of common ground (3, 5, 7, and 9 
common ground objects) as within-subject factors.  
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 2 with the following 
exceptions. All shelf images contained 12 objects in total, while the number of objects in the 
common ground varied between 3, 5, 7, and 9, thus leaving the number of objects in the 
privileged ground to vary between 9, 7, 5, and 3. A total of 32 shelf images were presented. 
Sixteen shelf images were used for the experimental condition with 4 shelf images for each 
magnitude condition, and the other 16 shelf images were for the control condition also with 4 
for each magnitude condition.4 Each shelf image was accompanied by 2 verbal instructions, 
                  
 
4 In the hidden perspective version, a technical error occurred in one of the control trials, 
whereby an image corresponding to its matching experimental condition was presented in the 
5000ms viewing time before a correct image onset and remained onscreen during the verbal 
instructions. Therefore, the data from this control trial in both the hidden perspective and 
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one of which was a critical instruction, and the other instruction was a filler instruction. The 
critical instruction could occur as either the first or the second instruction in a sequence. 
Thirty-two shelf images were grouped into 4 blocks, and each block had 8 shelf images, 
mixed of experimental and control trials. The shelf image in the control condition was 
presented at least 8 shelf images apart from its corresponding shelf image in the experimental 
condition. One practice block consisting of 3 shelf images was presented prior to the test 
phase, each shelf image was accompanied by 2 verbal instructions.  
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Proportion of egocentric errors 
Non-egocentric errors (which constituted 10.46% of the data from the hidden 
perspective version in 8-year-olds, 11.14% of the data from the visible perspective version in 
8-year-olds, 9.11% of the data from the hidden perspective version in 10-year-olds, and 
7.85% of the data from the visible perspective version in 10-year-olds) and response timeouts 
(2.79% overall) were excluded prior to the analysis. In the experimental condition, the 
proportion egocentric errors of individual participants ranged from no errors to 1 in a given 
magnitude condition and from no errors to .854 overall. In the control condition, the mean 
proportion egocentric errors for each age group in each magnitude condition of each task 
version were all below .011. 
The data from the experimental condition were submitted to a 2 x 2 x 4 mixed ANOVA 
with age and task version as two between-subject factors, and magnitude of common ground 
(3, 5, 7, 9 common ground objects; referred to as ‘magnitude’) as a within-subject factor. 
There was a significant main effect of the magnitude of common ground, F(3, 387) = 14.980, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .104, with a significant linear trend only, F(1, 129) = 38.001, p < .001, ηp2 = 
                                                       
 
visible perspective versions were excluded prior to the analysis, in order to make fair 
comparisons between children’s performance in these two task versions. 
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.228 (quadratic trend, p = .374, and cubic trends, p = .227). This suggested that with the 
increase of the size of privileged ground (and correspondingly the decrease of the size of 
common ground), accuracy increased in a systematic linear way. A significant main effect of 
task version was also observed, F(1, 129) = 24.587, p < .001, ηp2 = .160, with participants in 
hidden perspective version committing more egocentric errors than those in the visible 
perspective version. A marginally significant main effect of age was also observed, F(1, 129) 
= 3.489, p = .064, ηp2 = .026. In general, 10-year-olds showed a tendency to outperform 8-
year-olds, but this tendency did not reach statistical significance. A marginally significant 
interaction between age and task version was also observed, F(1, 129) = 3.194, p = .076, ηp2 
= .024. No other significant 2-way interaction was found, ps > .100. The 3-way interaction 
was also non-significant, F(3, 387) = 1.699, p = .167, ηp2 = .013. The results can be seen in 
Figure 3.5.5 
                  
 
5 GEE (generalised estimating equation) results converged with the results from ANOVA on 
proportion egocentric errors in Experiment 2. In the complimentary GEE analysis, the 
magnitude of common ground was specified as a within-subject variable, age and task 
version as two between-subject variables, and percentage egocentric errors as the dependent 
variable. The distribution of the dependent variable was specified as poison rather than 
normal distribution. Convergingly, the GEE results showed a significant main effect of 
magnitude (p < .001), a marginally significant effect of age (p = .053), a main effect of task 
version (p < .001) and a marginally significant interaction of age x task version ( p = .064). 
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Figure 3.5. Proportions of egocentric errors on experimental trails in Experiment 3. Error bars 
show standard errors. 
Because of its potential importance, we followed up the interaction between age and task 
version, even though it only approached statistical significance. Two independent t-tests were 
first conducted between the hidden and visible perspective versions for 8- and 10-year-olds 
separately. Eight-year-olds made significantly more egocentric errors in the hidden 
perspective version than in the visible perspective version, t(60) = 2.216, p = .030, Cohen’s d 
=.571. Similarly, 10-year-olds also performed more egocentrically in the hidden perspective 
version than in the visible perspective version, t(69) = 5.013, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.192. 
This tendency confirmed the main effect of task version on egocentrism. Two independent t-
tests were then conducted between 8- and 10-year-olds for the hidden perspective version and 
the visible perspective version separately. Two age group performed similarly for the hidden 
perspective version, t(61) = .033, p = .974, Cohen’s d = .009; but for the visible perspective 
version, 10-year-olds were significantly less egocentric compared to 8-year-olds, t(68) = 
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2.530, p = .014, Cohen’s d = .604. It seems that the marginally significant effect of age and 
the marginally significant interaction between effects of age and task version was mostly 
driven by the difference between 8-year-olds’ performance and 10-year-olds’ performance in 
the visible perspective task version6. 
3.3.2.2. Response time 
As for Experiment 2, only the descriptive statistics of the response time for Experiment 
3 were reported in Figure 3.6. No clear and systematic trends could be observed from the 
descriptive statistics in Figure 3.6.  
 
Figure 3.6. Means and standard errors of response time (ms) for 8 and 10-year-olds in 
Experiment 3. 
                  
 
6  Experiment 3 was first run with just 92 of these children. Analysis of data from this sample 
yielded the same results pattern to the results we presented in this paper, i.e., significant main 
effects of task version and common ground size, marginally significant effect of age, and 
marginally significant interaction between age and common ground. To check whether the 
marginally significant effects in our initial sample were due to insufficient power, we 
extended the sample size by 50% to gain the full sample reported here, but this did not 























Experiment 3 provided convergent evidence with Experiment 2 on the significant roles 
of the number of items in common ground and the need to retain these objects in memory 
while interpreting the director’s instructions. When the total number of objects was kept 
constant, the size of common ground still systematically affected children’s perspective-
taking performance. The greater the common ground size, the more egocentric errors children 
committed. Moreover, we found that children were more prone to select the distractor when 
they were under the enforced memory load than when such memory load was not enforced. 
Ten-year-old children showed a tendency to be more successful at identifying the target 
referent in the common ground compared to 8-year-olds, but the difference was only 
marginally significant. Moreover, we observed a marginally significant interaction between 
age and task version, which was mostly driven by 10-year-olds performing less 
egocentrically than 8-year-olds in the visible perspective version, but equally egocentrically 
in the hidden perspective version. The implications of these findings were discussed in details 
in the next section.  
3.4. General discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine whether memory factors could explain the 
variations in children’s perspective-taking performance. Eight- and 10-year-old children were 
instructed to take a speaker’s perspective either under enforced memory load (i.e., the hidden 
perspective version) or under reduced memory load (i.e., the visible perspective version). In 
Experiment 2, the size of common ground was systematically varied with the size of 
privileged ground held constant as 2; in Experiment 3, the size of common ground was 
systematically varied with the total number of objects held constant as 12. Consistent with 
 82 
previous studies, egocentric effects were clearly observed in the measure of errors in our 
study (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2003; Nilsen & 
Graham, 2009). The current study had three key objectives: (a) to evaluate the effect of 
holding in mind a speaker’s perspective on children’s degree of egocentrism, (b) to assess the 
effect of common ground size on children’s degree of egocentrism, (c) to examine whether 
10-year-old children would perform less egocentrically compared to 8-year-olds in our 
experimental setting, and whether the manipulated memory factors would drive this age-
related reduction in egocentrism. The current findings will be discussed in further details 
below in relation to these three objectives. 
Our study was the first attempt to directly measure the cost of holding in mind a 
speaker’s perspective on participants’ performance in the director task by removing the visual 
cues to the director’s perspective after a brief viewing time. Our findings from both 
experiments support the conclusion that children were more egocentric in the hidden 
perspective version than in the visible perspective version. The specific cognitive demands of 
each task can be decomposed as follows (Apperly et al., 2010). In the hidden perspective 
version, participants had to encode, retain and later integrate the director’s perspective with 
her instructions in order to successfully resolve the reference. Failure to include the target 
referent into the memory record of potential common ground referents would lead to failure 
to correctly recognise the target referent. However, in the visible perspective version, 
participants could identify the director’s perspective and integrate it with her verbal message 
at the point of need but it was not necessary to store relevant perspective information for any 
longer than it took to infer and integrate perspective information. The only difference 
between the two task versions was that there was an extra memory load of remembering and 
retaining encoded perspective information in the hidden perspective version. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the increase in egocentric errors arose from the difficulty 
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children face in managing this extra memory load in the hidden perspective version. This 
finding corresponds to the everyday situations in which communication requires us to 
remember who knows what, rather than figure out who knows what at the precise time we 
need this information. Our study operationalises a way to incorporate this memory demand 
which is frequently and naturally present in our everyday communication into the widely-
used director task, and results confirm that this memory load could partially explains 
children’s variations in perspective use in different real-life situations. 
Secondly, our study systematically manipulated the size of common ground in two 
different ways: in Experiment 2, we manipulated the number of objects in the common 
ground between 3, 5 and 7 whilst keeping the number of objects in the privileged ground 
constant as 2; In Experiment 3, we manipulated the number of objects in the common ground 
between 3, 5, 7 and 9 whilst keeping the overall number of objects as 12. Two experiments 
consistently found that both 8- and 10-year-olds were less successful at accommodating a 
speakers’ limited perspective in communication when there was a greater amount of common 
ground information. This effect of increasing common ground size on egocentrism is in line 
with a previous study showing the same effect of common ground size on adults’ egocentrism 
under the enforced memory load of holding in mind a speaker’s perspective (Zhao, Wang, & 
Apperly, under review). While common ground size co-varied with the total number of 
objects in Experiment 2, this was not the case in Experiment 3. Frick et al.'s study (2014) 
suggested that visual complexity of the layouts of object array had a detrimental effect on 5- 
to 8-year-olds’ perspective-taking performance when their own perspective differed from 
another person. Our findings have advanced knowledge in this field by providing evidence 
that even when two object arrays were of the same degree of visual complexity, the size of 
common ground still affected children’s degree of egocentrism. These findings provide 
support for the long assumed notion that listeners work on the basis of common ground to 
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interpret a speaker’s message (Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981), and have further extended this 
assumption from adult communicators to young communicators who are generally less 
experienced in communication and are equipped with limited social and cognitive capacities. 
Our findings are consistent with Nadig and Sedivy (2002)’s findings that children do show 
considerable sensitivity to common ground information in referential communication, 
although our study is not designed to examine the time course regarding this sensitivity to 
common ground. The findings also accord with Barr (2008)’s claim that people do anticipate 
items in common ground to be referred to, but also suffer from egocentric interference when 
they need to integrate linguistic input with perspective information. More importantly, our 
findings provide evidence about how the cognitive demand of managing common ground size 
may constrain people’s ability to use other’s perspective to guide communication. 
Thirdly, we sought evidence for age-related improvement in children’s ability to adopt a 
speaker’s perspective in referential communication, and also sought the possible cognitive 
factors that drove this age-related improvement. Results from Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that 10-year-olds outperformed 8-year-olds in the director task in the proportion of egocentric 
errors they committed. This finding is consistent with a number of previous studies 
suggesting that children’s ability to use other people’s mental states continues to grow over 
time after they have acquired the basic theory of mind competence (Dumontheil et al., 2010; 
Epley, Morewedge, et al., 2004; Symeonidou et al., 2016), especially in accord with Wang et 
al. (2016) showing that 10-year-olds committed significantly fewer egocentric errors than 8-
year-olds in the director task. Experiment 2 also witnessed an interaction among factors of 
task version, common ground size and age. The performance of 8-year-olds in the hidden 
perspective version was disproportionally affected by the increasing common ground size 
compared to 8-year-olds in the visible perspective version and 10-year-olds in both versions 
of the task. This provides some evidence that the memory-related factors we manipulated in 
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Experiment 2 might have contributed to the age-related improvement between 8- and 10-
year-olds’ perspective-taking performances. However, as discussed in section 3.2.3, this 
significant effect of age and significant interaction of age x task version x common ground 
size on egocentrism in Experiment 2 might have been driven by older children’s improved 
ability of identifying and employing the appropriate memory strategies when they were under 
the extra memory load of remembering the director’s perspective, rather than older children’s 
improved memory capacity of correctly remembering a larger amount of perspective 
information. This speculation is consistent with the suggestion that one key mechanism of the 
development of visuo-spatial working memory is that older children are better at recognising 
and adopting possible processing strategies (see Pickering, 2001 for a review paper). After 
controlling for the possibility of being strategic in only encoding the objects in privileged 
ground, Experiment 3 found that 10-year-olds committed only marginally fewer egocentric 
errors compared with 8-year-olds. Moreover, only a marginally significant interaction was 
found between the factors of age and task version in Experiment 3. Specifically, both age 
group showed a similar degree of egocentrism in the hidden perspective version, but 10-year-
olds showed a tendency to perform less egocentrically than 8-year-olds in the visible 
perspective version.  
Overall, the findings from Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 together provided some 
evidence for an age-related development in children’s ability to accommodate a speaker’s 
limited perspective during referential communication. While 10-year-olds performed 
significantly less egocentrically than 8-year-olds in Experiment 2, this age-related effect was 
marginally significant in Experiment 3. As our study only tested 8- and 10-year-old children, 
it is possible that this limited age range may have obscured the age-related development we 
intended to find. It would be sensible for future research to have a larger age-range when it 
comes to examining age-related development in perspective use.  
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Critically, the current study examined whether either of the two memory-related factors 
(i.e., remembering the director’s perspective and managing common ground size) would exert 
less effect on older children’s degree of egocentrism compared to younger children’s. The 
pattern observed in Experiment 2 was consistent with 10-year-olds being better than 8-year-
olds at managing the memory demand of remembering the increasing common ground size in 
the hidden perspective version but not in the visible perspective version. However, after 
eliminating the possibility of employing a useful encoding strategy, Experiment 3 only found 
a marginally significant interaction between task version and age, whereby 10-year-olds were 
less egocentric than 8-year-olds in the visible perspective version but not in the hidden 
perspective version. One plausible explanation was that 10-year-olds were more able than 8-
year-olds to infer the director’s perspective and use it to guide comprehension when the need 
to remember the director’s perspective was absent in the visible perspective version, but these 
10-year-olds were no better than 8-year-olds at reliably remembering the director’s 
perspective in the hidden perspective version. Following this interpretation, however, we 
would expect the same pattern of results to have also emerged between the two age groups 
from the visible perspective version in Experiment 2, which was not the case. It is unclear 
from the present study why interactions involving the factor of task version showed different 
patterns in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Therefore, this proposed explanation should be 
interpreted with caution and may need further exploration.   
Importantly, although common ground size had a systematic effect on children’s degree 
of egocentrism in both Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, no interaction involving common 
ground size was found in Experiment 3 after controlling for the aforementioned confounding 
variable. This finding may appear to be surprising, as previous studies have found that 
children’s successful performance on theory of mind tasks draws upon their executive 
functions including working memory and inhibitory control (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 
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2002; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Davis & Pratt, 1995; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; 
Hansen Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Harvey, 2014; Lagattuta, Sayfan, & Blattman, 2010). Therefore, 
it seems plausible to assume that the increasing size of common ground might influence 
younger children’s perspective-taking performance more strongly by placing an additional 
memory demand on their rather limited memory capacities compared to older children. 
However, our results provide no clear evidence for this suggestion. This finding, though 
surprising, is consistent with Wang et al. (2016) where they found that 8- and 10-year-olds 
were equally influenced by the complexity of the instructions they had to integrate with the 
director’s limited perspective. These findings suggest that we cannot take it for granted that 
the cognitive factors that affect children’s perspective-taking performance  are also those that 
drive children’s age-related improvement in perspective use. In additional to the memory 
capacity to manage increasing common ground size examined in the current study and the 
capacity to manage language complexity examined in Wang et al. (2016), inhibitory control 
might be another potential cognitive factor that drive children’s age-related improvements in 
perspective taking. This speculation is supported by the evidence that children’s egocentric 
error rates on the classic director task correlated with their inhibitory control capacities 
(Nilsen & Graham 2009). Therefore, it is possible that older children are less egocentric than 
younger children because of their age-related improvements in inhibitory control capacities. 
Thus, age-related improvements in inhibitory control are worth exploring in future research 
as a source of age-related reduction in egocentrism.  
To conclude, the present study incorporated into the commonly-used director task two 
types of memory demands which are frequently present in our everyday communication: the 
memory demand to hold in mind a speaker’s perspective, and the amount of common ground 
information to keep track of. We examined the effects of these two memory demands on 8- 
and 10-year-old children’s perspective-taking performance during language comprehension. 
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Findings demonstrated that 8- and 10-year-olds’ rates of egocentrism were modulated both by 
the demand of holding in mind a speaker’s perspective, and by the varied amount of common 
ground information they needed to keep track of. While 10-year-olds were significantly less 
egocentric than 8-year-olds in Experiment 2, this effect was marginal in Experiment 3. No 
clear evidence was found for the memory-related factors to be accountable for age-related 
improvement in children’s perspective-taking performance. Nonetheless, the current findings 
imply that children will be most successful at accommodating a speaker’s limited perspective 
when they can easily access information about what is shared between them and the speaker 
rather than having to remember and later retrieve this information from their memory. The 
findings also suggest that an increase in the number of potential referents shared between 
listeners and speakers may cause children to be more egocentric when they need to use a 
speaker’s limited perspective to identify a correct referent. When talking to children, 
highlighting what is shared between conversational partners or any perspective difference to 
narrow down the scope of potential referents would help them to better avoid falling back to 












4.1. Links from Chapter 2 and 3 to Chapter 5 and 6 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the role of memory in adults and children’s perspective 
taking performance using a newly adapted referential communication task (i.e., the director 
task). The study found that the cost of holding in mind a speaker’s perspective for a longer 
duration had a detrimental effect on both adults’ and children’s perspective taking 
performance. Adults with lower working memory capacities made more egocentric errors. 
Both adults and children made significantly more egocentric errors when the size of common 
ground was greater.  
Findings from Chapters 2 and 3 together suggest that the abilities to form common 
ground representations and to make relevant theory of mind inferences during referential 
communication was constrained by the memory demands of the specific communication task 
as well as by people’s working memory capacities. Memory processes are involved in the 
processes of perspective taking during communication: people form perspective 
representations about what the conversational partner knows or does not know about, store 
these perspective representations in their memory, and then retrieve from memory and 
integrate with linguistic input when these perspective representations are needed to 
disambiguate linguistic reference. Failure to form, store or use these perspective 
representations will result in committing egocentric errors.  
These findings naturally lead to a series of questions. How do people form and store 
common ground representations in memory? How does the memory system support the 
efficient use of common ground representations during everyday communication? What is 
the nature of the common ground representations stored in memory—do they include rich 
social contextual information, or do they only include simple binary information which 
indicates whether a piece of information is known to someone or not? More critically, is it 
necessary for one to rely on the explicit theory of mind inferences to ensure successful use of 
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common ground? Alternatively, can the use of common ground be achieved through 
submentalising, without necessarily going though explicit mental states inferences? Research 
in Chapter 5 and 6 was conducted to cast light on these questions.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, the director task required participants to make explicit mindreading 
inference about the director’s perspective and use relevant perspective information to identify 
the target referent in the common ground. In contrast, the experiences in Chapters 5 and 6 
tested whether the common ground representations can be established through a low-level 
memory-based mechanism, which supports the encoding, storage and retrieval of common 
ground representations. 
4.2. Different accounts of common ground representations  
Common ground representations shape the contents of a conversation and the manner in 
which they are delivered. Different accounts have been proposed by researchers regarding the 
nature of common ground representations people form. I will review three theoretical 
positions on this topic.  
Rich, episodic and ‘diary-like’ common ground representations 
Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981) proposed that people use a Reference Diary, i.e., an 
updated record of partner-specific knowledge, to help them keep track of common ground. 
According to Clark and Marshall, common ground information is stored in the form of rich, 
episodic, diary-like representations. This means that people need to keep an elaborated and 
up-to-date model of their conversational partner. Moreover, people need to explicitly refer to 
this model on a moment-by-moment basis during communication, which may place higher 
processing demands than people could plausibly satisfy in daily conversation.  
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‘One-bit’ common ground representations 
Galati and Brennan (2006) proposed a ‘one-bit model’ of common ground (see also 
Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Shintel & Keysar, 2009; and Galati & Brennan, 2010). The ‘one-bit 
model’ suggests that under some circumstances individuals can rely on a single cue (e.g.,  
whether the director can/cannot see this object, whether something was/was not talked about) 
to work out whether a certain piece of information is shared with their conversational partner. 
This ‘minimal’ account of common ground can explain why in some cases people can get 
access to common ground representations readily and rapidly, and use these common ground 
representations to adapt their language processing behaviours immediately. 
An ordinary, low-level memory mechanism for common ground  
Independent from both the full-blown ‘diary-like’ and the minimal ‘one-bit’ 
representations of common ground, Horton and Gerrig (2005a, 2005b, 2016) proposed a 
relatively low-level memory mechanism for common ground representations. This memory-
based approach emphasises the role of domain-general processes of memory encoding and 
retrieval in the representations of common ground. Specifically, they proposed that common 
ground can be represented via ordinary memory processes, which can be further divided into 
two processes: a strategic process and an automatic process. The strategic process refers to 
the process that interlocutors strategically/explicitly consider whether a specific piece of 
information is shared between each other. The automatic process is a cue-based, automatic, 
fast, and effort-free memory mechanism. Under this automatic memory process, speakers and 
listeners depend on salient memory cues in their working memory to activate associated 
episodic memory traces, enabling them to automatically retrieve associated common ground 
representations from memory. This memory-based mechanism for common ground pointed 
out that many instances of partner-specific effects, which may seem to occur on the basis of 
people’s dedicated explicit inference about common ground, can be explained by a relatively 
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spontaneous, implicit and effortless domain-general memory process (Horton & Gerrig, 
2016). 
4.3. The low-level memory mechanism for common ground 
representations 
Much of the evidence in support of a low-level memory mechanism for common ground 
representations (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b) comes from research examining the effects 
of lexical entrainment and partner-specificity.  
When people engage in referential communication, they often repeatedly use the same 
term to refer to the same object. This phenomenon is termed as ‘lexical entrainment’ 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod & Anderson, 1987). In the previous example, ‘Mr. Apple’ is 
a lexically entrained referring term which is agreed and shared by both conversational parties. 
Brennan and Clark (1996) proposed that an entrained referring expression may represent a 
partner-specific ‘conceptual pact’. During the process of grounding a reference, speakers and 
addressees are believed to develop a ‘conceptual pact’ which is ‘a temporary agreement about 
how the referent is to be conceptualized’ (Brennan & Clark, 1996, p. 1484). This conceptual 
pact is believed to be partner-specific. When the conversational partner changes, a new 
conceptual pact will be established and may differ from the previous one. Experiment 3 of 
Brennan and Clark (1996) found that after having established a ‘conceptual pact’ with an 
addressee, the speaker would stick to the original term (e.g., ‘pennyloafer’) when taking to 
the original addressee, even when the original term was over-informative; however, when 
facing a new addressee, the speaker tended to switch to a simpler term (e.g., ‘shoe’). 
Matthews, Lieven, and Tomasello (2010) also found that even 3- to 5-year-old children were 
slower to react to a new term compared to an original term which was previously established 
in a warm-up game. More importantly, this delay was larger when participants were with the 
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original conversational partner who had used the original term in the warm up game, 
compared to with a new partner. This study suggests that even 3-year-old children were 
sensitive to conceptual pacts during referential communication. 
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of studies examining and/or 
supporting a low-level memory mechanism for common ground within the framework of 
referential communication (Gorman, Gegg-Harrison, Marsh, & Tanenhaus, 2013; Horton, 
2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005b; Horton & Slaten, 2012; Matthews et al., 2010; Rubin, Brown-
Schmidt, Duff, Tranel, & Cohen, 2011; Shintel & Keysar, 2007, 2009). This mechanism 
explains partner-specific effects in terms of partner-specific memory associations. In this 
account, during interaction, information about conversation partner might become associated 
with a wide range of related information in episodic memory (e.g., the referring term for a 
specific referent). Partner-based information serves as memory cues, and its presence makes 
the memory traces strongly associated with the partner highly accessible.  
Horton and colleagues suggests that partner-specific information is retrieved under a 
memory mechanism named ‘resonance’ (Horton, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b). 
‘Resonance’ was first presented by Ratcliff (1978) for explaining the process of memory 
retrieval. It was later regarded by Graesser et al. (1997) as an important cognitive component 
in discourse comprehension. Resonance is considered to be an efficient, automatic and 
effortless mechanism. When the contents in working memory match closely with traces in 
long-term memory, resonance is likely to occur between the memory cues active in working 
memory and the information stored in long-term memory, thus causing the information in 
long-term memory to be activated and retrieved.  
One piece of evidence for this memory-based account came from Horton's study (2007). 
In this study participants performed a picture-naming task. Participants were first given the 
opportunity to associate specific words or object categories with each of the two experimental 
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partners. Participants then named a series of pictures in the presence of each experimental 
partner. Results showed that participants were faster to name an object when faced with the 
same partner as in the established partner-object episodic association than when faced with a 
different partner. Participants later took a partner-identification test, where they were asked to 
indicate which partner they had seen certain words with. No correlation was found between 
participants’ implicit partner-specific priming effect and their explicit recall of partner-object 
association. The lack of correlation suggested that the observed partner-specific effect did not 
result from explicit mindreading inferences, but from relatively implicit memory process. 
This study demonstrated that the associated partner identity served as a memory cue that 
facilitated the retrieval of the name of the object, and that the partner-specific effect occurred 
even in a non-communicative context where no explicit communicative goal existed.  
A recent study by Gorman et al. (2013) also provided support to the low-level memory-
based hypothesis of conversational common ground. The study found that shared learning 
experience with a partner in the study phase provided more contextual cues for participants to 
better distinguish between what was shared and what was privileged in a following referential 
communication task. Such enhancing effect of shared learning experience was even observed 
when the study partner was not the communication task partner. The results indicated that 
participants were able keep track of shared information based on memory cues, and that they 
would even generalise the shared information to another partner when the memory cues are 
strong. 
Similarly, the lack of a partner-specific effect in some circumstances can be explained 
within the memory-based account of common ground. For example, Shintel and Keysar's 
(2007) study showed that participants (as listeners) expected speakers to be consistent in 
using the same referring expression for a referent, even when the referring expression was 
used previously with another listener rather than themselves. This consistency expectation 
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was unlikely to be motivated by the assumption of cooperativeness underlying common 
ground inferences. Shintel and Keysar (2007) argued that when listeners formed memory 
representations of mappings between a referring expression and an object, they incorporated 
the identities of communication partners as contextual cues into their memory. When the 
partner-based cue is salient, ‘it can result in speaker-specific activation of existing 
expression–referent mappings’. However, if the partner-based cue is not salient enough, ‘it 
may be swamped by a relatively much stronger cue provided by the repetition of the same 
expression, which may explain why a speaker-specific facilitation benefit was not found’ 
(Shintel & Keysar, 2007, p. 368). Apart from the effect of the salience of memory cues, 
Horton and Gerrig (2005a) also suggested that memory errors might cause incorrect 
representations of common ground (e.g., when one piece of information is in the common 
ground with person A but is wrongly assumed to be in common ground with person B), 
which further lead to perspective-taking failures or miscommunication. 
The studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 explored such a low-level memory mechanism 
for common ground representations. I took a memory-based approach to test whether 
communicative contextual information would influence participants’ memory for objects in a 
relatively automatic way. Two types of contextual information regarding the representations 
of conversational partners was incorporated into the newly-designed experiments: Chapter 5 
examined the effect of the change of conversational partners on object recognition, and 
Chapter 6 examined the effect of the conversational partner’s perspective status (i.e., 
common / privileged ground) on object recognition.  
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4.4. Influence of conversational partner change on memory: 
inspired by work on event cognition  
‘Events are what happens to us, what we do, what we anticipate with pleasure or dread, 
and what we remember with fondness or regret. Much of our behavior is guided by our 
understanding of events’ (Radvansky & Zacks, 2014, p. 1). As interpreted by Brown-Schmidt 
and Duff (2016), Clark and Marshall (1981) hold an event-based view of how people gain 
explicit access to common ground representations. An example from Clark and Marshall 
(1981): 
When Ann uses the reference the man in the red shirt, Bob must find in memory an 
individual who fits that description . . .he must seek out an event that he can use along with 
certain auxiliary assumptions as the basis G for inductively inferring mutual knowledge of 
the identity of that man. (p. 53)  
Based on this event-based view, conversational partners search for an event that 
provides the necessary basis (‘G’) to determine whether something is in common ground or 
not. In this section, I will review the literature on event cognition and the memory processes 
involved in the representations of event models, and explain how the mechanism for event 
model representations could support a low-level memory mechanism for common ground 
representations.  
4.4.1. Event model, event-indexing model, and event segmentation theory 
Situation model / Event model. The concept of ‘situation model’, which refers to the 
mental representation of the situation described by the discourse, was proposed as a relatively 
high level of representation during discourse comprehension (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). 
The term ‘event model' was later proposed as an extended construct of 'situation model' in a 
broader research area of event cognition, including text comprehension, film comprehension 
and different types of real-world experiences (Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). An event model is 
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defined as the mental representation of the event which is currently being experienced or has 
previously been experienced.  
Event-indexing model. One key feature of event model is its multidimensionality. 
According to the event-indexing model (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, 
Magliano, & Graesser, 1995), people construct their mental representation of an event in 
long-term memory on the basis of  five dimensions, namely temporality, spatiality, causality, 
intentionality (i.e. goals) and the protagonist. Discontinuity in any of these five dimensions 
could potentially introduce an event boundary to people’s mentally constructed event model, 
causing the model to be updated to include a new event.  
Event segmentation theory. Based on the event indexing model, Zacks and his 
colleagues further proposed the event segmentation theory, which suggests that perceptual 
systems spontaneously and automatically segment a stream of ongoing activity into 
meaningful events based on the aforementioned five dimensions (e.g., Kurby & Zacks, 2008; 
Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 2009; Zacks, Speer, & Reynolds, 2009; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, 
Braver, & Reynolds, 2007). People construct a mental model to represent the event being 
experienced and use the current stable model to anticipate an upcoming stimulus. If the 
features of the current event change, prediction of upcoming information will become 
difficult and may cause a large number of errors to occur. This transient increase of errors is 
detected by the perceptual systems, which send signals to update the mental representation of 
the current event based on the new features of input. This theory explains how our perceptual 
systems parse the continuous flow of experience into meaningful chunks and how we make 
sense of the dynamic and complex world in an efficient and effective way.  
4.4.2. The effect of event boundary on memory encoding and retrieval 
Event segmentation is considered to form the basis of cognitive control and memory 
encoding and retrieval. Radvansky (2012) indicated in his recent review that, 'how we break 
 99 
up streams of action into events influences how we think about things and what we remember 
later. These memories then help guide us through flow of experience, allowing us to develop 
expectations of what will happen and what to do next' (p.269). The way we experience and 
construct events shapes our memory and cognition, while in turn our memory and cognitive 
mechanism help us to go through continuous activity in an effective and efficient way.  
Several studies on text comprehension (e.g., Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; 
Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Speer & Zacks, 2005) provided converging evidence 
that people’s memory for recently mentioned objects was impaired after reading sentences 
that involved an event shift. For example in Speer and Zacks (2005), participants first read a 
sentence e.g. ‘she could hear water running, and figured there must be a creek nearby’, and 
the ‘creek’ in this sentence was the object which participant would later be asked to 
recognise. Participants then read either a following sentence in which a temporal shift was 
involved (e.g., ‘An hour later, she was collecting wood for a fire.’) or a sentence in which a 
temporal shift was not involved (e.g., ‘A moment later, she was collecting wood for a fire’). 
Results showed that participants spent a longer time to read sentences involving such 
temporal shifts compared to the ones without temporal shift, and their memory for the 
previous mentioned objects was worse after reading sentences involving such temporal shifts. 
These findings were believed to suggest that the objects mentioned before an event boundary 
are removed from working memory and then enter the long-term memory. The information in 
the long-term memory either decays over time, or become less accessible and takes longer to 
retrieve. Either of these two consequences could account for participants’ impaired memory 
for the objects preceding the temporal shifts. 
Studies on comprehension of picture stories and films also support the event 
segmentation theory. For example, Gernsbacher (1985) used picture story to test participants' 
memory for pictures across events. Participants were asked to view a picture story, during 
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which they were probed to identify and distinguish the original picture from a left-right 
reversed form of the original picture. Participants showed better recognition memory for 
pictures which were presented after an event boundary than for pictures which were 
presented before an event boundary. This finding suggest that the surface information of 
recently encountered objects would become less available after the event model is updated. 
Swallow et al. (2009)’s study used film clips during which target objects was presented for a 
few second. This study found that participants’ recognition memory for object was 
significantly affected by whether an even boundary occurred in the film clip during a 5s delay 
from the offset of the object presentation until the onset of the memory test.  
A recent series of experiments investigated the effect of spatial shift on participants' 
recognition memory of objects presented in a virtual reality environment (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006; Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011; Radvansky, Tamplin, & Krawietz, 
2010). These studies found that participants were more likely to forget the recently 
encountered objects when they moved from one room to another, compared to when they 
stayed in the same room. The shift of location served as an event boundary and prompted 
people to update their current event model. After experiencing an event boundary, 
information linked to the prior event would become less accessible in one’s memory. This 
‘location updating effect’ was observed not only in a virtual reality environment, but also in a 
real-world setting where participants moved across real rooms (Radvansky et al., 2011). The 
location updating effect was further distinguished from the encoding specificity account 
(Thomson & Tulving, 1970) or the context-dependent memory. According to the encoding 
specificity account, if people return back to the original spatial context, their memory would 
be improved, because the original context provides more retrieval cues which facilitate the 
access of target information. Radvansky and his colleagues conducted one study to test this 
alternative explanation (Radvansky et al., 2011), but they found no improvement in 
 101 
participants’ recognition memory of recently encountered objects by returning to the original 
context. This finding suggested that the cognitive mechanism under which event 
segmentation influences memory cannot be fully explained by the encoding specificity 
account.  
4.4.3. Protagonist shift as event boundary 
As introduced earlier in this chapter, protagonist is one of the five key dimensions that 
people rely on in order to index the event models. When people are engaged in 
communication, they construct event models based on the dimension of protagonist. 
Therefore, shifts in protagonists (e.g., conversational partners) would influence how the event 
models is constructed and how people’s memory is structured. This protagonist shift effect 
could potentially explain how common ground information may appear to be partner-specific 
during communication and how this partner-specific effect can be explained by a relatively 
low-level memory mechanism. According to the event segmentation theory, two specific 
hypotheses can be derived. Firstly, a shift in protagonists could potentially introduce event 
boundaries during event processing, which cause the current event model to be updated. 
Secondly, a shift in protagonist could also have an effect on people’s memory encoding and 
retrieval. Information represented in a protagonist-associated event model should become less 
available after a protagonist shift.  
Most of the studies on protagonist shift provide strong evidence in support of the first 
hypothesis that character shifts do create event boundaries during reading processing (e.g., 
Magliano, Miller, & Zwaan, 2001; Rinck & Weber, 2003; Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, & 
Curiel, 1998). Some studies examined participants’ reading times of a specific sentence as an 
indication of the processing load for reading that sentence. Zwaan et al. (1998) tested all five 
dimensions proposed in the event-indexing model to investigate their relative importance in a 
constructed mental model. Results showed that sentences with discontinuities on temporal, 
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protagonist, goal-intentional or causal dimension reliably increased people’s reading times of 
those sentences. Reading times increased as a function of the number of situational shifts 
occurred. Rinck and Weber (2003) tested the effect of discontinuity in space, time and 
protagonist on the processing load of target sentences. Results showed that the protagonist 
shift did reliably increase participants’ reading times of a target sentence where such a shift 
was introduced.  
It seems compelling that protagonist is one of the basic dimensions that people depend 
on to construct event models. However, few studies have examined the effect of protagonist 
shifts on memory encoding and retrieval. One exception was a study by Rich and Taylor 
(2000), which examined the effects of shifts in protagonist (i.e., introduction of a new 
protagonist), shifts in place (i.e., movement to a new location), and shifts in time (i.e., the 
jump of narrative time). Each narrative has six memory recognition probes, each as a three-
word phrase describing a specific event that either happened in the text or was thematically 
possible but did not happen. When a probe appeared, participants were asked to respond ‘yes’ 
if the event had occurred in the narrative and ‘no’ if it had not. There were three types of 
probes: cross-section probes, within-section probes, and false probes. The cross-section 
probes described a previous event which occurred prior to a sentence that contained a shift in 
protagonist, place or time. The within-section probe described a current event that 
participants were experiencing. The false probe described an event that did not occur in the 
narrative. Results suggested that participants responded more accurately and quickly for 
within-section probes than cross-section probes. Moreover, among the three types of shifts, 
protagonist shifts seemed to have the strongest effect on people’s memory. Participants 
responded significantly more accurately and significantly more slowly to the probes when 
following protagonist shifts than following either location shifts or time shifts. Rich & Taylor 
(2000) claimed that the protagonist dimension seemed to be the most important index among 
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the three event indices examined in their study, as protagonist shifts had the greatest effect on 
participants’ memory compared to the location shifts and time shifts. 
4.4.4. The current work on the effect of conversational partner change on 
memory 
Studies on event segmentation theory suggest that people keep track of protagonist-
related information during an event, and that change of protagonist acts as event boundaries 
during event processing and results in the update of the current event model. Research on 
partner-specificity in referential communication suggests that speakers and listeners both 
keep track of partner-specific information in order to communicate successfully, and that the 
common ground status between a speaker and a listener will change if their conversation 
partner changes. Both lines of research focus on the change of person involved in an event 
and examine its effect on memory encoding and retrieval. 
By combining the event segmentation theory with the memory-based model of 
conversational common ground, I propose that the event segmentation theory may offer an 
efficient way for partner-associated common ground to be encoded and stored separately in 
episodic memory traces. Changes of communication partners would serve as event 
boundaries, which divide on-going social activities and conversations into several event 
models. Each constructed event model is indexed by a specific communication partner 
(although other indices also exist). The specific partner serves as an informative cue during 
later memory retrieval, enabling the partner-associated common ground to be easily tracked 
during communication.  
Studies in Chapter 5 tested whether event segmentation mechanism could potentially 
shape and support the memory representations of partner-specific information about common 
ground during online social interaction, and whether partner-associated common ground 
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information can be established through such a low-level memory mechanism, without 
necessarily making deliberate Theory of Mind inference.  
4.5. Influence of conversational partner’s perspective status on 
memory   
When we are actively involved in the process of perspective-taking during 
communication, we pay attention to our conversational partner’s perspective to assess what is 
shared and what is not shared between us. Experiments in Chapter 6 introduced a novel 
approach to examine whether participants’ memory for objects in a post-test was affected by 
whether object being encoded from the common ground or privileged ground during a 
preceding referential communication task.  
4.5.1. Common ground versus privileged ground 
The ability to establish and retain common ground information is essential for human 
communication. Common ground information is believed to be a foundation upon which 
people build everyday social lives through communication and interaction with others. The 
traditional view of cooperative communication (see ‘cooperative principle’ discussed in 
Chapter 1), which was first proposed by Grice (1957), expect people to use common ground 
information from the earliest moments of language processing while completely ignoring 
information in privileged ground. However, empirical studies have demonstrated that 
although common ground information shapes what and how people communicate, 
communication is never free from the influence of information in privileged ground. Studies 
have shown that information in one’s privileged perspective has an effect on language 
comprehension and production, either as a probabilistic constraint competing with common 
ground information (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Hanna et 
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al., 2003; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002), or as an immediate constraint that needs to be corrected 
and adjusted later by drawing upon common ground information (e.g., Barr, 2008; Epley, 
Keysar, et al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2000, 2003).  
Empirically, information in common ground and privileged ground both influences how 
people process languages (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000, 2003). Theoretically, however, common 
ground information is still considered to be prioritised over privilege ground information 
(e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981). Consideration of common ground in communication is 
often related to the concepts of ‘audience design’, ‘perspective taking’ and ‘partner-specific 
adaptation’; whereas attention to privileged ground, on the contrary, is often related to the 
concepts of ‘egocentrism’, ‘failure of perspective taking’ and ‘miscommunication’. When 
describing results from communication tasks, researchers often use the term ‘successfully 
take into account the information in common ground’ and ‘fail to completely ignore 
information in privileged ground’ (e.g., Hanna et al., 2003). The use of these terms implies 
that the effect of common ground is desirable whereas the effect of privileged ground is 
unwanted for language comprehension and production. Similarly, when analysing 
participants’ eye movements data in the director task, numbers of fixations and duration of 
looking time on the distractors in the privileged ground are often considered to reflect 
participants’ degrees of egocentric bias  (Keysar et al., 2000, 2003; Lin et al., 2010; Nilsen & 
Graham, 2009).  
Recent research has only started to examine the benefits of privileged ground 
information for communication. A study by Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008) shifted the research 
focus from the use of common ground information to the use of both common ground and 
privileged ground information. This study found that when speakers asked questions to 
inquire about information only visible to listeners (‘what’s above the cow with shoes?’), 
listeners rapidly directed their attention toward items in their privileged ground even before 
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hearing the full sentence. Conversational participants was found to be sensitive to the forms 
of utterances. Specifically, the use of questions directed participants’ attention to privileged 
ground information, whereas the use of imperatives directed participants’ attention to 
common ground information. Therefore, Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008) proposed that 
‘selective attention to privileged ground when being asked for information may reflect 
awareness of the knowledge states of others, rather than egocentricity’ (p1123).  
The use of common ground information is necessary but insufficient for one’s success in 
taking a conversational partner’s perspective. Successful communication requires a 
sophisticated process of balancing the information from both the common ground and the 
privileged ground in a context-specific way. Different communicative contexts may require 
people to pay more attention to information in the common ground or privileged ground.  
4.5.2. The current work on the effect of perspective status on memory in 
Chapter 6 
When we are engaged in a conversation, how do we distribute our attention to 
information in the common ground and privileged ground? When we are required to take a 
conversational partner’s perspective into account, do we spontaneously pay more attention to 
information in common ground compared to privileged ground? Does the ground status of 
objects (i.e., common ground vs. privileged ground) influences the representations of these 
objects in memory? Do our attention and memory systems grant common ground information 
a prioritised status overs privileged ground information? 
Studies in Chapter 6 took a memory-based approach to address these questions 
regarding the attention directed to information in common ground versus privileged ground, 
and the memory representations of common ground versus privileged ground. If more 
attention is assigned to common ground objects during perspective-taking, then participants 
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are expected to have better memories for objects in the common ground than those in the 
privileged ground in a subsequent object recognition test.  
4.6. Overview of Chapters 5 and 6 
Chapters 5 and 6 took a memory-based approach to study how common ground 
information may be encoded and stored in memory, and how people access the encoded 
common ground representations. Experiments were designed to examine whether people’s 
memory for objects can be influenced automatically by common-ground-related social 
contexts (e.g., whether an object was probed in the presence of the same / different person as 
it was encoded, or whether an object was visible / in visible to another person). If the 
common-ground-related social contexts have an effect on people’s memories for objects even 
when this effect is not required or even undesirable, then it is likely that common ground 
representations can be established under a relatively low-level memory mechanism which 
requires little explicit inference and cognitive effort.  
Chapter 5 asked whether a change in the identity of a communicative partner influences 
participants’ memories for objects associated with different communicative partners. I 
propose that people may draw upon the associative memory traces to keep track of partner-
specific representations in a domain-general manner. Chapter 6 examined whether the status 
of an object in a conversational partner’s perspective (i.e., common ground versus privileged 
ground) would spontaneously influence participants memories for the object. Participants 
were expected to show a better recognition memory for objects in the common ground than 
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In Chapter 4, I reviewed evidence of how people might assess common ground by 
drawing upon a low-level memory-based mechanisms and how event segmentation 
mechanism might automatically structures our memory into meaningful chunks associated 
with partner information. By combining the low-level memory-based model of common 
ground  assessment (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b) with the event segmentation theory 
(e.g., Kurby & Zacks, 2008; Zacks & Swallow, 2007), Chapter 5 aimed to explore whether 
the change of conversational partners might act as an event boundary and divide on-going 
communication into different event models, which offers an efficient way for common 
ground information to be encoded in separate episodic memory traces which are associated 
with specific partners. If such partner-specific associations was established and stored in 
memory, then the specific partner was expected to serve as an informative cue during later 
memory retrieval, enabling the partner-associated common ground information to be easily 
accessed during communication. Experiments in Chapter 5 was designed to investigate 
whether common ground assessment might be achieved during conversation via such a low-
level memory-based mechanism, without necessarily making deliberate Theory of Mind 
inference. 
Firstly, experiments in Chapter 5 gained inspiration from a recent study by Samson et al. 
(2010) on automatic and spontaneous perspective taking. Samson et al. (2010) found that an 
avatar’s visual perspective affected participants' own judgement about what they see, even 
when participants were only asked to judge their own visual perspective but never the 
avatar’s perspective. Samson et al. (2010) employed such a paradigm where the avatar’s 
perspective was irrelevant to participants’ task and was thus unlikely to be the object of 
strategic attention, but they still observed a marked impact of the avatar’s perspective on 
participants’ performance. They therefore concluded that people compute other’s 
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perspectives into account in a relatively automatic fashion. In the current study, we took a 
similar approach to examine whether the availability of objects in memory would be affect by 
whether or not the conversational partner associated with the specific object was present at 
the point of memory retrieval. If such a partner-specific effect emerged even when it was 
detrimental to participants’ performance, and when participants were not explicitly asked to 
bind the conversational partner information with the associated objects, then the finding 
would provide evidence that partner-specific effect can be established by a relatively low-
level memory mechanism.   
Secondly, the present experimental design also draws inspiration from a series of studies 
on event cognition by Radvansky and his colleagues (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; 
Radvansky et al., 2011, 2010). In the studies, participants were instructed to move from one 
room to another room in a virtual environment containing several rooms, where each room 
had one or two tables. Participants were asked to first pick up one object from a table, then 
walk to another table carrying the object, set the object down and then pick up another object. 
At critical points during the task, participants were probed with object images, and were 
asked to indicate whether they recognised the object as one of the two recent objects they 
interacted with. The memory test occurred either upon participants’ entrance into a new room 
or at the halfway point across a large room. Results showed that when people moved from 
one room to another, they were more prone to forgetting information than when they did not 
make such a spatial shift. Radvansky and his colleagues suggested that moving from one 
room to another (i.e., spatial shift) serves as an event boundary, which prompted people to 
update their current event model. The day-to-day activities in which people engage are parsed 
into different event models in this way. Information associated with the prior event becomes 
less accessible in memory after the event boundary. Information within each event model 
shares strong associations, while information between different event models shares 
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relatively weak associations. This event segmentation mechanism helps people to effectively 
organise the encoded information into memory chunks as they go through different events, 
which also benefit later memory retrieval. 
Event segmentation theory suggests that the change of protagonists, as well as the 
change of locations, prompts an event boundary which shapes the memory structure. 
Therefore, we designed a computerised ‘shopping task’ where the manipulation of the change 
of conversational partners was innovatively implemented. In the ‘shopping task’, participants 
interacted with a series of objects introduced by various agents. Each agent introduced two 
objects to participants, one at a time. Frequent object-recognition probes appeared either after 
a change of agents or no change of agents. The change of agent-identity was manipulated to 
investigate whether changes of communication partners would make the most recently 
encoded two objects less accessible in memory. We expected the event-model-updating effect 
to be observed in the present experiment. Specifically, people would tend to show more 
errors and slower responses when they were probed in the presence of a new agent than in the 
presence of the previous agent. If our hypothesis is confirmed, then this may provide insights 
about how partner-specific common ground may be achieved implicitly, efficiently and 
automatically under such a low-level memory mechanism shaped by the way we construct 
event models. 
5.2. Experiment 4 
5.2.1. Methods 
5.2.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-four students (20 females, mean age 20.83, age range 18 to 32) from the 
University of Birmingham participated in this study in return for a small honorarium or 
course credits. All participants reported normal colour vision, and normal or corrected-to-
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normal visual acuity. Ten additional participants were excluded prior to the analysis due to 
failure to perform above chance level. 
5.2.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
Fifty-six agent images were created with an iPad App named ‘3D Agent Creator’. Each 
agent had distinct physical features (e.g., eye shape, complexion, hair-styles and clothing.) 
Examples of the agent images employed in this study are provided in Figure 5.1. One shared 
feature among all agents was that they all contained exaggerated eye-features. One study 
suggested that presenting cartoon-like agent images with salient eye-features rather than 
human-like agents with realistic eye-features helped participants to focus more on agents’ eye 
gaze (Conty, Tijus, Hugueville, Coelho, & George, 2006). Therefore we expected that by 
presenting agents with exaggerated eye features, participants’ attention would be directed 
more towards the agents than other places. Fifty-two agents were presented in the 
experimental phase, while another 4 agents were presented in the practice phase. All the 
objects employed in our study were created by combining 10 colours (i.e., red, orange, 
yellow, green, blue, purple, white, grey, brown and pink) and 13 everyday objects (e.g., bag, 
hat, clock, cup, glassed, book, pants, scarf, shirt, shoes, socks, tie and umbrella).  
The experiment was visually presented on a 15.6-inch Samsung laptop. E-prime 2.0 
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used for the presentation of all materials 
and for recording participants’ response time and accuracy. 
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Figure 5.1. Examples of agent images used in Experiment 4. 
5.2.1.3. Design and procedure 
The Shopping Task 
The computerised ‘shopping task’ was designed for the present study. Fifty-two agents 
were presented to participants sequentially. Each agent introduced two objects to participants, 
one object at a time. Participants were asked to put each object into their shopping basket 
using a computer mouse, and then remove it out of basket before putting in another object. 
On 48 out of 104 trials a probe image would appear after one object had just been put into the 
basket, either during the presence of the same agent who was associated the object (i.e., the 
no-change condition) or during the presence of a new agent (i.e., the change condition). The 
participants were instructed to respond ‘yes’ by pressing the left button on a computer mouse 
if the probe was either the object they had just put into the shopping basket (the current 
object) or the object they had just taken out of the basket (the previous object). Figure 5.2 
illustrated the schematic procedure of the ‘shopping task’ for trials which presented current-
object probes (which was referred to as ‘current-object trials’ in the following sections), and 
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Figure 5.3 for trials which presented previous-object probes (i.e., ‘previous-object trials’). 
Participants were asked to respond ‘no’ by pressing the right button if a probe was an 
mismatched objects that recombined shape and colour features from the current and previous 
objects (i.e., foil probes). It was equally likely for a foil to be of the colour of the previous 
object and the shape of the current object versus the shape of the previous object and the 
colour of the current object. Each foil appeared only once, and was never used as positive 
probes. Participants’ response time and accuracy were recorded.  
In the current study, participants were asked to hold in mind both the current object and 
the previous object at the same time and to update their mental representations of the recent 
two objects every time when a new object was introduced, instead of holding in mind only 
the current object. This design choice was made for three reasons: 1) to increase the difficulty 
level of the memory task; 2) to create foils by mismatching the shape and colour features 
from the current and previous objects; 3) to implement the change of conversational partners 
into a similar experimental paradigm which has already been proven to be able to detect 
event updating effects in Radvansky and his colleagues’ studies (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2006; Radvansky et al., 2011, 2010), whilst minimizing additional adaptations as our first 
attempt7. 
We were primarily interested in the effect of conversational partner change on memory. 
Our predicted patterns of results were: 1) Participants would show more accurate memory for 
each type of memory probes when they were probed in the no-change condition than in the 
change condition; 2) Participants would take shorter time to make a correct response to each 
type of memory probes when they were probed in the no-change condition than in the change 
                  
 
7 In most of Radvansky and Colleagues’ computerised experiments, participants were also 
required to remember and recognise the two most recently interacted objects (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006; Radvansky, Krawietz, & Tamplin, 2011; Radvansky, Tamplin, & Krawietz, 
2010). 
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condition. In accordance with the findings from Radvansky and colleagues, we also expected 
that participants’ memories for current objects would be better than their memories for 
previous objects.  
 
Figure 5.2. Schematic presentations of current-object trials in the ‘shopping task’. 
 
Figure 5.3. Schematic presentation of previous-object trials in the ‘shopping task’.  
The within-participants design 
A within-participants design was constructed with condition (change and no-change 
conditions) and probe-type (positive probes and foils) as two independent variables. Within 
the positive probes, there were two sub-types: the current-object probes and the previous-
object probes. The structure of this within-participant experimental design is illustrated in 
Figure 5.4. The whole experiment consisted of 1 practice block (8 trials) and 4 test blocks (26 
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trials each). Participants were allowed to take breaks between blocks. During the test phase, 
each participant completed 104 trials in total, 48 of which were accompanied by a memory 
probe. Not every possible test point was associated with a memory probe. This was in order 
to make it less likely for participants to be able to predict where probes would appear. There 
were 24 probe trials for the change and no-change conditions respectively, resulting in 6 trials 
presenting current-object probes, 6 trials presenting previous-object probes, and 12 trials 
presenting foils in each condition. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The order of trials within each block was fixed based on a pseudo-random assignment of 
different conditions and probe types, with the criteria being that (a) participants never 
encountered more than three probe trials continuously, (b) participants never encountered 
three or more probe trials from the same condition in a row, (c) and the trial immediately 
before a trial presenting a previous-object probe never contained a memory probe. 
 
Figure 5.4. The structure of the within-participant experimental design in Experiment 4. 
Test Procedure 
After signing an informed consent form, participants were seated in front of a laptop. 
They were instructed to imagine that they were shopping in a supermarket, and to regard the 
agents on the screen as shop assistants. At the beginning of each trial, an agent was standing 
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behind a table and introducing an object placed on the right side of the table by a series of eye 
gaze shifts and hand gesture. Research has suggested that non-verbal communicative cues 
such as eye gazes and pointing gestures can direct people’s attention towards the target 
stimuli (Bristow, Rees, & Frith, 2007; Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000). Then a shopping 
basket with a plus sign (+) appeared on the left side of the table. At this point, the agent 
averted his/her eye gaze towards the basket, indicating participants to put the object into the 
basket. Participants were asked to drag the object into the shopping basket using a computer 
mouse. The object was no longer visible to participants as soon as it was put into the basket. 
Before introducing participants to another object, the agent again averted his/her eye gaze 
towards the basket. Participants were instructed to take the object out of the basket by 
clicking on a minus sign (-) on the basket. When the minus sign was clicked, the object flied 
out of the basket and disappeared from the left side of the screen (which lasted for 600ms). 
After one agent introduced two objects in sequence, a second agent introduced another two 
objects, and so forth. The change of agents is displayed by the previous agent fading out 
gradually (900ms) and then the new agent fading in (900ms). In order to match the duration 
of trials, in the no-change condition, the existing agent was displayed on the screen for the 
same duration (1800ms). In the change condition, the memory test appeared after a new agent 
has faded in; while in the no-change condition, it appeared after the most recent product had 
been put into the shopping basket and before the same agent presented another product. In the 
memory test, a white cross was first presented in the centre of a black screen for 1000ms, 
followed by a probe image. The probe image stayed on the screen until participants made a 
response. Figure 5.5 illustrates an example of the event sequence of a previous-object trial in 
the change condition, and Figure 5.6 illustrates an example of the event sequence of a 
current-object trial in the no-change condition. The experimental procedure typically lasted 
for 25 to 35 minutes. Participants were fully debriefed at the end of the experiment. 
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Twenty-four participants whose accuracy was significantly above chance level for all 
three probe-types (current-object probes, previous-object probes and foil probes) were 
included in the final analysis.  
Accuracy and response time data were analysed separately (see Table 5.1). The response 
time analysis only included trials to which participants responded correctly. Response times 
longer than 2.5 standard deviations from mean response time were also excluded prior to the 
analysis, which caused 1%- 2% (varying with probes types) of the response time data from 
correctly responded trials to be dropped. Responses quicker than 200ms were generally 
considered as abnormal  by many studies (e.g., Ballesteros et al., 2015; Grubert & Eimer, 
2016; Hübner & Töbel, 2012; Lupianez, Ruz, Funes, & Milliken, 2007) and hence were 
planned to be excluded prior to our analysis. In the current data, however, no response was 
found to be quicker than 200ms. 
Table 5.1. Accuracy (proportions) and Response Time (ms) with standard deviations for 
Experiment 4. 
 
As the trials presenting positive probes and foil probes involved different types of 
responses, they were analysed separately. For trials which presented positive probes, 2 x 2 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted with condition (no-change vs. change) and 
probe-type (current vs. previous object) as the main contrasts, for accuracy and response time 
 Accuracy Response time 
 No-change Change No-change Change 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Current objects 0.95 0.09 0.88 0.13 779 137 826 181 
Previous objects 0.92 0.13 0.89 0.13 791 138 895 226 
Foils 0.89 0.08 0.91 0.10 945 231 1021 245 
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respectively. For trials which presented foil probes, the accuracy and response time data were 
submitted to paired t-tests with the change/no-change condition being a within-participants 
factor. If participants showed significantly stronger memory traces (reflected by higher 
accuracy or quicker response) for each probe type in the no-change condition than in the 
change condition, this would provide evidence in support of our hypothesis that participants 
may form associations between objects and the agents in memory automatically.  
We first reported the ANOVA results for trials which presented positive probes. For 
accuracy, there was a marginally significant main effect of condition, F(1, 23) = 4.054, p = 
.056, ηp2 = .150. Participants were marginally significantly more accurate in the no-change 
condition than the change condition. There was no main effect of probe type, F(1, 23) = .294, 
p = .593, ηp2 = .013, and also no interaction of probe type x condition, F(1, 23) = .869, p = 
.361, ηp2 = .036. Planned comparisons were carried out to examine the main effect of 
change/on-change condition, for current-object trials and previous-object trials separately. 
For current-object trials, participants made significantly more errors when a change of agents 
happened than when no such change happened, t(23) = 2.105, p = .046. For previous-object 
trials, participants tended to be less accurate in the change condition compared to the no-
change condition on average, but there was no statistically significant difference, t(23) = 
.893, p = .381. 
For the response time data, a significant main effect of change/no-change condition was 
found, F(1, 23) = 8.864, p = .007, ηp2 = .278.  Participants spent significantly longer time to 
make a correct response when they were in the change condition compared to the no-change 
condition. There was main effect of probe types, F(1, 23) = 1.359, p = .256, ηp2 = .056, and 
no significant interaction between probe types and conditions either, F(1, 23) = 1.601, p = 
.218, ηp2 = .065. The data from current-object and previous-object trials were then entered 
into paired t-tests respectively to examine the change/no-change effect. For current-object 
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trials, although participants’ response time to memory tasks was slightly longer in the change 
condition than in the no-change condition, the difference was not statistically significant, 
t(23) = 1.422, p = .168. For previous-object trials, it took participants significantly longer to 
make correct responses in the change condition than in the no-change condition, t(23) = 
2.584, p = .007. 
For trials involving foil probes, the accuracy and response time data were submitted to 
paired t-tests to make comparisons between change and no-change condition. For accuracy, 
there was no significant difference between conditions, t(23) = .862, p = .397. However, the 
response time was significantly longer in change condition than in no-change condition, t(23) 
= 2.584, p = .017. 
5.2.3. Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 generally confirmed our hypothesis. Participants made 
significantly more errors and longer responses in memory tasks if there was a change of 
communication partners between the memory encoding point and retrieving point. This 
experiment showed a significant effect of agent change. Although the information regarding 
agent change was irrelevant to the memory task and participants did not need to pay attention 
to this information, their performance was still influenced by whether or not there was a 
change of agents. 
Nonetheless, one alternative explanation could not be dismissed based on the present 
experimental design. In the change condition, the change of agents was displayed by the 
previous agent fading out from the computer screen (900ms) and then the new agent fading in 
on the screen (900ms). In contrast, in the no-change condition the existing agent was 
displayed on the computer screen continuously for the same total duration (1800ms). There 
was thus a possibility that participants showed a declined memory in the change condition 
merely because of the visual distraction caused by a previous agent gradually fading out and 
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new agent fading in, rather than the change of agents’ identity per se. Experiment 5 was 
designed to examine this alternative explanation. 
5.3. Experiment 5 
The aim of Experiment 5 was to test whether the significant effect found in Experiment 
4 resulted from the change of agent-identity, or alternatively from the visual distraction of a 
previous agent fading out and a new agent fading in in the change condition. In Experiment 5, 
both the change and no-change conditions contained sequences of agents coming in and out 
of a scene. Therefore, the effect of agent change on participants’ recognition memory was 
observed again in Experiment 5, then we could reject the suggestion that declined memory in 
the change condition was merely resulted from visual distraction of agents fading in and out 
of the display. 
5.3.1. Methods 
5.3.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-one participants (25 females, mean age 20.71, age ranges from 18 to 38) from the 
University of Birmingham participated in this study in return for a small honorarium or 
course credits. All participants reported normal colour vision, and normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. Twelve additional participants were excluded prior to analysis due to 
failure to perform above chance level. 
5.3.1.2. Materials and apparatus  
The materials and apparatus used in Experiment 5 were identical to those used in 
Experiment 4.  
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5.3.1.3. Design and procedure 
The experimental design and procedure in Experiment 5 were identical to those in 
Experiment 4 with the following exception. In Experiment 5, an image of a wooden door was 
added to the upper right corner of the computer screen during experiment. In the change 
condition, after each introduced object was put into the basket by the participants, the 
previous agent left through the door (this sequence lasted for 1850ms), and then the new 
agent came into the room through the door (1850ms). In the no-change condition, the present 
agent left the room through the door (1850ms), and then the same agent came back in again 
(1850ms). 
5.3.2. Results 
The descriptive results of the accuracy and response time data are summarized in Table 
5.2. The same protocol we employed to clean and analyse data in Experiment 4 was applied 
to data from Experiment 5. 
For trial which presented positive probes, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted on the measure of accuracy and response time separately, with condition (no-
change vs. change) and probe-type (current vs. previous object) as the within-subject factors. 
For accuracy, there was no main effect of condition, F(1, 30) = 1.972, p = .170, ηp2 = .062, 
no main effect of probe type, F(1, 30) = 2.154, p = .153, ηp2 = .067, and a marginally 
significant interaction between probe types and conditions, F(1, 30) = 3.433, p = .074, ηp2 = 
.103. Planned comparisons were carried out to examine the main effect of the change/on-
change condition, for the current-object and previous-object trials separately. For current-
object trials, there was no difference between the change condition and no-change condition, 
t(30) = .407, p = .687. Strikingly, for previous-object trials, participants made significantly 
fewer errors in the change condition than in the no-change condition, t(30) = 2.094, p = .045, 
contrary to our prediction.  
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For response time, there was no main effect of condition, F(1, 30) = 2.048, p = .163, ηp2 
= .064, and no main effect of probe type, F(1, 30) = .093, p = .763, ηp2 = .025. However, 
there was a significant interaction between probe types and conditions, F(1, 30) = 4.528, p = 
.042, ηp2= .131. The data from the current-object and previous-object trials were entered into 
planned t-tests respectively to make comparisons between the change and no-change 
condition. For current objects, participants’ responses were significantly slower in the change 
condition than in the no-change condition, t(30) = 2.445, p = .021. For previous objects, there 
was no difference between the two conditions, t(30) = .150, p = .882. 
For trials which presented foil probes, the accuracy and response time data were 
submitted to paired t-tests with the change/no-change condition as a within-subject factor. 
For accuracy, participants showed no difference between the change condition and no-change 
condition, t(30) = .822, p = .417. For response time, participants’ response on average tended 
to be slower in the change condition than in the no-change condition, however this difference 
failed to reach significance, t(30) = 1.692, p = .101. 




Experiment 5 was conducted to test the alternative explanation that the significant effect 
of conversational partner change in Experiment 4 was merely a consequence of the 
 Accuracy Response Time 
 No-change Change No-change Change 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Current objects 0.95 0.09 0.93 0.11 910 280 1019 345 
Previous objects 0.88 0.14 0.95 0.11 983 478 977 362 
Foils 0.94 0.09 0.92 0.10 1059 334 1117 331 
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distractive fading effect, which occurred in the change condition but not in the no-change 
condition. In Experiment 5, the sequences in the change and no-change conditions were 
closely matched. Results of Experiment 5 depicted a rather mixed picture. Contrary to our 
expectation, the accuracy result for the previous-object trials showing weaker memory trace 
for previous objects in the no-change condition compared to the change condition. However, 
in favour of our hypothesis, participants took significantly longer time to make a correct 
response in the change condition compared to the no-change condition on the current-object 
trials, and also marginally significantly longer time on the trials which presented foil probes. 
Findings from Experiment 5, therefore, failed to rule out the alternative explanation that the 
visual distraction of agent-fading caused declined memory in the change condition compared 
to the no-change condition.  
5.4. Discussion of Experiments 4-5 
Experiments 4 and 5 was intended to demonstrate that changing communication partners 
in a social situation reduces the availability of recently encoded objects in memory. Two 
experiments were carried out using a computerised ‘shopping task’, during which the change 
of agent-identity was manipulated and participants were asked to recognise three types of 
objects (current, previous and foils) in either the change or no-change condition. Results in 
Experiment 4 were largely consistent with our hypothesis, showing declined memory after a 
change of agents. Findings from Experiment 5 showed a mixed pattern: the significant effect 
observed for current object probes and foils probes in Experiment 5 seemed to indicate that 
the change of agents indeed had a negative effect on the accessibility of recently encoded 
objects in memory, but the results for previous object probes did not support our hypothesis. 
The mixed pattern of results from Experiment 5 drove us to have a closer look at the 
trial structure for each type of objects. The manipulation of the change/no-change condition 
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was straight-forward for the current object trials. The only difference between these two 
conditions was whether a previous agent was replaced by a new agent before a memory probe 
appeared. However, the structure of the trials which presented previous-object probes was 
relatively complicated. Participants could see and encode the previous object twice: the first 
time when participant put the object into the basket, and the second time when they took the 
object out of basket. In Experiments 4 and 5, the label ‘change/no-change condition’ was 
defined as whether participants encountered a new agent right before the memory test. This 
label may appear to be confusing for previous-no-change trails, as it also contained a change 
of agents—although such a change did not occur right before the memory test, it happened 
between the first and the second opportunity to encode information. Since a reversed pattern 
of agent change effect was observed on previous-object trials in Experiment 5, it was unclear 
whether such a complex experimental design might have obscured the predicted effect of 
agent change on memory. Follow-up experiments 6 and 7 were therefore designed to 
eliminate this potential confounding effect, by removing the previous-objects probes and 
increase the number of current-object probes in one memory test.  An additional concern was 
that each participants only completed six experimental trials for either the current or previous 
object type in the change condition and in the no-change condition respectively, which may 
have caused the lack of expected effects in Experiment 4 and 5. Follow-up experiments 
should be designed to increase the data points collected from each participant in each 
experiment condition in order to enhance the possibility of detecting the predicted effects.  
One issue in the current study is the high exclusion rate in the data. Ten out of thirty-
four participants in Experiment 4 and twelve out of forty-three participants in Experiment 5 
were excluded prior to analysis. Participants whose accuracy was not significantly above 
chance level in any of the three probe-type subgroups were exclude from analysis, because it 
was likely that their average or below-average performance resulted from the failure to 
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follow the instructions of the experiment. The ‘shopping task’ required participants to hold in 
mind two objects (i.e., a previous object and a current object) at the same time, and more 
importantly, to update one of these two objects every time a new object was introduced. This 
instruction might be confusing for some participants, thereby causing the relatively high 
exclusion rate. Nonetheless, the instructions we used were similar to the instructions used in 
Radvansky et al.’s study on spatial updating8, which did not indicate that participants had any 
difficulty in following instructions. Nonetheless, in the following experiments, effort was 
made to develop more appropriate instructions in order to reduce the exclusion rate.  
Moreover, the memory test in the current design consisted of a sequence of single 
recognition probes presented at the centre of a full-screen black background. Such a setting of 
the memory phase was completely different from the setting of the presentation phase, and 
this sudden visual change may have created an unintended event boundary, which might have 
affected participants’ performance. Another concern is that having the same agent leaving 
and returning the room in the no-change condition might have also introduced an unintended 
event boundary, as participants might have started to update the current event model upon the 
agent leaving the room. Future experiments should try to eliminate the possibility that a new 
event boundary is to be inserted by the change of settings between the presentation phase and 
test phase, and by the potential interruption of the same agent leaving and returning the room 
in the no-change condition.  
                  
 
8 In most of Radvansky et al.’s experiments (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 
2011, 2010), participants were required to put down an old object and pick up a new object 
while moving across the space. Participants were asked to recognise whether the memory 
probe was either the object that was currently being carried or the one that had just been set 
down. 
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5.5. Rationale for Experiments 6-7 
Experiments 6 and 7 continued to address whether participants could automatically form 
associations in memory between objects and conversational partners. We expected 
participants’ memory of a recently-encoded object to be less available when the object was 
probed in the presence of a new conversational partner than in the presence of the same 
partner. A new experimental paradigm was used to eliminate potential problems with the 
paradigm of Experiments 4 and 5 which may have yielded the inconsistent findings.   
Firstly, the new experimental paradigm adapted the premise of the ‘director task’ 
paradigm and participants were asked to follow several directors’ verbal instructions to select 
objects. In Experiments 4 and 5, although we had incorporated social cues such as eye gazes 
and hand gestures in order to emphasize the social communicative element of the ‘shopping 
task’, the interaction between participants and the agents was still limited. By using a 
communication task, Experiments 6 and 7 incorporated one-way verbal interaction between 
the agents and participants to enhance the social communicative context of the study. Each 
agent also had a unique voice in order to strengthen the identity of the agents. A small pool of 
agents was presented repeatedly in Experiments 6 and 7, with the aim to overcome potential 
visual distraction of introducing brand new faces on each experimental trial in Experiments 4 
and 5.  
Secondly, a group of 6 objects was presented at the same time and also occluded at the 
same time to make sure that each object was shown to participants for the same duration. On 
each trial, participants was asked to remember a group of 6 objects altogether. In Experiments 
6 and 7, there was no such distinction between current and previous objects.  
Thirdly, the memory test took place in the presence of an agent, rather than over a black 
background, in order to eliminate the possibility that a new event boundary might be inserted 
by the change of settings between the presentation phase and test phase. Memory probes 
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consisted of true probes and foils. The foils were made of new colours and shapes (different 
from any of the colours or shapes presented on the same experimental trial), rather than the 
mismatch of the shape and colour of the current and previous objects in Experiments 4 and 5, 
Therefore, each colour and shape would only be presented once during each memory test.  
5.6. Experiment 6 
5.6.1. Method 
5.6.1.1. Participants 
Thirty students (2 males, mean age 18.9, age range 18 to 21) from the University of 
Birmingham participated in this study in return for course credits. All participants reported 
normal colour vision, and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. No participants were 
excluded prior to the analysis. 
5.6.1.2. Materials and apparatus  
Six agent images from the previous experiments were used in Experiment 6, three 
female images and three male images (see Figure 5.7). Each agent was associated with a 
unique voice. The voice recordings of instructions were delivered by native English speakers. 
We labelled each agent with a number in order to explain the experimental design more 
clearly.  
Each object can be identified by two distinct features: colour and shape. Nine colours 
and thirteen shapes were used to generate a pool of totally 117 different objects. The colours 
used in the current study were: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, grey, brown, and 
pink. The shapes were: bag, cap, clock, mug, glasses, notebook, trousers, scarf, t-shirt, shoes, 
socks, tie, and umbrella. Examples of objects are shown in Figure 5.8.  
 131 
The experiment was presented on a 14-in Samsung laptop. E-prime 2.1 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was used for the presentation of all materials and for 
recording response time and accuracy. 
 
Figure 5.7. The agent images used in Experiment 6. 
 
Figure 5.8. Examples of the object images used in Experiment 6. 
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5.6.1.3. Design and Procedure 
Participants were first presented with a video to get familiarised with their 
communicative partners, i.e., the agents. The video lasted for 95 seconds, depicting each 
agent coming in to a room through a wooden door, dancing for approximately 10 seconds and 
then leaving the room through the door. Figure 5.9 illustrates some of the frames extracted 
from the original video.  
 
Figure 5.9. Frames extracted from the original video used in Experiment 6. 
A total number of 36 grid images were presented in the main experiment, thus resulting 
in 36 experimental trials. These 36 experimental trials were grouped into 6 blocks each 
containing 6 trials. Participants practiced on 4 additional trials prior to the main experiment. 
Every experimental trial consisted of two phases: the presentation phase and test phase. 
In the presentation phase, a 4x4 grid was presented to participants with six objects 
placed on it (see Figure 5.10). Every object on the grid had its unique colour and shape. 
These six objects were further divided into two sets: set A and set B, each containing three 
objects. The first agent came into the room and stand behind the grid. He or she then gave 
three individual instructions which referred to the three objects in set A. The instructions 
were structured as ‘click on the + colour + shape’, e.g. ‘click on the pink mug’. Participants 
were asked to follow the agents’ instructions and click on the referred objects on the grid 
using a computer mouse. Participants were given 4000ms to make a response to each 
instruction from the onset of the instruction. If no response was made within 4000ms, then a 
time-out would trigger the start of next instruction or next presentation. After giving three 
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instructions, the first agent went out of the room through the door. Then either the same agent 
(i.e., the no-change condition) or a new agent (i.e., the change condition) came into the room 
and gave another three instructions which referred to the three objects in set B. After all the 
instructions were given, the six objects on the grid were blocked off by 6 black squares, 
which marked the end of the presentation phase. 
 
Figure 5.10. An example of the grid image during the presentation phase. 
After the six objects were occluded by black squares, a test phase began with six single-
recognition-probe tasks (see Figure 5.11). Six probe images were presented sequentially on a 
white test board in the lower right corner of the screen. The probes contained both target 
probes and foils. Participants were instructed to response ‘yes’ to target probes which were 
objects previous displayed on the grid on the same trial. Participants were instructed to 
response ‘no’ to foil probes which were not objects presented on the grid on the same trial. 
Foil probe was always made of new colour and shape which had not been presented in the 
same experimental trial either as objects displayed on the grid or as probes.  
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Figure 5.11. An example of the single-recognition probe task presented during the test phase. 
Within each block, there were always three trials in the change condition and three trials 
in the no-change condition. Participants never encountered more than two trials of the same 
condition successively. Objects in Set A were always introduced by Agents 1, 2, or 3, and 
each of the three agents was equally likely to appear. In the no-change condition, objects in 
set B were introduced by the same agents as set A. In the change condition, objects in set B 
were introduced by Agent 4, 5, or 6, and each of these three agents was equally likely to 
appear. No agent appeared in two successive trials. All possible pairings between Agent 1/2/3 
and Agent 4/5/6 in the change condition were presented, and each pair of agents occurred 
twice during the whole experiment. 
Target probes could be either objects from set A or set B. The number of foils, the 
number of target probes from set A, and the number of target probes from set B, each ranged 
between 1 to 3 objects. This resulted in 6 possible compositions of the probes (see Table 5.3). 
This was designed to prevent participants from predicting answers and being strategic when 
performing the task. These six possible combinations were randomly assigned to the six 
experimental trials within each block. Objects introduced at various points of the presentation 
phase (first, second, or third in each set) were equally likely to be selected as target probes 
and were equally likely to be presented at all probe positions (from the first to the sixth). In 
the whole experiment, each object appeared no more than twice during the presentation stage, 
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no more than twice as a target probe and no more than once as a foil during the test stage. No 
object was presented twice on any three successive trials.  
Table 5.3. The possible compositions of the six probes on each experimental trial. 
 
5.6.2. Results 
As we aimed to investigate the effect of agent change on participants’ memory for 
objects they recently interacted with, our main interest was to examine whether the change of 
agent identity in change condition would have an effect on participants’ memory for the 
objects from set A. The reason was that only objects from set A were probed either in the 
presence of the same agent who verbally mentioned the object or in the presence of a new 
agent, whereas objects from set B were always probed in the presence of the same agent. 
Therefore, only the accuracy and response time data collected for set A probes were entered 
into the main analysis. Participants’ overall accuracy was used to check against chance level, 
in order to make sure that all participants included in analysis understood our experimental 
instructions, were not making random responses throughout the experiment and did not have 
major memory related problems. All participants performed above chance, thus no participant 
was excluded prior to analysis. For the response time data analysis, only the trials to which 
participants responded correctly were included. Then response times higher than 2.5 standard 
deviations from mean response time were excluded, which caused 1.7% of the response time 
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data for correctly responded trials to be dropped. No response was found to be quicker than 
200ms.  
Paired t-tests were carried out between the no-change condition and change condition on 
both accuracy and response time data from set A. For accuracy, no difference was found 
between the no-change condition (mean = .79, SD = .12) and the change condition (mean = 
.77, SD = .12), t(29) = 1.275, p = .212. Similarly, for response time, there was no difference 
between the no-change condition (mean = 688ms, SD = 120) and the change condition (mean 
= 692ms, SD = 113), t(29) = -.509, p = .614. Overall, the results showed no effect of the 
change of agents on participants’ memory performance. 
5.6.3. Discussion 
In the present experiment, participants performed virtually identically in the change and 
no-change conditions. This suggests that the change of conversational partner during the 
presentation phase did not disrupt participants’ memory for objects in the memory test. No 
evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the change of conversational partner could 
structure memory in ways similar to the effect of spatial shift on memory in Radvansky and 
his colleagues’ studies (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011, 2010). 
However, it is noteworthy that although only data from set A were entered into analysis, 
participants were not aware of this analysis plan. Participants were instructed that they would 
be examined on whether they could correctly recognise the true probes from both set A and 
set B and correctly reject the foils, which required them to encode all the six objects on each 
trial. Therefore, for the change condition trials, having a change of conversational partners in 
the middle of participants’ encoding phase might have helped participants’ memory for 
objects, rather than disrupted their memory as we previously predicted (e.g., Pettijohn, 
Thompson, Tamplin, Krawietz, & Radvansky, 2016; Radvansky, 2012). According to 
Radvansky (2012) and Pettijohn et al. (2016), the spatial shift of ‘walking through doorway’ 
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can cause not only forgetting, but remembering. Specifically, Radvansky points out that the 
presence of an event boundary during encoding improves people’s overall memory, because 
it decreases retroactive interference (which is a memory phenomenon that the newly learned 
information interferes with the recall of previous learned information). For example, 
Experiment 1 in Pettijohn et al. (2016) asked participants to learn two lists of 20 words, one 
list in the shift condition and the other in the no-shift condition. They first learned the first 10 
words of one list in one room, and then either moved to another room (shift condition) or 
across a large room (no-shift condition) where they learned the last 10 words of that list. A 
memory test was presented two minutes after either a spatial shift or no shift, and participants 
were asked to recall the entire lists. Results showed that participants’ memory for the whole 
word list was improved when they experienced a spatial shift in the middle of the learning 
phase compared to when they simply moved across a large room. This finding suggests that if 
participants experience an event shift in the middle of their encoding, their memory of the 
encoded information might be enhanced. Therefore, we decided to run a follow-up 
experiment in which the event boundary would be moved from the middle of encoding phase 
to the point after encoding has been completed, and to examine whether the predicted effect 
of the change of conversational partners on memory could then be observed. 
5.7. Experiment 7 
5.7.1. Methods 
5.7.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-one students (17 females, mean age 19.04, age range 18 to 29) from the 
University of Birmingham participated in this study in return for course credits. All 
participants reported normal colour vision, and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
No participants were excluded prior to the analysis. 
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5.7.1.2. Materials and apparatus  
The materials and apparatus used in Experiment 7 were identical to those of Experiment 
6 with the only exception that the objects in Experiment 7 contained twelve different shapes 
rather than thirteen shapes. Nine colours (i.e., red, orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, grey, 
brown, and pink) and twelve shapes (bag, cap, clock, mug, glasses, notebook, trousers, scarf, 
t-shirt, shoes, socks, and tie)9 were used to generate a pool of 108 different objects. Each 
object appeared only 2 or 3 times during the presentation stage.  
5.7.1.3. Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 6 with the following 
exceptions. In the presentation phase, all six objects from set A and set B were introduced by 
the same agent. After giving six verbal instructions, the agent went out of the room. Then 
either the same agent (i.e., the no-change condition) or a new agent (i.e., the change 
condition) came into the room, followed by the memory test.   
5.7.2. Results 
In the current experimental design, the change of agent happened after the first agent 
introduced all six objects. The data for true probes and foil probes were processed separately, 
as they involved different types of responses. For the response time analysis, only the trials to 
which participants responded correctly were included. Response times longer than 2.5 
standard deviations from mean response time were excluded prior to the analysis, causing 3% 
of the response time data from correctly responded trials to be dropped. No response was 
found to be quicker than 200ms.  
                  
 
9 Umbrella was removed from the pool of objects due to the caution that the difficulty level 
of remembering umbrellas might be higher than that of remembering other objects, as 
indicated by some participants’ feedback during the debriefing session and also by the by-
item analysis we did on participants’ accuracy and response time data in Experiment 6. 
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The descriptive data of accuracy and response time are summarised in Table 5.4. For 
true probes, paired t-tests were carried out between the no-change condition and change 
condition on accuracy and response time data respectively. For accuracy, there was no 
difference between the change condition and the no-change condition, t(20) = 1.008, p = 
.325. For response time, no difference was found between the change condition and the no-
change condition t(20) = .400, p = .693. For foils, similarly, paired t-tests were carried out 
between the no-change condition and change condition on accuracy and response time data 
respectively. For accuracy, participants made less errors in the change condition than in the 
no-change condition, t(20) = 2.137, p = .045. For response time, a marginally significant 
difference was found between the change condition and the no-change condition, t(20) = 
1.886, p = .074, and this non-significant effect suggested that participants tended to take 
longer time to make a response in the no-change condition compared the change condition.  




Experiment 7 was conducted to examine whether the predicted effect of the change of 
conversational partners on memory could be observed after controlling for a potential 
confounding effect of having an event abound during encoding. Findings from Experiment 7 
showed that participants performed similarly in the change condition and the no-change 
condition when it came to true probes. Participants even performed better in the change 
 Accuracy Response Time 
 No-change Change No-change Change 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
True probes 0.83 0.09 0.84 0.10 738 108 743 124 
Foils 0.90 0.08 0.93 0.09 782 137 768 126 
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condition compared to the no-change condition when it came to foil probes (which was 
opposite to our hypothesis). No evidence was found to support our hypothesis that change of 
agent would hinder people’s memory performance on objects appeared before the agent 
change. Detailed discussion on the implications of these findings will follow in the next 
section.  
5.8. General Discussion 
5.8.1. Summaries of Experiments 4-7 
Our study in Chapter 5 was the first to integrate the theory of the low-level memory 
mechanism for common ground representations (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b) and the 
theory of the memory processes involved in event model representations (e.g., Radvansky & 
Zacks, 2014) to propose a plausible route of how partner-specificity common ground can be 
achieved. Two new experimental paradigms were designed to seek evidence for the proposed 
low-level memory mechanism for partner-specific representations, which may be shaped by 
the relatively automatic event segmentation system. An innovative computerised ‘shopping 
task’ was employed in experiments 4 and 5, and an adapted version of the director task was 
employed in experiments 6 and 7. In both experimental paradigms, the key manipulation was 
whether the memory probes appeared during the presence or the absence of the specific 
conversational partner who were associated with the probed objects. Our key investigation 
was whether the change of conversational partners prompted an event boundary which 
consequentially made recently encoded objects less accessible in memory, compared to when 
such change did not happen. In our study, this change of conversational partners was 
irrelevant to the task participants were performing, and participants were never explicated 
asked to pay attention to the identity of the conversational partner. If an effect of partner 
change could be observed even when such an effect would be detrimental to participants’ task 
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performance, then it gains plausibility for the view that partner-specific representations can 
be encoded, tracked and accessed in a relatively automatic way. 
The current findings from Experiments 4 to 7 together, however, do not support our 
initial hypothesis. Experiment 4 provides preliminary results in support of our hypothesis that 
people’s memory for objects become less available after experiencing a change of agents 
compared when such change has not happened. Experiment 5 failed to replicate the same 
effect after controlling for the confounding factor of visual distraction introduced by agent-
facing scenarios. Some convergent evidence seemed to be gained from participants’ 
responses on trials with current object probes and foils, but responses on trials with previous 
object probes revealed a pattern of results that contradicted our hypothesis. Experiment 6, 
where the previous object probes were removed, failed to reveal any agent-change effect on 
participants’ memory. Experiment 7 further controlled for a cofounding factor, i.e., the 
occurrence of an event boundary in the middle of the whole object encoding phase. However, 
Experiment 7 again failed to observe any effect in line with our hypothesis. Taken together, 
the findings from Experiments 4 to 7 indicated a minimal and inconsistent role of the change 
of agent identity on participants’ memory under the current experimental settings.  
5.8.2. Formation and retrieval of partner-specific associations: automatic? 
Participants do form associations between conversational content and relevant 
conversational partners and represent these partner-specific associations in episodic memory 
in some circumstances, as they exhibit partner-specific effects in certain communicative 
situations (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Brown-Schmidt, 2009a; Horton, 2007). The key interest 
of the current study lies in the processes of how the partner-specific representations are 
formed, tracked and accessed in memory. We hypothesised that people may form partner-
specific associations by automatically segmenting events into partner-labelled episodic 
chunks, which may in result implicitly affect the availability of objects, even when it is 
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unnecessary and detrimental to do so. However, the findings from Experiments 4 to 7 did not 
support this hypothesis. Some people might argue that the current experimental paradigms 
are not sensitive enough to detect the predicted effect of agent-change on memory; however, 
I argue that this insensitivity itself might be informative in telling us something about the 
encoding and retrieval mechanism for partner-specific representations.  
As detailed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the low-level memory-based mechanism for 
common ground proposed by Horton & Gerrig (2005a, 2005b) primarily focuses on a cue-
based memory retrieval process upon which common ground can be accessed relatively 
automatically, quickly and effortlessly. Many studies have provided evidence in support of 
such a low-level memory retrieval process of common ground (Barr, 2014; Gorman et al., 
2013; Horton, 2007; Horton & Slaten, 2012). For example, Horton (2007) demonstrated that 
speakers was faster to name an object when they were in the presence of an individual with 
whom the object name was previously associated. However, a recent study by Brown-
Schmidt and Horton (2014) failed to replicate the key findings of the first of the two 
experiments in Horton (2007). This failure of replication casts doubt on the idea that the mere 
associations between partners and referents would be sufficient to facilitate participants’ 
access to the object names in memory. Horton and Gerrig (2016) also revisited the memory-
based processing approach to common ground recently. Horton and Gerrig (2016) 
acknowledged in the paper that the partner-referent associations in Horton (2007) was 
relatively arbitrary as the only link between a partner and a referent was that participants 
named an object while the partner was seated next to the participant without any interaction. 
This weak link might have been insufficient for partner identity to act as a very salient cue to 
active relevant memory representations.  
Moreover, the low-level memory mechanism for common ground (Horton & Gerrig, 
2005a, 2005b) is primarily proposed on the basis of assuming that associations between 
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conversational partners and referents have been formed and stored in memory. However, 
Horton and Gerrig did not specify the memory encoding process of how the partner-specific 
associations can be formed in memory: for example, is the formation of partner-specific 
associations automatic, fast and effortless, or is it constrained by cognitive resources and 
cognitive goals? A recent paper by Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, and Ryskin (2015) emphasises on 
the encoding process of partner-specific associations, and proposes that people form partner-
specific representations under the constraints of attention, memory and communicative 
relevance. Brown-Schmidt et al. (2015) agree with the idea that conversational partners act as 
a special type of context and thus provide contextual memory cues for conversational 
participants to retrieve what is shared between them (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b), but 
they believe that only ‘a limited number of bindings’ should be encoded between the specific 
information and its contextual cues. This proposal is against an automatic encoding 
mechanism for partner-specific association for two reasons. Firstly, Brown-Schmidt et al. 
(2015) argue in the paper that if people automatically form all contextual associations as ‘an 
unbounded number of bindings’ will be formed which exceeds the limits of attention and 
memory. Secondly, they propose that partner-specific representations should be constrained 
by the communicative relevance of the conversational partner. Namely, when a partner is 
communicatively relevant, or when there is extensive partner interaction, the bindings 
between the content of the conversation and the partner would be formed more strongly and 
tightly in memory.  
Drawing upon this up-to-date literature on the memory-based mechanism for common 
ground, there are at least two ways in which we could explain the lack of partner-specific 
effect in our current study. The first plausible explanation is that participants did not form 
partner-specific associations in the mere co-presence of the conversational content and 
conversational partner. One reason is that the identity of the agents was not highly 
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communicatively relevant in our experimental paradigms, and participants might have been 
busy remembering /rehearsing the objects rather than paying attention to the agent identities. 
The partner-specific representations may not be formed in a completely automatic, stimuli-
driven way, although they can still be formed spontaneously and efficiently when the 
conversational partner serves as a meaningful and relevant conversational context. Another 
plausible explanation is that although participants have formed associations between specific 
partners and objects, these associations might not be strong and sufficient to facilitate 
participants’ memory retrieval of the objects. What is in common between these two 
explanations is that they both include the notion that the memory-based processes of partner-
specific representations are constrained by the communicative relevance/meaningfulness of a 
partner in a conversational context. The difference is that the first explanation focuses on the 
formation of partner-specific representations, while the second one focuses on the retrieval of 
partner-specific representations. This emphasis on the communicative relevance of the 
conversational partner might also may explain the reason why Radvansky and colleagues’ 
studies (Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; Radvansky et al., 2011, 2010) have managed to 
observe an effect of spatial shift, but our study failed to observe an effect of agent-change. In 
Radvansky et al.’s study, participants were actively experiencing the spatial shift, as they 
were performing a walking action to cross the space in a virtual environment. In our study, 
however, the change of agents was only presented on a screen in front of participants and 
thus were only passively experienced by participants. Future research is needed to further 
examine these two explanations and to shed light on the specific processes of the proposed 
memory-based mechanism for common ground.  
5.8.3. Limitations and future improvements 
Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the change of agents in the current series of 
experiments was only presented on a screen in front of participants and thus were only 
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passively experienced by participants. Future research could try to adapt the experimental 
paradigm to make the conversational partners more communicatively relevant and 
meaningful, in order enhance participants’ communicative motivation. For example, we 
could adapt the director task used in Chapters 2 and 3 for which participants had to use their 
conversational partner’s perspective to interpret their messages by implementing the change 
of directors into the experimental paradigm.  
Secondly, it was suggested by some researchers that the memory tests in the present 
series of experiments might be very difficult due to the fact that many of the presented 
objects were from the same semantic category, i.e., clothing. The high level of difficulty of 
the memory tests might have caused the current experimental paradigms to be insensitive to 
the predicted effect of agent-change on memory. However, participants’ overall accuracy was 
in fact relatively high in Experiments 4 to 7 (i.e., the mean accuracy for each probe type in 
each experiment was all above 0.77), which demonstrated that it was unlikely that 
participants found the memory tests very difficult due to objects being from the same 
semantic category. Nonetheless, future research could be done to use stimuli from different 
semantic categories to control for this confounding variable.  
Thirdly, the memory probes occurred repeatedly during the current experiments, and 
participants were highly likely to have been prepared for the memory probes and have used 
memory strategies like rehearsal during the encoding phase (although they could not 
anticipate exactly at which point the memory test would occur in Experiment 4 and 5). 
Additionally, the duration between the encoding phase and the retrieval phase was relatively 
short, so that the memory tests were likely to have tapped into participants’ working memory 
rather than longer term memory. Future research could consider using an unexpected 
recognition task to test participants’ memory for objects after they have completed the whole 
communication task. In this case, participants are not aware of this memory test when they 
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are undertaking the preceding communication task. They are therefore unlikely to have 
employed any memory strategy in order to enhance their memories for the objects occurred in 
the conversation. The duration between the encoding phase and the retrieval phase would be 
relatively long, which would make the memory test more likely to tap into participants’ long-
term memory rather than working memory.  
5.9. Conclusion  
We propose that people may automatically segment events into partner-indexed episodic 
memorial chunks through which partner-specific associations are automatically encoded in 
memory, and these partner-specific associations may affect the availability of objects 
associated with the partners. However, Experiments 4-7 provided little support for this 
hypothesis. The findings cast doubt on the idea of a completely automatic memory-based 
mechanism for common ground, and provide incentive for future research to further examine 
the potential constraints on the formation and retrieval process of partner-specific 
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6.1. Introduction  
Researchers have long assumed that common ground is the foundation upon which 
people communicate with each other (e.g., Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981). It is, therefore, 
important and interesting to explore how people spontaneously assign attention (and possibly 
other cognitive resources) to information in common ground versus privileged ground during 
communication, and how this affects their memories for information in common ground 
versus privileged ground in a post-test. The aim of Chapter 6 was to investigate whether the 
long assumed privileged status of common ground over privileged ground could be achieved 
via a relatively low-level memory-based mechanism. Specifically, we were interested in 
whether participants’ memory for objects in a later unexpected memory test would be 
affected by the mere difference of whether objects occurred in the common ground or 
privileged ground during a preceding communication task. Our rationale was: if more 
attention was automatically assigned to objects in the common ground compared to objects in 
the privileged ground when participants were engaged in the communication task, then we 
would expect participants to show higher recognition rates for objects in the common ground 
than those in the privileged ground in the following memory test. If participants automatically 
showed higher recognition rates for objects in the common ground compared to objects in the 
privileged ground, then this effect would provide some evidence in favour of the proposal 
that common ground information might be represented and assessed via a relatively low-level 
memory mechanism. 
The present study also examined whether participants’ memory for objects would be 
affected by how the common ground was established. As introduced in Chapter 1, Clark and 
Marshall (1981) have proposed that common ground can be established on three bases, i.e., 
physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence and cultural co-presence/community 
membership. Information that either exists in the shared physical environment (physical co-
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presence), or is maintained in the shared past or present conversations (linguistic co-
presence), or is part of the shared sociocultural background between speakers and listeners 
(community membership) can be regarded as mutual knowledge between conversational 
partners. In the present study, we used both physical co-presence and linguistic co-presence 
to establish common ground shared between participants and their conversational partner in 
the communication task. As a result, each object could bear one of three types of ground 
status: common ground established by both physical and linguistic co-presence, common 
ground established merely by physical co-presence, and privileged ground. For example in 
Figure 6.1, the rabbit was visible to the director and was also referred to by her, so it could be 
considered as in the type of common ground established by both physical and linguistic co-
presence. The sunglasses were visible to the director but were not referred to by her, therefore 
in the common ground established by merely physical co-presence. In contrast, the pineapple 
was invisible to the director therefore in participants’ privileged ground.  
A particular interest of the present study lied in whether participants’ memory for 
objects in the common ground established by mere physical co-presence would be more 
accurate than their memory for objects in the privileged ground. We expected participants’ 
memory for an object to be facilitated merely by its being presented in the common ground 
than in the privileged ground. We also expected participants to show more accurate memory 
for object in the common ground established by both physical and linguistic co-presence 
compared to objects in the common ground established by mere physical co-presence, as the 
linguistic interaction might add details and richness to the representations of the common 
ground information.  
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Figure 6.1. An example of the shelf images used in this study. 
6.2. Experiment 8 
6.2.1. Methods 
6.2.1.1. Participants  
Thirty-two students (24 female, mean age 21.63, age range 17 to 32) from the University 
of Birmingham participated in this study in return for study credits. All participants had 
normal colour vision and normal or corrected-to-normal visual and auditory acuity.  
6.2.1.2. Design and procedure 
During the experiment, participants first played an adapted version of the director task. 
Participants then took an unexpected memory test in which they were asked to recognise 
whether the object images presented in the memory test had been seen in the director task.  
Both the director task and the memory test were presented with E-prime 2 software 




Participants were first invited to play a variant of the director task (which was similar to 
the visible perspective version of the director task in Chapter 3).  During the instructions 
phase, participants were made aware of the perspective difference between a director and 
themselves, and were instructed that if the director could not see a certain object, then she 
could not ask participants to move the object. Participants were instructed to bear the 
director’s perspective in mind when interpreting her instructions, and were given an example 
of how the director’s limited perspective could constrain her reference. Each trial began with 
a fixation stimulus (+) displayed in the centre of the screen for 1000s. After the 1000ms 
fixation phase, an image of a 4 x 4 shelf was presented. A female director was standing 
behind the shelf. There were always 12 objects on the shelf, one object in a slot. All objects 
were items we encounter in our everyday life, from categories such as food, animal, 
cookware, clothing, instruments and toys. Of the 12 objects on the shelf, there were always 8 
objects visible to both the participants and the female director, and thus in their common 
ground. The remaining 4 objects were occluded from the director’s perspective by green 
squared backgrounds, and thus in participants’ privileged ground. Participants were first 
given 5000ms to view the shelf image, following which they were given instructions by the 
director to move objects on the shelf. Participants were instructed to respond to the 
instructions as quickly and accurately as possible. A new instruction was always presented 
8000ms after the onset of the previous instruction in order to control for encoding time, 
regardless of whether a response was received.  
Sixteen shelf images were presented to participants sequentially during the director task, 
each shelf image was accompanied by 4 instructions and each instruction referred to an 
unique object on the shelf. The 16 shelf images formed 2 test blocks, each block with 8 shelf 
images. Participants were allowed to take a break between the blocks. Two different versions 
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of the director task were created by reversing the order of the presentation of the 16 shelf 
images, i.e., an original order version and a reversed order version. Before the experimental 
phase, participants were presented with 2 additional shelf images for practice, each shelf 
image consisted of 2 instructions. Each object image was only presented once across the 
entire task.  
Among the 16 shelf images used in the experimental phase, 8 shelf images each 
consisted of a set of critical objects which were 3 objects of the same exemplar but of 
different sizes (e.g., a small balloon, a medium balloon and a large balloon) and 9 objects 
from different exemplars (see Figure 6.2a). Each of these 8 shelf images contained 1 critical 
instruction and 3 non-critical instructions. A critical instruction (e.g., ‘move the big balloon 
one slot down from there’) required participants to use the director’s perspective to identify 
the correct referent from the 3 objects of the same exemplar (as the biggest balloon among 
the three balloons were occluded from the director, and thus could not be referred to by the 
director). The position of the critical instruction varied from the 1st to the 4th of a set of 
instructions presented with each shelf image. For the other 3 non-critical instructions, 
participants did not have to use the director’s perspective to resolve the reference. The other 8 
shelf images each consisted of 12 objects from different exemplars (see Figure 6.2b), and 4 
non-critical instructions were given with each shelf image. The structure of the critical 
instructions was always ‘move the [scalar adjective] [noun] one slot [directional word] from 
there’ (e.g., nudge the small ball one slot up); whereas the structure of non-critical 
instructions was either ‘move the [scalar/normal adjective] [noun] one slot [directional word] 
from there’ or ‘move the [noun] one slot [directional word] from there’. Directional words 
were ‘left’ (17 out of 64 instructions) ‘right’ (17 instructions) ‘up’ (15 instructions) and 
‘down’ (15 instructions). Participants were told that the directional words ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
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referred to their own left and right sides. For critical instructions, only ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
directional words were used.  
 
Figure 6.2. (a) The left shelf image contained 3 objects of the same exemplar (i.e., 3 balloons 
of different sizes) and 9 objects from different exemplars. (b) The right shelf image contained 
12 unique objects from different exemplars. 
Memory test 
After the director task, participants were asked to undertake an unexpected memory test 
in which they were asked to recognise the objects that had been presented on the shelf. None 
of the three objects of the same exemplar was included in the memory test. The memory test 
consisted of 48 true probes and 48 foil probes. The 96 probes were randomly selected to be 
presented sequentially to each participant. The 48 true probes consisted of 16 objects which 
were in the common ground and had been referred to by the director (which was labelled as 
linguistic common ground objects, one from each shelf image), 16 objects which were in the 
common ground but had not been referred to by the director (labelled as visual common 
ground objects, one from each shelf image), and 16 objects in the privileged ground (labelled 
as privileged ground objects, one from each shelf image). The 48 foil probes were also 
chosen from everyday items from categories such as food, animal, cookware, clothing, 
instruments and toys. Each probe trail began with a fixation stimulus (+) displayed in the 
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centre of the screen for 1000 ms. Following the fixation screen, participants were presented 
with a probe image, to which they were instructed to make a response by either pressing the 
right arrow key labelled as ‘yes’ if they had seen the object during the director task, or 
pressing the left arrow key labelled as ‘no’ if they had not seen the object during the director 
task. The next trial only commenced after a response had been made. Participants were 
instructed to respond as accurately as possible. Although both participants’ response time and 
accuracy were recorded during the memory test, our main focus was on accuracy. Therefore, 
participants were not required to respond as quickly as possible.  
6.2.2. Results 
Director task 
The director task was mainly used as an encoding phase in the present study. Our focus 
was not on participants’ performance in the director task but on their performance in the 
memory test. As a result, only the accuracy rates of participants’ responses to the critical 
instructions of the director task were examined as a performance check. Among the 32 
participants, 1 participant committed 7 egocentric errors out from the 8 critical instructions. 
This high rate of egocentrism was likely to be due to a misunderstanding of the task or a lack 
of concentration, so this participant’s data from the memory test were excluded prior to our 
analyses. Other 31 participants all performed relatively well in the director task (average 
accuracy was 0.984), with 4 participants making 1 egocentric error each and others making 
no egocentric errors.  
Memory test 
Participants whose overall accuracy in the memory test failed to be significantly above 
chance level (i.e., failed to correctly response to 57 or more probes out of 96 probes) would 
be excluded from the analyses on both accuracy and response time. In the present experiment, 
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all participants’ overall accuracy was significantly above chance level, ranging from 0.625 to 
1, so no one was excluded prior to the following analysis.  
The means and standard errors of the accuracy data for each probe type were reported in 
Tabl3 6.1. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on accuracy with probe 
type (i.e., linguistic common ground object, visual common ground object, and privileged 
ground object) as a within-subject factor. A main effect of probe type was observed, F(2, 60) 
= 74.365, p < .001, ηp2= .713. Two planned paired t-tests were carried out between recall 
rates of linguistic common ground objects and those of visual common ground objects, and 
between recall rates of visual common ground objects and those of privileged ground objects, 
to examine if there were incremental differences among these three probe types as we 
predicted. Paired t-tests revealed that participants’ recognition memory for linguistic common 
ground objects was significantly more accurate than that for visual common ground objects, 
t(30) = 9.401,  p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.648. Participants’ recognition memory for visual 
common ground objects was significantly more accurate than for privileged ground objects, 
t(30) = 2.381, p = .024, Cohen’s d = 0.446. The significance level for each t-test was adjusted 
to .025 after applying Bonferroni corrections. 
For the response time analysis, only the trials to which participants responded correctly 
were included. Response times longer than 2 standard deviations from mean response time 
were excluded prior to the analysis, which caused 3.2% of the response time data from 
correctly responded trials to be dropped. No response was found to be quicker than 200ms. 
The means and standard errors of the response time data used in the analyses for each probe 
type were reported in Table 6.2. Similar to the accuracy data, one-way repeated-measure 
ANOVA was carried out on response time with probe type as a within-subject factor. No 
main effect of probe type was found, F(2, 60) = 2.323,  p = .107, ηp2 = 0.072.  
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Table 6.1. Means and standard errors of participants’ accuracy (in proportions) for each type 
of true probes and foils probes, for Experiment 8, 9 and 10 respectively. 
 
Table 6.2. Means and standard errors of participants’ response times (in milliseconds) for 
each type of true probes and foils probes, for Experiment 8, 9 and 10 respectively. 
 
6.2.3. Discussion 
The current findings confirmed our main hypothesis that participants would show 
significantly better memory for linguistic common ground objects compared to visual 
common ground objects, and also significantly better memory for visual common ground 
objects over privileged ground objects. These findings provide some evidence to the idea that 
 True probes 
Foil probes 
 





 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Experiment 8 0.821 0.024 0.536 0.037 0.452 0.031 0.929 0.011 
Experiment 9 n/a n/a 0.585 0.028 0.550 0.026 0.949 0.016 
Experiment 10 n/a n/a 0.580 0.025 0.600 0.022 0.947 0.009 
 
 True probes 
Foil probes 
 





 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Experiment 8 1058 56 1119 81 1162 76 1124 70 
Experiment 9 n/a n/a 976 42 961 38 1053 57 
Experiment 10 n/a n/a 922 34 898 30 936 42 
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people may automatically form stronger memory representations for common ground 
information over privileged ground information during communication. 
One limitation of the current findings was that the difference observed between the 
recognition rates of visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects, though 
significant ( p = .024), was not strong, as its effect size was only modest (Cohen’s d = .446). 
As the main focus of the present study was to examine the difference between participants’ 
memories for visual common ground objects and for privileged ground objects, we decided to 
collect more data on this pair of probe types in a follow-up experiment. If the significant 
difference between participants’ memories for visual common ground objects and privileged 
ground objects could be replicated in the follow-up experiment, then we would be more 
confident to pursue further research ideas upon this reliable effect.  
Additionally, an alternative explanation was that the significant difference between 
visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects might merely be driven by an 
item effect rather than a genuine effect of the objects’ ground status. Since we did not use the 
very same objects for visual common ground and privileged ground, it was possible that the 
visual common ground objects were overall easier to be remembered and retrieved by nature 
compared to the privileged ground objects, which contributed to the effect observed in 
Experiment 8. In order to examine this alternative explanation regarding item effect, we 
decided to create another version of the director task alongside the use of the original version 
in the follow-up experiment. The visual common ground objects from the original version 
became privileged ground objects in the new version, and the privileged ground objects from 
the original version became visual common ground objects in the new version. Participants 
took part in either the original version or the swapped version of the director task. If the 
follow-up experiment replicated the significant effect between these two different probes 
types in both task versions, then this alternative explanation could be dismissed.  
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6.3. Experiment 9 
6.3.1. Methods 
6.3.1.1. Participants 
Twenty-six students (16 female, mean age 21.69, age range 19 to 39) from the 
University of Birmingham participated in this study in return for a small honorarium or study 
credits. Fourteen participants took the original shelf version of the director task and 
correspondingly the stimulus set A of the memory task, twelve participants took the swapped 
shelf version of the director task and the stimulus set B of the memory task (see section 
6.3.1.2 for more details). All participants had normal colour vision and normal or corrected-
to-normal visual and auditory acuity.  
6.3.1.2. Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 8 with the following 
exceptions. A new version of the director task was created by swapping the ground status of 
the visual common ground objects and the privileged ground objects presented on each shelf 
image in Experiment 8 (see Figure 6.3). For the 8 shelf images without critical instructions, 
the ground status of all four visual common ground objects and four privileged ground 
objects was swapped. For the other 8 shelf images with critical instructions, the ground status 
of a pair of objects (one is privileged ground, and one in visual common ground) remaining 
unchanged for each shelf, as the critical object in the privileged ground needed to remain in 
the privileged ground for the critical instruction to work appropriately. For example, the red 
small ball in the privileged ground in Figure 6.3a remained unchanged in the privileged 
ground in Figure 6.3b. Both the original shelf version and the swapped shelf version were 
used in Experiment 9. Each version generated two sub-versions by reversing the order of the 
presentation of the shelf images. Participants were assigned to one of the four task versions: 
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original-shelf-original-order, original-shelf-reversed-order, swapped-shelf-original-order, and 
swapped-shelf-reversed-order.  
 
Figure 6.3. (a) example of the original shelf image used in Experiment 8. (b) Example of the 
new shelf image creased for Experiment 9 by swapping the visual common ground objects 
and the privileged ground objects presented on the shelf. 
The memory test consisted of 112 true probes and 48 foil probes. The true probes 
contained 56 visual common ground objects and 56 privileged ground objects. We did not 
include the linguistic common ground objects in the true probes, as our main interest was 
whether participants showed a difference between their memory for the visual common 
ground objects and memory for the privileged ground objects. All the visual common ground 
object and privileged ground objects presented on the shelves were included in the memory 
test, except for the un-swapped pairs of objects from the shelf images involving critical 
instructions. The 48 foils remained as foils in Experiment 8. Two different ‘stimulus sets’ 
(i.e., stimulus set A & stimulus set B) were created for the memory test to compliment the 
different versions of the director task. The visual common ground objects in stimulus set A 
were the privileged ground objects in stimulus set B, and vice versa. For participants who 
took the original-shelf-original-order or original-shelf-reversed-order versions of the director 
task, they later participated in the memory test with stimulus set A. For participants who took 
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the swapped-shelf-original-order or swapped-shelf-reversed-order versions of the director 
task, they later participated in the memory test with stimulus set B.  
6.3.2. Results 
Director task 
Among the 26 participants, 4 participants committed 1 egocentric error each out of the 8 
critical instructions, and the other participants did not commit any egocentric errors. The 
overall accuracy rate is .995.  
Memory test 
Three participants whose overall accuracy in the memory test failed to be significantly 
above chance level (i.e., failed to correctly respond to 91 or more probes out of 160 probes) 
were excluded prior to the following analyses.  
Participants’ performances on the memory test with stimulus set A (11 participants) and 
stimulus set B (12 participants) were analysed together, as this factor was not the interest of 
the present study10. The means and standard errors of the accuracy data for each probe type 
were reported in Table 6.1. Paired t-test was conducted between participants’ accuracy of 
visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects. Although participants’ 
recognition memory for visual common ground objects showed a tendency to be better than 
their recognition memory for privileged ground objects, no significant difference was 
observed, t(22) = 1.396,  p = .177, Cohen’s d = .265. 
For the response time analysis, only the trials to which participants responded correctly 
were included. Response times longer than 2 standard deviations from mean response time 
                  
 
10 When a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with stimulus set as a between-subject factor 
and probe type as a within-subject factor, there was no significant effect of stimulus set, and 
no significant interaction of stimulus set x probe type. 
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were excluded prior to the analysis, which caused 2.7% of the response time data from 
correctly responded trials to be dropped. No response was found to be quicker than 200ms. 
The means and standard errors of the trimmed response time data for each probe type were 
reported in Table 6.2. Paired t-test was conducted between participants’ response time for 
visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects, and similarly, no significant 
difference was observed, t (22) = .932, p = .362, Cohen’s d = .078. 
One point worth noting is that the memory test in Experiment 9 consisted of 160 probe 
trials, while the memory test in Experiment 8 only consisted of 96 probe trials. A follow-up 
analysis was conducted to examine whether participants performed differently in the first half 
and the second half of the memory test due to fatigue effect in Experiment 9. Two-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ accuracy data and response 
time respectively, with probe type (visual common ground objects versus privileged ground 
objects) and probe order (the first 80 probes versus the last 80 probes) as two within-subject 
factors. For accuracy data, a main effect of probe order was observed, F(1,22) = 26.499, p < 
.001. Participants performed significantly better on the first 80 probe trials compared to the 
last 80 probe trials. No main effect of probe type was found, F(1, 22) = 1.495, p = .234, nor 
was there any interaction of probe order by probe type, F(1, 22) = 1.080, p = .310. As we can 
see from Table 6.3, for the first 80 probe trials, participants’ average recognition rate of the 
visual common ground objects was higher than that of the privileged ground objects, whereas 
for the last 80 probe trials, the average recognition rates of the visual common ground objects 
and of the privileged ground objects seemed similar. For response time data, ANOVA 
revealed no main effect of order, F(1, 22) = 2.110, p = .160, no main effect of probe type, 
F(1, 22) = .278, p = .603, nor interaction between order and probe type, F(1, 22) = 1.085, p = 
.309.  
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Table 6.3. Means and standard errors of participants’ accuracy and response time for each 
probe type, for the first 80 probe trials and last 80 probe trails in Experiment 9 respectively. 
 
6.3.3. Discussion 
No evidence was clearly observed to support our expectation that participants would 
show better memory for visual common ground objects compared to privileged ground 
objects. However, two non-significant trends are worth noting: first, the accuracy for visual 
common ground objects tended to be higher than the average accuracy for privileged ground 
objects, although not statistically significant; second, participants performed significantly 
worse on the last 80 probe trials than on the first 80 probe trials, and their performance on the 
first 80 probe trials revealed a tendency which was in line with our expectation. Based on 
these findings, we speculated that the duration of the memory test in Experiment 9 might 
have been too long so that participants’ performance on the last half of the memory test was 
contaminated by fatigue. Given the positive results of Experiment 8, these more modest 
effects were further investigated in a follow-up experiment. In Experiment 10, the memory 
test contained a reduced number of memory probes, but the sample size was enlarged to make 
up the shortage of data points from each participant. 
















 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
First 80 trials .637 .030 .584 .029 .957 .011 980 44 995 44 1112 70 
Last 80 trials .521 .030 .512 .032 .942 .023 962 45 929 40 997 48 
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6.4. Experiment 10 
6.4.1. Methods 
6.4.1.1. Participants 
Forty-two students (38 female, mean age 19.21, age range 18 to 22) from the University 
of Birmingham participated in this study in return for study credits. Twenty-one participants 
took the original version of the director task and correspondingly the stimulus set A of the 
memory task, the other twenty-one participants took the swapped version of the director task 
and the stimulus set B of the memory task. All participants had normal colour vision and 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual and auditory acuity. One additional participant 
participated in the study but did not complete it due to technical breakdown.  
6.4.1.2. Design and procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to that of Experiment 9 with the following 
exceptions. The length of the memory test was reduced. The memory test consisted 64 true 
probes and 32 foils. The number of true probes (including both visual common ground 
objects and privileged ground objects type) was reduced from 56 per type in Experiment 9 to 
32 per type in Experiment 10, with 2 probes of each type from each shelf image. The number 
of foils also reduced from 48 to 32.  
6.4.2. Results 
Director task 
Among the 42 participants, 1 participant committed 2 egocentric errors out of 8 critical 
instructions, 7 participants committed only 1 egocentric error each, and the other participants 
did not commit any egocentric errors. The overall accuracy rate is .973.  
Memory test 
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Ten participants whose overall accuracy in the memory test failed to be significantly 
above chance level (i.e., failed to correctly response to 57 or more probes out of 96 probes) 
were excluded from the following analysis on both accuracy and response time.  
Participants’ performances on the memory test with the stimulus set A (16 participants) 
and stimulus set B (16 participants) were analysed together.11 The means and standard errors 
of the accuracy data for each probe type were reported in Table 6.1. Paired t-test revealed no 
difference between participants’ recognition memory for linguistic common ground objects 
and their recognition memory for visual common ground objects, t(31) = .867,  p = .393, 
Cohen’s d = .147. 
For the response time analysis, only the trials to which participants responded correctly 
were included. Response times longer than 2 standard deviations from mean response time 
were excluded prior to the analysis, which caused 4.1% of the response time data from 
correctly responded trials to be dropped. No response was found to be quicker than 200ms. 
The means and standard errors of the trimmed response time data for each probe type was 
reported in Table 6.2. Paired t-test was conducted between participants’ response time for 
visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects, and no significant difference 
was observed, t(31) =1.050, p = .302, Cohen’s d = .132. 
6.4.3. Discussion 
The length of the memory test was reduced in Experiment 10 with the purpose of 
eliminating the potential fatigue effect. However, the findings from both accuracy and 
response time showed that participants were equally good at recognising the visual common 
ground objects and privileged ground objects during the memory test. No evidence was found 
                  
 
11 When a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with stimulus set as a between-subject factor 
and probe type as a within-subject factor, there was no significant effect of stimulus set, and 
no significant interaction of stimulus set x probe type. 
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to confirm the hypothesis that participants would automatically form a better memory for 
objects which were visible to the director but not verbally referenced by the director, 
compared to objects which were occluded from the director’s perspective. The implications 
of these findings and the potential limitations of the present study will be discussed with 
details in the next section.  
6.5. General discussion 
6.5.1. Summaries of Experiment 8-10 
To our knowledge, the present study was the first to examine whether the status of an 
object in a conversational partner’s perspective (i.e., common ground versus privileged 
ground) would implicitly influence participants’ memory for these objects. Three 
experiments were conducted systematically using the same paradigm. Participants first 
participated in an adapted version of the director task, during which they followed the 
director’s instructions to move some objects on a shelf. Participants then took an unexpected 
memory test with varied numbers of single recognition probes, during which they were asked 
to correctly recognise the objects which had been presented on the shelves in the previous 
director task and to correctly reject the foils. We distinguished three different types of objects 
presented on the shelf: linguistic common ground objects, visual common ground objects, 
and privileged ground objects. The present study was particularly interested in whether 
participants would automatically form stronger memory representations and, as a result, show 
better recognition memory for objects which could be seen but were not mentioned by the 
director (i.e., visual common ground objects), compared to objects which could not be seen 
by the director (i.e., privileged ground objects).  
Experiment 8 showed that participants were more accurate at recognising the linguistic 
common ground object than the visual common ground objects, and also more accurate at 
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recognising the visual common ground objects than the privileged ground objects, although 
the difference between the second pair of objects was not particularly strong. Experiment 9 
was conducted with the aim of replicating the effect (and hopefully revealing a stronger 
effect) between visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects. However, no 
statistically significant difference was found between participants’ memory for visual 
common ground objects and that for privileged ground objects. Participants performed 
significantly worse in the second half of the memory test compared to the first half of it. In 
order to ensure that the predicted effect was not hindered by fatigue, Experiment 10 was 
conducted with the length of the memory test being reduced. Findings from accuracy and 
response time showed that participants seemed to be equally good at recognising the visual 
common ground objects and the privileged ground objects. Overall, the three experiments in 
the current study failed to demonstrate stronger memory representations for visual common 
ground objects than for privileged ground objects.  
6.5.2. Implications and limitations of the current findings 
As mentioned in the introduction section, our first expectation was that participants 
would show more accurate memory for linguistic common ground objects compared to visual 
common ground objects. This expectation was confirmed by the finding from Experiment 8, 
supporting the idea that the conversational participants rely on the common ground 
representations whose nature is more likely to be ‘gradient’ and ‘rich’ rather than ‘binary’ 
and ‘one-bit’ (Brown-Schmidt, 2012). The current finding provides some preliminary 
evidence that people’s memory of common ground information is likely to be affected by 
how common ground is established. Linguistic interaction, proposed by Clark and Marshall 
(1981) as one of the three bases on which common ground is established, might have 
increased the availability of the representations of common ground information in 
participants’ memory on top of the basis of physical co-presence. However, it is also worth 
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noting that the term ‘linguistic common ground objects’ was chosen for the current study to 
contrast with the term ‘visual common ground objects’, and to correspond to the ‘linguistic 
co-presence’ and ‘visual/physical co-presence’ concepts proposed by Clark and Marshall 
(1981). Although the common ground objects verbally mentioned by the directors in the 
current experimental paradigm were termed as ‘linguistic common ground objects’, these 
objects were not just talked about, but participants also looked at them for longer than at the 
other objects, and importantly, participants also physically interacted with them. Therefore, 
apart from the extra linguistic interaction, these objects also received more visual attention 
and physical interaction, which might have also contributed to participants’ higher 
recognition rates for these ‘linguistic common ground objects’ compared to the ‘visual 
common ground objects’. It would be interesting for future studies to tease these potential 
causes apart and to further investigate the richness of common ground representations 
established via different bases or via the combination of several basis, e.g., linguistic 
interaction, physical interaction, visual attention and physical co-presence etc. For example, a 
condition where participants are merely ask to follow the director’s instructions to fixate on 
the target object without making any physical interaction could be added to the current 
paradigm to distinguish the effect of physical interaction and the effect of linguistic 
interaction on memory.   
Secondly, we expected participant to show better memory for objects in the common 
ground established by mere physical co-presence than objects in the privileged ground. We 
asked the question of whether participants would spontaneously pay more attention to 
information in common ground compared to information in privileged ground when we are 
engaged in communication. Our rationale was that if more attention was spontaneously 
assigned to common ground information compared to privileged ground information, then we 
would expect participants to show a better memory for the visual common ground objects 
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compared to privileged ground objects. However, no clear difference was found between the 
visual common ground objects and privileged ground objects, which was the main focus of 
the present study. Overall, the present study did not lend support to the idea that our attention 
and memory, which are believed to be relatively low-level domain-general cognitive 
processes, may grant common ground information a prioritised status over privileged ground 
information.  
One plausible explanation is that in every communicative situation, people do not 
necessarily and consistently pay more attention to and thus form stronger representations for 
information in common ground, compared to information in privileged ground. The way 
people assign attention to communicatively relevant information may be constrained by many 
context-specific factors, for example, the ratio between common ground information and 
privileged ground information, or people’s communicative motivation. Supportively, the eye-
tracking study reported in Chapter 2 showed that participants dwelled longer at each common 
ground object compared to each privileged ground object when there were fewer common 
ground objects on the shelf. In contrast, they dwelled longer at each privileged ground object 
than each common ground object when there were fewer privileged ground objects on the 
shelf. In the present experiments, there were always 4 objects in the privileged ground and 8 
objects in the common ground. It is possible that the unequal ratio between common ground 
information and privileged ground information may have made the privileged ground objects 
more salient than common ground objects, and may have drawn participants’ attention more 
towards privileged ground objects. One way to examine this possibility is to make the ratio 
between the number of common ground objects (including both linguistic common ground 
objects and visual common ground objects) and that of privileged ground objects equal. If 
participants start to show better memories for visual common ground objects than for 
privileged ground objects after such change, then it suggests that the lack of evidence for our 
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hypothesis from the experiments in this chapter may be due to the confounding variable of 
the ratio between common and privileged ground information.   
It is also plausible that the memory test used in the present study was unable to capture 
the effect we expected to find. In the current experiments, single recognition probes were 
used to assess participants’ memory performances. In our everyday life, however, people are 
not usually explicitly asked to recognise whether a piece of information is shared between 
themselves and their conversational partners or not in a non-communicative setting. Free 
recall tests might have some advantages over recognition tests, but it also has some 
disadvantages. For example, as suggested by Mandler, Pearlstone, & Koopmans (1969), 
recognition typically examines the availability of information, while recall examines how 
accessible it is; and free recall is generally more difficult compared to recognition. It is 
unclear how participants’ performance might be affected if a free recall task replaces the 
current recognition task. Another doubt is that, similar to recognition, people are usually not 
required to explicitly freely recall what information is shared between themselves and their 
conversational partners in the absence of any communicative cue. Perhaps a better suggestion 
would be to incorporate some communicative elements into the current memory test, so that 
the context of the memory test resembles our real-life communicative context under which 
people usually retrieve the common ground representations and privileged ground 
representations stored in memory. For example, the memory probes could occur in the 
presence of the director, as people usually retrieve relevant representations in the presence of 
a conversational partner. A further suggestion is to have memory probes presented following 
the director’s voice cues alongside the presence of the director, as previous studies have 
demonstrated that listeners use speaker’s voice as a cue to infer speaker’s identity in order to 
efficiently retrieve relevant perspective representations during language comprehension (e.g., 
Ryskin, Wang, & Brown-Schmidt, 2016). 
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Another interesting finding was that participants’ recognition rates for the visual 
common ground objects and privileged ground objects were close to chance level, while their 
accuracy rates for foils were relatively high. The high accuracy rates for foils indicate that 
participants’ close-to chance level recognition rates for the positive probes (visual common 
ground and privileged ground objects) was not due to random selection. It is plausible that 
participants might not have paid close attention to all the objects presented in the grid during 
the director task, especially for the visual common ground and privileged ground objects that 
they had not linguistically and physically interacted with. Therefore, participants might have 
been biased to mark the objects that did not appear to be adequately familiar to them as 
‘false’ in the memory test, resulting in their relatively high accuracy rates of correctly 
rejecting foils and low accuracy rates of correctly recognizing visual common ground and 
privileged ground objects. Future research could consider employing two-alternative forced-
choice memory tests rather than single recognition probes to eliminate this type of response 
bias (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). Another possible reason for this finding was that 
participants might have actively inhibited the representations of the visual common ground 
and privileged ground objects, which led to their low accuracy rates of these objects. Previous 
research has suggested that many instances of forgetting may result from active inhibitory 
processes which leads to the selective retrieval of relevant information (Anderson, 2001; 
Colzato et al., 2008), e.g., the retrieval-induced forgetting phenomenon (Anderson, Bjork, & 
Bjork, 1994). To test this explanation, future research could add a dual task condition where 
participants’ active inhibitory resources are taxed by a secondary task alongside the main 
memory test. If the low recognition rates of visual common ground and privileged ground 
objects observed in the current study were due to active inhibition, then we would expect 
improved recognition rates for visual common ground and privileged ground objects.   
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6.5.3. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current study asked a novel question of whether the feature of objects 
being in the common ground versus privileged ground affected participants’ memory for 
these objects, but the three experiments did not provide consistent evidence to answer this 
question. Nonetheless, the current study found that participants were better at recognising the 
objects in the common ground established by both linguistic and physical co-presence, 
compared with the objects in the common ground established by mere physical co-presence. 
This finding confirms that the nature of common ground representations in our everyday 
communication is likely to be graded and rich rather than binary. Future research is needed to 
examine what factors might constrain the richness of the common ground representations and 
privileged ground representations people form during communication. Additionally, it might 
be possible to explore a more suitable way to test participants’ memory in order to address 












The aim of the present thesis was to examine the interplay between memory and 
common ground, more specifically, the role of long-term memory and working memory in 
forming, retaining and using common ground representations during communication. The 
thesis addressed this research question from two different angles. Firstly, Chapters 2 and 3 
examined how participants’ ability to use common ground information in language 
comprehension was constrained by the memory demands of the tasks and memory capacities 
of participants. Secondly, Chapters 5 and 6 explored whether the effects of common ground 
could be achieved via the low-level memory-based mechanism proposed by Horton and 
Gerrig (2005a, 2005b), which was introduced in Chapter 4.  
In the following sections, I will first summarise the main empirical findings from the 
thesis. I will then critically discuss the overall findings and their theoretical implications by 
grouping evidence into two themes, i.e., the sensitivity to common ground during 
communication, and the role of memory in the use of common ground. Thirdly, I will discuss 
some future research directions opened up by the current work. Finally, I will conclude with 
the contribution of the current work to this research area.  
7.2. Summary of empirical findings 
Experiment 1 in Chapter 2 adapted a widely-used referential communication task (i.e., 
director task) to capture the memory demand of having to hold in mind someone’s 
perspective for later language comprehension. Experiment 1 also manipulated memory load 
by systematically altering the relative size of common ground versus privileged ground, as 
well as measuring individuals’ working memory capacities. With the adapted director task, 
the present study succeeded in finding distinct memory-related effects during perspective 
encoding and during the integration of perspective information with the director’s 
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instructions. First, participants’ eye-movement records during the perspective encoding phase 
were sensitive to the relative size of common versus privileged ground, and participants with 
medium and high working memory capacities showed a greater sensitivity to the relative size 
of common versus privileged ground. Second, during the integration of perspective and 
instructions, participants committed more egocentric errors as the size of the common ground 
increased. More egocentric errors were also observed among participants with low working 
memory capacities, which is consistent with the suggestion that integration of perspective and 
instructions draws heavily upon domain-general working memory resources (Lin et al., 
2010). However, these two main effects of common ground size and working memory 
capacity did not interact with each other. Therefore, I argue that it is plausible that common 
ground size and working memory capacity factors play dissociable roles in perspective 
encoding and perspective integration respectively. Common ground size might have 
influenced participants’ egocentrism via the encoding and retaining process of long-term 
memory, whereas working memory might be more heavily engaged in integrating perspective 
information with verbal messages. 
Built upon the foundations laid by Chapter 2, Chapter 3 took a developmental 
perspective to examine the relationship between memory and perspective use in school-aged 
children. As reviewed in Chapter 3, acquiring conceptual ‘theory of mind’ understanding is 
not adequate for successfully using a conversational partner’s perspective information in 
language comprehension (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000, 2003), and children’s ability to use a 
speaker’s perspective undergoes a prolonged developmental trajectory until adulthood (e.g., 
Dumontheil et al., 2010). It is therefore important to examine what memory-related factors 
affect children’s ability of using perspective in online communication, and whether the same 
factors contribute to their age-related development in perspective use. In experiments 2 and 3, 
the memory demand of holding in mind a speaker’s perspective was enforced in the hidden 
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perspective task version and was minimal in the visible perspective task version. The size of 
common ground was manipulated in two different ways in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
respectively. The two experiments examined the effects of these two memory demands on 8- 
and 10-year-old children’s perspective-taking performance during language comprehension. 
While 10-year-olds were significantly less egocentric than 8-year-olds in Experiment 2, this 
age-related improvement was marginal in Experiment 3. Both 8- and 10-year-olds committed 
more egocentric errors when they were under the enforced memory demand of holding in 
mind a speaker’s perspective than when this demand was minimal, and were more egocentric 
when they had to manage a larger amount of information in common ground. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, no clear evidence was found that these two memory factors were the 
factors that drove age-related improvement in perspective use, as no significant interaction 
was observed between age and these two memory factors in Experiment 3 (after controlling 
for a confound variable in Experiment 2).  
A series of experiments presented in Chapter 5 examined whether the change of 
conversational partners during communication would introduce an event boundary, thus 
making recently encoded objects less accessible in memory, compared to when there was no 
such change. Two different experimental paradigms were employed in Chapter 5 to seek 
evidence for this proposed low-level memory-based mechanism for partner-specific object 
representations. Experiment 4 provided evidence showing that participants’ memory for the 
recently encoded objects did become less available after experiencing a change of 
conversational change; however, Experiments 5, 6 and 7 failed to consistently replicate this 
partner-specific effect. These findings were only tentative, but they casted doubt on the idea 
of a low-level memory-based mechanism underlying common ground which was thought to 
be automatic (Horton & Gerrig, 2005a, 2005b). There is no doubt that people do form and 
retrieve common ground representations in and from memory to guide their communication. 
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However, findings from Chapter 5 suggest that this memory-based mechanism for common 
ground might not be completely automatic and stimulus-driven, but instead might be 
constrained by other social or cognitive factors, for example, the communicative relevance of 
a partner in a conversational context.  
Chapter 6 used a newly-adapted version of the director task to explore a novel 
question—whether the feature of objects being in the common ground versus privileged 
ground in a preceding discourse influenced participants’ recognition memory for these 
objects in a later unexpected memory test. If participants spontaneously paid more attention 
and thus form stronger memory representations for information in the common ground 
compared to information in the privileged ground, then they would be expected to show a 
better recognition memory for objects in the common ground. Unfortunately, Experiments 8 
to 10 failed to provide consistent evidence to support this hypothesis. One possible reason for 
this failure is that the ratio between the numbers of objects in the common ground versus 
privileged ground may have directed participants’ attention more towards objects in the 
privileged ground. However, this finding also opens up the possibility that people do not 
necessarily form and retain stronger representations for common ground compared to 
privileged ground. 
7.3. Discussion of general findings 
7.3.1. Sensitivity to common ground during communication 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the existing literature demonstrates that people do show 
sensitivity to common ground during communication. However, what remains controversial 
is the questions about when, how and to what extent people show sensitivity to common 
ground in language processing. Four different accounts regarding this debate have been 
reviewed in Chapter 1, namely, the reference diary account (Clark & Marshall, 1978), 
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perspective adjustment model (Epley, Keysar, et al., 2004; Keysar et al., 2000, 1998), 
constraint-based model (e.g., (Hanna et al., 2003), and anticipation-integration model (Barr, 
2008). In this section, I will review the present findings regarding the sensitivity to common 
ground in this thesis, discuss how the empirical findings fit with these different theoretical 
accounts, and then further propose that successful communication needs to take into account 
both common and privileged ground information.  
7.3.1.1. How the current findings fit with different accounts of common ground 
Chapters 2 and 3 examined participants’ sensitivity to common ground information from 
two aspects, i.e., their sensitivity to common ground during perspective encoding, and their 
use of common ground during perspective integration. On the one hand, chapter 2 showed 
that adult participants were sensitive to the size of common ground during perspective 
encoding. Moreover, such sensitivity to the size of common ground during perspective 
encoding was not modulated by participants’ high or low working memory capacities. This 
finding indicated that participants were aware of the need to take common ground into 
account, and were efficient at distinguishing and registering what was in common ground and 
what was in privileged ground regardless of their working memory capacities. On the other 
hand, findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggested that both adults and children had 
difficulty in using common ground information during perspective integration despite their 
awareness of the need to take common ground into account. This difficulty in the use of 
common ground was greater when there was a larger amount of common ground information. 
First, the current findings have provided some evidence which cannot be fully explained 
by the reference diary account (Clark & Marshall, 1978). The reference diary account 
suggests that in every communicative situation people search in memory for events which 
allow them to know if certain information is in common ground. According to Clark and 
colleagues, common ground serves as a primary context which is central to language, and it 
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fully constrains language comprehension by defining the relevant domain of interpretation 
(Clark, 1992; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). However, the current findings demonstrate that 
common ground did not serve as a full constraint over participants’ language comprehension, 
as participants still erroneously selected competitors in the privileged ground in the current 
experiments. Admittedly, the egocentric errors in the hidden perspective version could be due 
to memory failure rather than failure in assessing common ground, as participants memory 
for what objects were in the common ground might be erroneous. However, this memory 
failure account would have difficulty in explaining why participants still frequently made 
egocentric errors even when they were not required to remember relevant perspective 
information in mind (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Keysar et al., 2000; and also findings from 
the visible perspective version in Experiment 2&3). More importantly, the cognitive 
mechanism of the reference diary account was unspecified by Clark & Marshall (1978). 
Therefore, although the evidence observed in the current study does not necessarily rule out 
the reference diary account, it does not support the reference diary account either.  
The remaining three accounts all acknowledge that common ground does not fully 
constrain language comprehension, but the accounts differ on the view of whether common 
ground can immediately constrain language comprehension. The constraint-based account 
(Hanna et al., 2003) views language comprehension as a single, integrated, probabilistic and 
interactive process in which common ground functions as a constraint alongside other 
potential constraints. This constraint-based account suggests that common ground can 
immediately constrain language processing. The perspective adjustment account (e.g., Keysar 
et al., 2000) and anticipation-integration account (Barr, 2008) both view language 
comprehension as a two-stage process and both emphasise the role of common ground in the 
later correction phase. One difference between the perspective adjustment account and 
anticipation-integration account is that the former only recognises people’s use of common 
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ground in a late “adjustment” stage, whereas the latter not only recognises their use of 
common ground in a late “integration” stage, but also recognises their sensitivity to common 
ground in an early ‘anticipation’ stage where no perspective use is required. Another 
difference is that the former regards the egocentric effect as an adaptive strategy or default 
which is generally beneficial for social information processing, whereas the latter regards the 
egocentric effect as an autonomous activation process which is beyond control and even 
awareness (see Barr, 2008 for a more detailed comparison between these two accounts).  
The perspective adjustment account would have difficulty accounting for the finding 
that participants showed considerable sensitivity to the size of common ground during 
perspective encoding in Chapter 2. According to perspective adjustment account, people only 
show sensitivity to common ground during the later adjustment phase but not the early phase, 
which is not the case in Chapter 2. In contrast, the anticipation-integration account could 
potentially explain participants’ sensitivity to common ground during perspective encoding as 
participants anticipated referents to be from common ground, although participants in 
Chapter 2 did not show strong preference for common ground prior to perspective integration 
as observed in Barr (2008). The fact that adult participants still made egocentric errors 
despite their awareness of the need to accommodate the speaker’s limited perspective is also 
consistent with the idea from anticipation-integration account that people suffer from the 
autonomously activated interference of privileged information during the early moments of 
perspective integration. The finding that adults with higher working memory capacities made 
less egocentric errors also accords with the idea that the later correction process in which 
common ground information plays a role draws upon people’s executive functions capacities. 
People with higher working memory capacities might be more capable of correcting the 
initially activated egocentric bias.  
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Lastly, although the current findings do not directly provide evidence in favour of the 
constraint-based account, the findings do not contradict this account. The constraint-based 
account could explain the sensitivity to common ground during perspective encoding as a 
result of common ground information acting as a salient constraint before the onset of 
instructions. It could also explain the varied degree of egocentrism during perspective 
integration as a result of competition between linguistic constraints (e.g., ‘the large hat’) and 
pragmatic / perspective constraint (e.g., the fact that the largest hat is blocked from the 
director’s perspective). It is plausible that when linguistic constraints sometimes overrode 
pragmatic constraints, egocentric errors would occur. Overall, the experiments in the thesis 
have contributed some evidence to the debates on when and how people show sensitivity to 
common ground during language processing.  
7.3.1.2. Successful communication requires consideration of both common ground and 
privileged ground 
As summarised in Chapter 4, consideration of common ground is often related to the 
concepts of ‘audience design’, ‘perspective taking’ and ‘partner-specific adaptation’ in the 
existing literature. However, attention to privileged ground or the use of privileged 
knowledge is often labelled as ‘egocentrism’, ‘failure of perspective taking’ or 
‘miscommunication’. The current findings demonstrate that paying attention or showing 
sensitivity to privileged ground itself is not the same thing as ‘egocentricity’. For example, 
Chapter 2 found that over half of the participants explicitly adapted their eye-movements 
based on the relative size between common ground versus privileged ground, which suggests 
that people may choose to attend to privileged ground information in order to remind 
themselves not to move objects in privileged ground. Moreover, participants who explicitly 
reported their use of such a memory strategy and those who did not were equally good at 
using perspective information to identify the target referent. This suggested that paying more 
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attention to privileged ground information did not necessarily lead to egocentrism. Chapter 6 
further confirmed that both common ground information and privileged ground information 
received a considerable amount of attention during communication from participants who 
successfully used the director’ perspective information in most critical trials (most 
participants made no egocentric errors and only a few participants each made one egocentric 
error out of eight critical trials). Experiments in Chapter 6 provided no evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that participants’ memory traces for objects in visual common ground were 
any stronger compared to their memory traces for objects in the privileged ground. 
Altogether, the evidence from the present thesis clearly suggests that people do not only form 
common ground representations but also form privileged ground representations during 
communication, and paying attention to privileged ground does not necessarily lead to 
egocentrism. 
Successful communication requires people to distinguish shared knowledge from 
privileged knowledge and to use the appropriate set of knowledge from common ground 
or/and privileged ground, rather than merely drawing upon common ground information. 
However, most research has focused on the processes underlying the formation and use of 
common ground representations in communication, and there has not been much research 
investigating when and how people may form and use privileged ground representations in 
communication. A study by Lane et al. (2006) showed that participants did not only have 
difficulty avoiding using privileged knowledge, but that reminding oneself not to mention the 
privileged information could even make it harder to guard against giving the privileged 
information away. This study focused on people’s use of privileged knowledge, however it 
was still designed under the notion that the use of privileged knowledge should be avoided. 
Another research by Brown-Schmidt et al. (2008), which was reviewed in Chapter 4, showed 
that listeners rapidly directed their attention toward items in their privileged ground when 
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they heard instructions in the form of questions rather than of imperatives. This finding 
implies that conversational participants may interpret a speaker’s use of questions as an 
indication of the speaker’s lack of certain information, which guide their attention towards 
privileged rather than common ground information. This type of sensitivity to privileged 
ground reflects people’s understanding of others’ mental states rather than reflecting one’s 
egocentricity.  
It would be a fruitful area for future researchers to design experiments or adapt the 
existing paradigms in order to address questions regarding the formation and use of 
privileged ground representations as well as those of common ground representations. For 
example, when do people prioritise their attention to information in privileged ground over 
information in common ground, and how do people use both privileged ground 
representations and common ground representations to guide communication. 
7.3.2. The role of memory in common ground  
7.3.2.1. The role of memory in perspective taking during communication 
In Chapter 1, we reviewed the theories of the memory processes involved in language 
comprehension, e.g., working memory, long-term memory and potentially long-term working 
memory. However, as discussed in the introduction section in Chapters 2 and 3, a lot of 
research using communication tasks has examined the relationship between working memory 
and perspective taking (Cane et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2010; Nilsen & Graham, 2009; Ryskin et 
al., 2015; Wardlow, 2013), but very little is known about the role of long-term memory in 
perspective-taking processes. The experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 pioneered a way to 
incorporate the memory demand of holding in mind a speaker’s perspective into a 
communication task, and to examine how this memory retention load contribute to the use of 
online visual perspective taking. Apart from enforcing the memory load of retaining a 
speaker’s perspective for seconds, the current experiments also systematically manipulated 
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the number of common versus privileged items. Additionally, Chapter 2 measured 
individuals’ working memory capacities using the OSPAN task. In this section, I will discuss 
how these memory-related manipulations might inform us of the roles of working memory 
and long-term memory in perspective taking, and also in the development of perspective 
taking in children. 
In terms of the role of working memory, Chapter 2 provided evidence that working 
memory was heavily involved in perspective integration phase. The lower one’s working 
memory capacity, the fewer memory resources one could utilize to integrate perspective 
information into communication, and the more egocentric errors one would commit. It was 
speculated that the demand of managing an increasing common ground size might have taxed 
adult participants’ long-term memory rather than working memory.  
In order to understand the role of long-term memory in perspective taking, two questions 
are important to address: 1) if the demand of having to remember a speaker’s perspective 
prior to perspective integration had any effect on participants’ overall performance; 2) if the 
demand of having to remember a speaker’s perspective modulated the effect of the size of 
common ground on egocentrism. The first question addresses whether the longer-term 
memory encoding and retention loads affected perspective taking. The second question is 
interested in whether the effect of common ground size interacted with the effect of enforced 
encoding and retention load. An interaction would potentially indicate that the demand of 
managing an increasing size of common ground information taxed participants’ long-term 
memory resources.  
It is worth noting that Experiment 1 in Chapter 2 only employed the hidden perspective 
task version which enforced the memory load of remembering the director’s perspective, but 
had no control condition which resembled the visible perspective version in Chapter 3. 
Nonetheless, a previous study by Wang et al. (submitted), which manipulated the relative size 
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of common ground versus privileged ground in a visible perspective version of the director 
task, may be able to shed some light on these two questions. One experiment in Wang et al. 
(submitted) systematically manipulated the relative magnitude of common ground versus 
privileged ground in a classic director task by varying the number of blocked slots on the 
shelf (3, 5, 7 or 9 slots) while keeping the total number of presented objects constant as 12. 
Overall, participants committed fewer egocentric errors in Wang et al.’s study (ranging from 
2.1% to 5%) than in Chapter 2 (ranging from14.6% to 31.1% across different magnitude 
groups). More importantly, results from Wang et al.’ s study showed that the magnitude 
factor had no systematic effect on adults’ perspective taking performance in the director task. 
A summary of the findings from Wang et al. (submitted) and Experiments 1-3 of the thesis 
can be found in Table 7.1.  
The comparison between findings from Chapter 2 and findings from Wang et al. 
(submitted), while preliminary, may help us answer the two aforementioned questions for 
adult participants. 12 As to the first question, this comparison indicates that the demand of 
having to remember the director’s perspective had a detrimental effect on adult participants’ 
overall performance. The enforced memory demand made it generally more difficult to 
successfully encode, maintain or use the person’s perspective information in communication. 
The variation of this memory demand across different communicative situations could 
partially account for the variation in people’s performances of using their communicational 
partner’s perspective during language processing. Second, it seems that the size of common 
ground only affected adult participants’ egocentrism when it was necessary to hold in mind 
the speakers’ appropriate perspective information for successful language comprehension. 
                  
 
12 Please note that Wang et al. (submitted) manipulated the number of blocked slots on the 
grid, but there were some blocked slots which did not contain any object. However, 
Experiments 1-3 in this thesis all manipulated the number of objects in the privileged ground. 
Therefore, we could not conduct direct comparison between the findings from these two 
studies.  
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When the demand of having to remember the director’ perspective reduced to minimal, adults 
might be generally able to efficiently and effectively track and use the director’s perspective 
online during communication. Previous research showed that participants were efficient at 
online calculation of simple level-1 perspective which concerned whether another person 
could see a certain item or not (Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010). Such efficient 
calculation is likely to be a relevant process in solving the director task with minimal 
retention load. This finding further supports the conclusion in Chapter 2 that the size of 
common ground may have affected the rates of egocentric errors via a long-term memory 
process. Working memory capacities, on the other hand, may have directly affected the 
likelihood of successfully integrating the appropriate perspective information with the 
speaker’s message.  
Do working memory and long-term memory contribute to children’s perspective-taking 
behaviours similarly as to adults’? Chapter 3 provides direct evidence to answer the 
aforementioned two questions. Firstly, both 8- and 10-year-olds made significantly more 
egocentric errors in the hidden perspective version than in the visible perspective version. 
This finding further confirms the idea that the memory demand of remembering what the 
speaker knows, which is commonly embedded in everyday communication, constrains how 
well adults and children can use perspective information to guide communication. Secondly, 
in Chapter 3, a main effect of the size of common ground on egocentrism was observed in 
both 8- and 10-year-olds: the larger the common ground size was, the more egocentric errors 
the children made. However, no clear evidence was found that this main effect of the size of 
common ground on egocentrism interacted with the effect of task version in Experiment 3, 
after controlling for the confounding variable in Experiment 2. This result indicated that the 
size of common ground affected 8- and 10-year-olds’ degree of egocentrism even when it 
was unnecessary for them to remember the perspective information. 
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The second finding seems inconsistent with the conclusion from Chapter 2 that the size 
of common ground may have affected adult participants’ rate of egocentric errors via a long-
term memory process. One possibility is that whereas the size of common ground may have 
affected adults’ perspective use mainly via a longer term memory route, it may have also 
affected children’s perspective use via a working memory route. When under the minimal 
load of remembering the speaker’s perspective, adults may be generally able to track and also 
use the director’s perspective online during communication efficiently and effectively. 
Children may be as efficient as adults at calculating the speakers’ perspective online in the 
director task, as Surtees and Apperly (2012) found that children and adult participants were 
both efficient at calculating simple level-1 perspective which concerned whether another 
person could see a certain item or not. However, it is plausible that the demand of integrating 
an increasing size of common ground with verbal messages may considerably tax children’s 
cognitive resources (especially working memory), as their executive functions are still 
developing and their social experience is rather limited. One way to test this possibility is to 
add the measurement for children’s working memory capacities (e.g., OSPAN task) into the 
current developmental experiments, and examine whether ANOVA with working memory 
capacities and the size of common ground as two factors would reveal a significant 
interaction. If working memory capacity modulates the effect of common ground size on 
children’s rates of egocentrism, then this possibility can be confirmed.   
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Table 7.1. A summary of the findings from Wang et al (submitted), Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
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Overall, the present thesis proposes that working memory may be important for 
integrating common ground information with the speaker’s current utterance over short 
periods of time and with a storage capacity limit of just a small number of items. In contrast, 
long-term memory may be the main resource for retaining common ground information over 
an extended discourse. This idea is consistent with the literature on the memory process 
involved in text comprehension, which was reviewed in Chapter 1 (Ericsson & Kintsch, 
1995; Graesser et al., 1997). 
7.3.2.2. The low-level memory-based mechanism for common ground 
The traditional view of common ground by Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981) suggests 
that individuals mark their memory for an event with information about who is present during 
the event. They also explicitly search in their memory for signs of co-presence to assess 
whether a piece of information is shared with someone. Horton and Gerrig (2005a, 2005b) 
have developed their theory on the foundation of this traditional view that common ground 
information is represented in long-term episodic memory. They further propose that under 
some situations people may rely on an automatic associative memory mechanism to 
efficiently retrieve and use common ground information during communication, without 
necessarily employing an explicit process to determine mutual knowledge which calls upon 
higher-order mindreading abilities. This low-level memory-based approach did not rule out 
the route of explicit mentalising to common ground, but it offers an alternative way of how 
the effects of common ground might be achieved with the support of a domain-general 
memory process, corresponding the ‘submentalising’ concept proposed by Heyes (2014),  
Chapters 5 and 6 examined whether a change of conversational partners (Chapter 5) and 
the ground status of an object in a conversational partner’s perspective (Chapter 6) would 
affect participants’ memory for objects in a relatively automatic way. The results from 
Chapters 5 and 6 failed to show effects which could support the account of the low-level 
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memory mechanism of common ground. While acknowledging the potential limitations of 
the current experimental designs (which have been discussed in sections 5.8 and 6.5 of this 
thesis), this failure to find predicted effects warrants some cautious discussion of the 
possibility that the memory-based mechanisms underlying the effects of common ground 
may not be completely automatic. A review paper by Brown-Schmidt et al. (2015) suggests 
that the formation of common ground representations may be constrained by cognitive factors 
(e.g., attention, memory) and contextual factors (e.g., communicative relevance). A further 
speculation is that the retrieval of common ground representations in communicative 
situations may also be constrained by these cognitive and contextual factors, and also social 
factors (e.g., moods, motivations, goals). It is undeniable that our memory for objects could 
be influenced by the presence/absence of someone whom those objects are associated with, 
and by whether the object is visible or invisible from someone’s perspectives, but what 
remains unclear is under what circumstances these influences might occur. The suggestion of 
an automatic memory-based mechanism of common ground needs further careful 
investigation.  
7.4. Future directions 
There are a number of ways in which the current work can be developed in further 
research. First, it would be informative to conduct an eye-tracking version of Experiment 3 
with children. The application of eye-tracking technique on children will allow us to develop 
a better understanding of the time course of children’s sensitivity to common ground during 
perspective encoding and perspective integration. It would be particularly interesting to 
examine whether children in the hidden perspective version would show a similar pattern of 
eye movements during the perspective encoding phase as adults did in Chapter 2. If yes, then 
it would indicate that children are also sensitive to common ground from as early as the 
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perspective encoding phase, and that children are efficient enough at encoding common 
ground and privileged ground information. It would also be interesting to examine whether 
children would show different patterns of eye movements in the visible perspective version 
and the hidden perspective version. The application of eye-tracking method on children 
would help develop a full picture of how children infer and use common ground information 
in different sub-processes of perspective taking. It will also help draw similarities and 
contrasts between the time courses by which common ground is incorporated in 
communication in adults and in children.  
Second, compared to applying eye-tracking methods on both adults and children, a 
potentially cheaper and less time-consuming way is to use mouse-tracking or motion-tracking 
instead. The mouse tracking method has been proven to be useful in studying how people 
track their own and others’ beliefs in recent theory of mind literature (e.g., van der Wel, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014). During the testing phase of the current experiments in Chapters 2 
and 3, it was interesting to observe that participants, especially children, often approached a 
distractor in the privileged ground at the beginning, but then stopped half way and managed 
to reach towards the target referent in the common ground at the last moment. The trajectory 
of this ‘half-movement’ has the potential to offer a continuous measure of participants’ 
degree of egocentrism, and may reveal some interesting findings which have been missed in 
the current results.  
Third, in Chapters 2 and 3 where the role of memory in perspective taking was 
examined, the memory demands of the director task was primarily manipulated, whereas the 
measure of individual differences in working memory capacity is only limited to the use of 
OSPAN task on adults. OSPAN task is generally believed as a reliable and valid measure of 
working memory capacity that correlates to a wide variety of other cognitive tasks (e.g., 
Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Unsworth & Engle, 2007; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, 
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Broadway, & Engle, 2009). However, future research should extend its focus from working 
memory solely to other memory processes as well, e.g., long-term memory. An improvement 
could be made to the current design by using a battery of memory tasks (including working 
memory tasks and also long term memory tasks) to test both adults and children’s individual 
differences in different aspects of memory processes, and to examine how each aspect of 
memory processes is involved in different sub-processes of perspective taking. The present 
findings from Chapter 2 imply that long-term memory and working memory might play 
dissociable roles in perspective encoding and perspective integration respectively. By adding 
the individual difference measure on longer term memory (e.g., cued recall test), future 
research can examine whether one’s long-term memory capacity affects their perspective-
taking performance under the enforced memory load of remembering a speaker’s perspective. 
It can also examine whether the effect of the size of common ground interacts with the effect 
of long-term memory capacities on adults’ degree of egocentrism.  
Fourth, another important avenue is to delineate the nature of the common ground 
representations established via different ways. As reviewed in Chapter 1, common ground 
can be established physically, linguistically, or culturally (Clark & Marshall, 1978, 1981). 
Some researchers propose that the nature of common ground representation can be simply 
one-bit and binary—either in common ground or in privileged ground (Brennan & Hanna, 
2009; Galati & Brennan, 2010). In contrast, Brown-Schmidt (2012) argues that common 
ground representations are likely to be gradient and rich. The present findings from 
Experiment 8 indicate that the richness and strength of common ground representations in 
memory can be influenced by how common ground is established, thus providing some 
evidence in support of Brown-Schmidt (2012)’s suggestion. However, most existing studies 
on perspective taking and common ground have only manipulated the status of common 
ground as a simple binary feature, and such binary nature has usually been established by 
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only one single manipulation which is most likely to be visual / physical co-presence (e.g., 
the director task). In contrast, in our everyday life, we talk about the items which we are 
looking at, we direct other people’s attention to the items we are talking about, we judge each 
other’s communality membership by the things we read or talk about, and we use our culture 
knowledge to help us understand the things we talk about. The three bases of common 
ground, i.e., physical co-presence, linguistic co-presence and culture co-presence, hugely 
interact with each other. Future research could be done to examine how these different routes 
interplay with each other to shape the representations of common ground. I speculate that the 
representations of common ground established by a combination of more than one type of co-
presence would be stronger and richer than the representations of common ground established 
by a single type of co-presence. 
Lastly, another avenue for future research is to use a more interactive communication 
task and to examine the role of memory in common ground during both language 
comprehension and language production. Communication is a two-way interaction during 
which conversational participants take turns to be speakers and listeners, and it involves both 
language comprehension and language production. During such an everyday interactive 
communication, speakers and listeners also give feedback to each other’s messages or 
interpretations, and also make adaptations to language comprehension and production 
accordingly. However, most studies examine either language comprehension or production in 
a one-way manner where speakers are always speakers and listeners are always listeners. 
Taking such an isolated approach to studying communication would reduce participants’ 
motivation to take their conversational partner’s perspective into account. (e.g., Yoon, Koh, 
& Brown-Schmidt, 2012). Additionally, memory might play different roles in the use of 
common ground during language comprehension versus language production. For example, 
research showed that speakers tended to have better memory for the content of a conversation 
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than listeners (e.g., Yoon, Benjamin, & Brown-Schmidt, 2016). It is, therefore, important to 
study the role of memory in perspective taking during both language comprehension and 
language production in order to develop a full picture of this research question. One 
straightforward step following this thesis is to operationalise a way to incorporate the demand 
of remembering a listener’s perspective and the demand of managing increasing common 
ground size into a language production task and to examine the effect of these memory-
related factors on language production. For example, a previous study found that 4-year-old 
children tended to produce more complex expressions to listens when the object array size 
was larger in a referential communication task, compared to when there were fewer 
distractors in visual scenes (Matthews et al., 2012). Future research could further investigate 
how common ground size might affect both adults and children’ perspective-taking 
performance in language production when they are under the memory demand of 
remembering a listener’s perspective. A more advanced step could be to study how 
conversational participants use the perspective information they have previously encoded in 
memory in an interactive communicative scenario, where a single participant plays both the 
role of a listener and a speaker at various points.   
7.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the current thesis examined the role of memory involved in encoding, 
retaining and using common ground information shared between conversational participants 
during communication. This thesis converges on many areas, including attention, memory, 
social cognition, developmental psychology and psycholinguistics. Ten experiments 
presented across four empirical chapters in this thesis address the two main research 
questions proposed at the outset. One question is how memory constrains both adults’ and 8- 
and 10-year old children’s abilities to use a speaker’s perspective information during 
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language comprehension. The current work in Chapters 2 and 3 highlights the role of both 
working memory and long-term memory in perspective use. The other questions is whether 
the effects of common ground can be established with the support of a low-level memory-
based mechanism, without necessarily going through high-level mindreading inference. The 
current work in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that the memory-based mechanisms underlying the 
effects of common ground may be constrained by cognitive factors (e.g., attention, memory) 
and contextual factors (e.g., communicative relevance). I hope the methodologies and 
findings in this thesis will open up new avenues for future investigation on the role of 
memory underlying the effects of common ground during communication from different 
research angles and on different subject groups, in order to develop a full picture of how 
memory constraints and supports the use of common ground in our everyday communication.   
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